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FOREWORD
This meeting is on a subject about which I confess to have strong
feelings. Since World War II, the problem of divided nations has been
causing the United States a lot of trouble in every part of the world.
The United States not only participated in two wars in Korea and
Vietnam, which were dual-system nations, but paid a high price in
blood and money for its involvement.
The Vietnam solution was clearly not a very satisfactory one for
the United States or for the Vietnamese people. The Korean solution
was a truce, not a final settlement. We have yet to find a way to unify
the two systems into one national entity by peaceful means.
Germany is a model by which to compare the other cases,
particularly the China case, one of the most difficult and intransigent
examples of conflict between two governments and two social
systems. Germany appears at present to be a reasonably successful
compromise, whereby the two German governments live side by side
at peace and have substantial interchange of trade and visitors. A
question with which we should deal is how permanently successful
that compromise is likely to be and what promise the German model
offers in some adaptable form for Korea or for China.
I have just returned from a trip to the Soviet Union. The Soviet
specialists were talking about these very problems. The idea of
peaceful exchanges of persons and goods between the two Koreas
seemed to interest officials and scholars in Moscow. East Germany
still concerns the Soviet Union very much, particularly as it relates
to the situation in Poland, since the lines of communication to East
Germany through Poland are a very important strategic asset for the
Soviet Union. If peaceful relations between East and West Germany
broke down, the situation in Poland would be more acute, and indeed
tension would rise throughout Europe.
It can be seen that these issues are dynamic. They require much
elucidation, and that is what we hope to achieve here in these
discussions.

RayS. Cline
December 1, 1981
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PREFACE
The Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies
and the University of Maryland School of Law were delighted to
co-sponsor this Conference on Multi-System Nations and International Law, held at the International Club Building in Washington, D.C.
on June 23, 1981. This distinguished gathering of worldwide
specialists on international law and political science presented a vast.
amount of information and a wide range of perspectives on the topic
at hand, within the period of a single day. Limitations of space made
it possible for only a select group of government officials, academicians, business representatives and journalists to attend the conference, but the enthusiastic response of those present clearly indicated
that the results wou.ld be of interest and use to a far greater audience.
In order to ensure that the conference proceedings gain the widest
exposure and greatest utility possible among scholars, legalists,
foreign policy specialists and others, we have agreed through joint
effort to produce this publication of conference papers and oral
summaries for general distribution.
Despite primary attention devoted to the international legal
aspects associated with multi-system societies, a consensus of opinion
quickly emerged on the fact that legal systems do not exist in an
abstract context. To the contrary, a recurrent theme throughout this
conference was the inescapable interaction of law and political reality
in dealing with multi-system nations. And, quite apart from functioning in a political vacuum, the divided nations themselves are
confronted with the reality of involvement by, and strategic competition among, external global powers. Experience demonstrates that
these factors, in many cases, act as a "stumbling block" to unification
or as a preservative of status quo fragmentation.
Beyond these points, however, wide variation exists in the
separate experiences of Germany, Korea and China in the international system of the twentieth century. The conferees made an
admirable presentation of comparisons and contrasts between those
experiences, and of their own unique perspectives on the potential
evolution of these multi-system societies.
Our thanks go to all of those who participated in this conference,
and to the American Society of International Law for its active
interest in the event. Professor chiu would like to thank David
Simon, David Salem and Lyushum Shen for their assistance in the
course of editing the manuscript for publication.
Robert L. Downen
Director of Pacific Basin
Studies, CSIS
Georgetown University

Hungdah Chiu
Professor of International Law
University of Maryland School
of Law

December 1, 1981

ii

INTRODUCTION
John Morton Moore
In exammmg the subject of multi-system nations from the
standpoint of international law, two central issues emerge. One is
conflict management and the second is self-determination.
In the last 2,000 years, we have tended to create institutions
which were rather effective at stopping the previous war. Because it
was assumed that World War I was an accident- the result of a
diplomatic system gone awry- the League of Nations system was
designed to eliminate war by accident. The U.N. Charter deals with
war by aggression across clear international boundaries, primarily in
response to World War II. The East-West split, however, has curbed
the effectiveness of that system.
At present there are two fundamental challenges to the U.N.
Charter: nuclear weaponry (and the resultant need to maintain a
strategic balance), and the mixed civil-international setting. The
latter is the principle realized form of conflict in the international
system (along with its associated terrorism).
The most dangerous and central of these mixed civilinternational settings is the multi-system nation. Two examples of
U.S. involvement in this area are the conflicts in Korea and
Indochina. From these two conflicts, it can be seen that the United
States must make it abundantly clear that Article 2, subparagraph 4
of the U.N. Charter (the prohibition of force as a modality of major
change) must apply between the entities in a multi-system nation.
This principle should apply in conflict management no matter what
characterization any side wishes to give either entity. A Major
question to be addressed at this Conference should be the following:
What might U.S. policy do in areas where this principle is not clear
in order to make it so?
The other central issue which arises in the examination of the
multi-system nation phenomenon is self-determination. In examining
this matter, does one look to aspirations for unification, or to
aspirations for separate national identity? The basic question, at any
rate, is how does self-determination apply in the multi-system nation
setting? It is to be hoped that this Conference will make a major
contribution in both areas.
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Chapter 1
ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF
PARTITIONED NATIONS: THEORIES
AND FINDINGS
Ray E. Johnston
Introduction
It is an ironic fact that in this age of widespread political
partition so little is known about the empirical processes by which
nations are divided and partitioned. Few efforts have been made to
isolate partition as an empirical phenomenon and explain its causes
and effects. Even more ironic, political partition is one of man's most
frequently used conflict-resolution devices. Partition is used to
settle cases of both civil war and international war as well as less
rancorous disputes among domestic interests and communal factions.
Still more ironic is the fact that partition tends also to cause disputes
and may well be the cause of the final dispute. Other ironies can also
be found. In this age of internationalism and interdependence of
nation-states, political partition and division are more extensive and
intensive than at any other time in human history. While international integration is being touted as a solution to the historical
conflicts of Europe, pan-Africanism in the post World War II years
has failed to overcome the parochial claims and counterclaims of
nationalism based on older colonial boundaries and partitions.
Paradoxically, as political empires wane, economic empires of the
multinational corporations find rampant nationalism a natural
milieu within which to build new imperial powers based on control of
complex technological capital and concomitant natural resources.
There is no magic in "unification" and "reunification" - in that
direction also lies conflicts and human disaster. A single world
governrrwmt, in this year of cold war escalation and runaway defense
budgets, appears more and more utopian. In assessing the international status of multi-system nations - partitioned nations, perhaps
the best one can do is an attempt to develop strategies to aid the parts
to peacefully co-exist, recognizing the legitimacy of each while
(1)
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developing a new international integration of the divided units.
Almost twenty years ago Sulzberger made a similiar call:
Partition is this century's awkward form of compromise and we
have seen Ireland, Korea, VietNam and Germany divided with
each segment claiming the national name. Is the day coming
when Russia will call East Germany Prussia, when Jordan calls
itself Palestine, when South and North Vietnam resume their
former titles, respectively Annam and Tonkin? Could that
facilitate de facto acknowledgment of these unhappy separations?
Such changes need not end the dream of unification. Would they
imply a new political epoch has begun or facilitate new
approaches to old problems that old approaches could not solve?'

A Caveat: In our search to understand and evaluate or determine the
international status of divided, partitioned, or multi-system nations,
we should not restrict ourselves to the more dramatic and politically
volatile cases of nations such as Germany and Korea. What is needed
by the social scientist and the statesman alike is a theory of the
causes and effects of political partition and political integration of
systems at various levels of political organization. Our theory should,
at a minimum, explain the divisions of such entities as Cyprus and
The Samoan Islands on the one hand and the creation of Singapore or
the division of Pakistan on the other hand. I have argued below and
in other writings that a general theory of partition would explain the
divisions of metropolitan areas and nation-states alike. While bold,
the call is not unreasonable.
F11pm this caveat, I can turn to a general summary of the purposes
of this paper. While I had several research goals in mind, the central
purpose was to present some general conceptual tools and
frameworks to be used in assessing the international legal status of
"multi-system nations" or, as defined herein, partitioned nations. The
significance of the problem is indicated by a presentation of the
extensiveness of partition and division in the world today. Following
this survey of the divisions of the contemporary world I have
presented a logical, or, if you will, an epistemological analysis of the
concepts of "dual-system" and "multi-system nations". This analysis
aids in focusing attention upon the unit of analysis to be treated as a

1. L. Sulzberger, "New Labels for a New Era," The New York Times. February
17. 1964.
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partitioned nation and whose status is to be assessed. In addition to
the exploration of several approaches to the problem, I present a
historically derived typology of partition and offer some new concepts,
however incomplete, on sovereignty disputes, durability of partitions
and boundary disputes. The paper concludes with an application of an
integration framework to assess the international and sovereignty
status of Taiwan.
THE EXTENSIVENESS OF PARTITION
Eight years ago (1973) when I wrote that the phenomenon of
political partition enjoys a broad contemporary scope and lengthy
historical lineage, the United Nations listed some 135 nation-states
and a dozen or so trade blocs and treaty organizations. 2 Since that
time, the globe, including the seas and oceans, has been further
partitioned and bounded. The recorded increase in the number of
nation-states is at a rate of about 2.4 percent per year. Over the 8
years, this represents a 19.4 percent increase in the number of
nation-states; which are now counted at 161. These increases may be
slightly misleading. They do not represent an increase in the absolute
number of partitions in the world. This holds since most of the new
nation-states moved from other forms of territorial status to the
sovereign state status. What this movement may well suggest is that
nationalism and the potential for partition are not waning; if
anything, both potentials appear to be increasing. 3
The extensiveness of partition is also illustrated by sovereign
claims over both polar caps and the seas and oceans of the world. The
North Pole is still disputed, with Russia, Norway and Iceland
debating different techniques and theories of claiming sovereign
status over the pole. The status of Antarctica is disputed with the
United States refusing to recognize any claims of sovereignty. No less
than seven states claim Antarctica. Australia, Belgium, Chile
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of South Africa
and the Soviet Union have all made various claims to Antarctica, and

2. Information Please Almanac 1981 Atlas And Yearbook <New York; Simon and
Schuster, 19811.
3. Ray E. Johnston, "Partition as a Political Instrument". 27 J. cw INTI.. AvvAms
159-74 <No.2, 19731.
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all have signed a treaty in 1959 which neutralized the polar
continent. 4
However claims of sovereignty persist through increasing claims
being made over the ocean. In 1950 five per cent of the world's
sixty-two coastal states claimed territorial seas 12 nautical miles
wide. In 1977, the figure had risen to 45 percent with about 7.6
percent of the total area of the oceans so claimed. According to the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) every state has the
right to establish a territorial sea not in excess of 12 miles; in 1977
twelve different widths were claimed by 123 countries. 5 The status of
the oceans and seas continues to be disputed. The United Nations is
attempting to provide the legal basis for a variety of statuses, but
"there are still deep divisions separating the positions of important
states and major groups of states on fundamental issues."
Some years ago, Jean Gottman, provided an appropriate view of
the extensiveness and endurance of the proclivity to partition the
world.
"Our political world is a limited one: it extends only -over the
space accessible to men. Accessibility is the determining factor:
areas to which men have no access do not have any political
standing or problems. The sovereignty of the moon has no
importance today [1952- how quickly history moves.], because
men cannot reach it nor obtain anything from it. The antarctic
had no political standing before navigators began going there,
but since it was made accessible by its discoverers, the icy
continent has been divided into portions like an apple pie - and
all these portions are distinct political compartments in which a
•
number of international incidents have occurred. When the first
explorers land on the moon (The American flag is now unfurled
thereon) the earth's satellite will pass from the field of astronomy
to geography textbook and lunar political problems will appear
and grow steadily. As, with improved techniques, men got within
their reach the riches of the ocean's depth beyond territorial
waters, the sovereignty and legislation of these abyssnal spaces
became a matter of concern for political authorities. . . ."6
4. Harm J. de Blij, Systematic Political Geography, !New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 19731 p. 127 ff. See also Norman J. G. I'ounds, Political Geography !New
York: McGraw-Hill second edition 19721, pp. 101-121.
5. J.R.V. Prescott, Boundaries And Frontiers. !London: Croom Helm ltd., 19781,
p. 136.
6. Jean Gottman, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at
Analysis", 4 WoRLD PoLITICS, (No. 4, 19521, p. 513.
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There is no better conclusion to a section dealing with the extensiveness of political partitions.

A HIERARCHY OF DIVISION
By 1981 there were an estimated 4,362 million people worldwide
living in tens of thousands of local administrative and communal
units, which are in turn part of 161 sovereign states and 57 "related
territories." These states and territories are in turn represented by,
are members of, or are constrained by regional and international
economic, political and defensive organizations. Most of these organizations from the sub-state level to the international level are
geographically based. Some have no territorial base and are functionally differentiated as to tasks they perform. Such an example is
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank). At the top of the hierarchy is the United Nations which is the
only multi-purpose and almost universally represented world organization. With the exception of the highest level, there has been an
increasing number of divisions at all the lower levels. This hierarchy
is shown in the table below:

Table 1: A Hierarchy of Local and World Organizations Partitioning of the Globe by
Type and Name of Organizations: Number of divisions increase as the levels
of universality are lowered.
LEVEL IV: The United Nations
LEVEL III: Economic Partitions

Political Partitions

Defensive
Partitions
NATO, WTO
ANZUS

EEC, BENELUX,ECSC, OAS, OAU, ARAB
IMF, COMECON, EFTA, LEAGUE CENTO
CARIFTA, ASEAN
OPEC, ECOWAS, BRIT·
ISH COMMONWEALTH
OECD, IBRD.
LEVEL II: 161 Sovereign Nation-States and 57 related Territories LEVEL 1:
Subnational and Territorial divisions, administrative units, communal units, chartered, and unincorporated areas and peoples. These units number in the tens of
thousands, most of which divide people by functional and geographical criteria. This
table is not exhaustive but does include most major divisions.

6
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In the progression from the higher to lower levels of partitions
there is a diminution in (a) geographical territory subsumed, (b)
population size, and (c) range of responsibilities and powers. However, with the progression from the higher to lower levels there is an
increase in the level of value consensus, communal integration,
leadership integration, individual participation and access to functions. The functions and powers at the lower levels tend to be much
more specific and concrete in terms of everyday life. Almost any state
or territory at level II provides an example of the subnational
divisions. I have selected the French Government Areas of 1968 for
this paper simply because of the availability of data:
Table 2: The Hierarchy of French Government Areas in 1968
Name of Unit type
Department
Arrondissement
Canton
Commune

Number of Units

Average Area
(square Kml

95
322
3209
37,708

5804.7
1712.5
171.9
14.5

Source: THE STATESMENT'S YEARBOOK 1973, <MacMillan Co., London!, p. 4.

Subnational partitions frequently occur for many of the same
reasons which nations and surpanational regions and functions are
divided and partitioned. One primary reason is the search for the
"consensual community." Both leaders and followers in partition
movements hold the notion that separation of a group from the larger
society will produce an almost utopian community of similar people
who share similar ideas and actions. Another reason for subnational
partition is conflict resolution and conflict management. For example, even administrative units such as Michigan's Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) are divided into several geographical
regions. The policies and decisions made for each region affect very
different kinds of people. The northern Michigander is a rural
oriented person, a conservationist who is less likely to advocate
metropolitan beaches and parks than the southern, urbanized
Michigander. The department's regional boundaries reflect these
potential conflicts of interest in the state's population. Still another
reason for sub-national partition is the search for economic and
political advantage. Thus many new sub-divisions, incorporated
townships, and water and sewage districts are founded for almost

INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF PARTITIONED NATIONS
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entrepreneurial concerns. They take on the form of an investment
group or elite in search of a mass clientele. As Daniel Elizar reports,
other reasons for sub-national partition are size and population
diffusion, place of living and occupation, administrative effectiveness
and efficiency. 7
The statuses of partitions about which we are concerned are
those at the national and supranational levels. Subnational divisions
and partitions (while frequently of questionable status) are determined by the law and customs of the state. No matter what the basis
of the status of a particular partition is in national and international
law, few if any are maintained by accident; therefore, if we are to
understand their status we must understand why they are created
and maintained.
CONCEPTS OF DUAL-OR MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS
AND POLITICAL PARTITION
If by political division one means factions and sub-units, all
nations are divided. The study of the politics of divided nations, by
such a definition, would take in the entire universe. Hence, in the
desire to narrow our focus, the introduction of terms like "dualsystem nations" and "multi-system nations" will certainly improve
our science if, in fact, the concepts carried by such terms are clearly
specified and possess explanatory power. These two terms immediately beg the questions of defining what is meant by system and what is
meant by nation. My understanding is that the term "system" is used
to describe the existence of a governmental regime claiming autonomy and legitimate authority over both a people and a geographical
territory. The term "nation", from the writings so far presented to
me, is a little more mystical. I take it that scholars like Yung Wei
really refer to the Chinese people in using the term. However, they
never really specify which people are Chinese and which are Tibetan,
which are Mongolian, which are Burmese and so on. Nation is a word
that is all encompassing or all excluding and is used to include those
who are "in" and exclude those who are "out" of political favor.
Political geographers like Roger Kasperson and Julian Minghi fare a
little better in defining nation as a racial, ethnic, linguistic, and

7. Daniel J. Elizar, American Federalism; A View From The States. !New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19661, pp. 130-40.
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cultural group of people marked by feelings of kinship, of belonging
together, of being a culturally common kind ofpeople. 8 While this is a
little more specific it leaves us with no clear and exclusive rationale
to go from the concept to empirical measurement.
Despite these conceptual shortcomings, I will attempt an approximation of the meaning of a dual-system and a multi-system nation.
"Such a nation is, evidently, one in which two or more governments
claim to represent the entire national grouping." With the exception
of Korea (North and South), there is perhaps no such system on
earth. None of the three Chinese governments claims autonomy over,
or guardianship of, all Chinese people. Nor do the German or Dublin
governments make such claims, and so we could enumerate some 35
or more cases of recently divided or partitioned nations. 9
Still another way to use the terms is as descriptions of the
situation of two or more competing regimes, both claiming sovereignty over the same people and territory and both having effective
control over some part of the people and territory. As rare as this
situation is, it appears to exist in areas such as Korea, Germany and
China/Taiwan. As descriptive terms of real situations our concepts of
dual-system and multi-system nations lose their theoretical universality, but gain in unique empirical application. As such we could call
the dual-system nation one in which two regimes have risen having
some control over territory and people with at least one of the
regimes claiming legitimate right to represent the whole. This sounds
similar to the case of East and West Germany today. A multi-system
nation would be similarly defined to describe a situation in which two
or more regimes have arisen with at least one claiming to be the
legitimate government of the whole. Again, however, we have to
question the scientific value of such conceptual labors. Since the ideas
describe unique historical events they contribute little to scientific
knowledge or to theories of political cleavage, division and partition
of nations. 10
8. Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi, The Structure Of Political
Geography, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 40-41 and passim.
9. I am currently updating Norman J. G. Pound's "History and Geography: A
Perspective on Partition", 18 J. OF INT'L AFFAIRS <No.2, 1964), pp., 161-172, where he
notes 25 to 35 cases of partition. The three Chinese governments are Peking, Taiwan,
and Singapore.
10. Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A
Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches", A paper prepared
for and delivered at Symposium on Functional Integration and Divided Nations, Seoul.
Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980, reprinted in Chapter III of this book.
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The realities of the world are such that China has two
governments claiming the legitimate right to rule a specified people
and territory. Both governments have legitimacy within part of that
territory and control of part of the population. Within the parts more
or less separate systems of leadership, administration, economics and
social-cultural life have come about. In Germany, again, two separate
entities have occurred, with two separate and differing economies,
cultures and social patterns. One government - East Germany still claims in its party dogma to represent the whole. However, both
parts have recognized the right of the other and have entered into
agreements of co-existence. New states are rising from the old; it is
still possible to tear these new German states down, to reamalgamate, but the costs would undoubtedly run into hundreds of
thousands of lives. What we are dealing with are political cleavages,
divisions and partitions. Whether we call them dual-system or
multi-system nations doesn't alter that fact. We need to recognize
how these cleavages, divisions and partitions come about, how they
are maintained, and how they evolve toward new integrations or
toward violent forms of conflict and destruction.
Before turning to concepts of cleavage and partition, I want to
note that the idea of multi-state nations has become quite popular
with the increased interest generated in the area of minority group
politics, ethno-nationalism and human rights. The idea of the
multi-state nation is well exemplified by the Kurds and Albanians.
Both groups are more or less identified with a specific geographical
region; each group also has its own habits, cultures, language,
historical identifications and communal identifications. However,
each group finds itself controlled by more than one sovereign
nation-state system. The Albanians find the majority of their
population claimed as citizens of both Albania and Yugoslavia. The
Kurds live in Southeastern Turkey, Northern Iraq, Northwestern
Iran and part of Russia. This territory is more or less contiguous and
forms what is once known as Kurdistan. Such a multi-state nation
may provide the basis for political division and partition. During the
recent "hostage crisis in Iran" speculation that Iran would be divided
along these old Kurdistan national-ethnic lines was rampant in both
the popular press and in folk knowledge. Speculation along these
lines has resumed since the ouster of Bani Sadr in the summer of
1981.
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Given the definition of a dual-system or multi-system nation to
be one in which two or more regimes have gained legitimacy and
control over part with at least one making claims over the whole, and
the above definition of multi-state nation, we can see that both are
closely related to the problems of division and cleavage. Both
situations lead to lasting partition and the emergence of new states
out of the old. Both can lead to peaceful integrations. These outcomes
depend upon a host of domestic and international factors, among
which is the legal and international status of the different systems.
An assessment of the international status of such systems may
be provided by theoretical concepts developed for the study of divided
nations and political partition. 11 My purpose here is not to re-develop
a set of concepts and theoretical propositions; but, rather to present
enough theory to enable us to say something about the current status
of the so called multi-system nations or dual-system nations. I
assume that by knowing what is meant by political cleavages,
political partition and political division, we can at least assess the
cases - Germany, Korea, and China/Taiwan - in terms of these
statuses.
I have already written that a useful approach to the study of
divided nations is to develop a universal theory or general theory of
political partition such that it covers the phenomenon no matter
where it occurs. Hence, a useful concept of political partition must be
broad enough to enable the researcher to isolate the phenomenon and
to differentiate it from other genre of political fragmentation. The
concept and related theoretical framework must also apply to
different levels of the political system, the sub-national, the national
and the international. With these requirements in mind, I offer a few
definitions and attempt to apply them to an assessment of the
Republic of China on Taiwan. Political Partition is a legal, political
and behavioral process as opposed to a decision by which apgroup of
people advocate disassociation from other groups and from the
structural relationships within a particular society. This definition of
partition is very close to the one offered some years earlier by
Norman J. C. Pounds:
"Political partition is the division of a state so that it loses its
identity or even disappears from the political map; or, the

11. See supra, note 6.
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creation of two or more systems within a territory which had
previously been subject to only one system." 12
While I have discussed the process of partition at length in earlier
writings, what I clearly want to suggest her.e is that partition is a
phenomenological process through which a people draw apart and
attempt to succeed in divorcing themselves from the problems and
concerns of the "host society." This process generally begins with
political cleavages and culminates in the decision to divide the group
geographically by political boundaries. This is not an inevitable
process since cleavages can lead to all sorts of other outcomes.
However, the meanings of both cleavage and division are different
from, and exclusive of, political partition.'3
In system analysis terminology, political partition is accompanied by a disjuncture of both functionally-universal and functionallyspecific relationships. With partition, two or more independent sets of
relationships, along with the accompanying structures, are established. The number of sets of course depend upon the number new
political systems which have risen from the old system. This
proposition of disjuncture of relationships provides an operational
rationale to empirical measurement.
Political partition is, at the national and international levels,
also accompanied by leadership demands for autonomy over the life
fate of the seceding group. Where such demands of autonomy are
made early in the process, political partition takes on the form of a
nationalistic movement. Equally important is the fact that the
demand for autonomy to guide the life fate of the group provides
much of the political content of the partition process. The legal
content is the claim for legal autonomy and a disjuncture of the old
legal system. The establishment of a separate government and set of
laws and judicial practices, and the search for and obtaining of
recognition as a member of the community of sovereign states
provides much of the legal content of political partition. The
international legal content, in addition to the search for recognition
as a state, is decided by treaties, trade agreements, contracts to buy
and sell and obligations resulting from the decisions of foreign,
domestic and international tribunals and courts of adjudication.

12. Pounds, "Perspective on Partition," supra, 9, p. 162.
13. See supra, note 6, pp. 159-74.
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For the purposes of this paper, division and political division
remain relatively primitive terms denoting a final decision to bound
or "differentiate" a group, role structure, process, or territory. Thus,
all sorts of boundaries are referred to as divisions including
boundaries internally and externally derived resulting in political
partition. Divisions may be either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal
divisions layer society into strata of various types ranging from caste
and class systems to, say, managerial line systems. Vertical divisions
cut up the landscape or separate groups into different stratified
systems such as the division of the federal systems into separate
states. Political division generally carries a specification of a
boundary line. The boundary is legal in character.
Again, what I want to emphasize is that the decision to draw a
political boundary does not necessarily result in political partition.
Boundaries, however, can take on meanings and an existence of their
own in the minds of the populace. In the case of the Kamaroons, the
original boundary was no more than an arbitrary line drawn for
colonial trading purposes. The boundary became a cause celebre in
the search for nationhood and for a national myth upon which to base
the nation. One of the reasons for this is that boundaries tend to
demarcate a cessation of interactions of one or more human
relationships. While political geographers have noted that the only
function of a boundary is to mark the limits of some type of authority
or ownership, they become symbols of both rewards and
deprivations. 14
Cleavages or Political Cleavages shall remain relatively undefined. In recent political science literature cleavages and cross cutting
cleavages are the precursors to political instability and mark the
deterioration or disappearance of political systems. Cleavages, accordingly, denote the existence of factions, parties, and racial, ethnic,
cultural, class, caste and ideological groups among others. Where
cleavages are cross-cutting, political analysts believe partition is
unlikely. Where the cleavages tend to fall along the same issue lines,
contemporary analysis has it that instability and the potential for

14. Le Vine, "The Politics of Partition in Africa: The Cameroons and the Myth of
Unification", 18 J. of INTL. AFFAIRS (No., 2, 1964), pp. 198-210.
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civil war and division run high. There is a fault with this modern
analysis, the fault being that cross-cutting cleavages are seen as
differentiated role structures, where there is a high degree of
subsystem autonomy. A consequence of both the role differentiation
and the sub-system autonomy is the creation of high degrees of
sub-system interdependence. This is the dependence of one group
upon another which in turn is supposed to avert divisive conflict.
However, this is just where the fault lies in this type of analysis. The
most highly militant and ideologically committed groups are willing
to sacrifice sub-system autonomy and its material benefits in favor of
dividing and later setting up a new system of differentiated role
structures. 15 The fear of permanent minority group status within a
society or the stigma of permanent minority group status can give
rise to demands by minority group members for political partition. In
fact, an earlier review of the literature indicated that being placed in
an apparant minority position is one of the primary causes of the
demands for political separation. Political partition is a method of
reestablishing majority status. If the minority can separate into an
autonomous political unit or even into a semi-autonomous political
unit, the members of the group will ipso facto be the ruling majority.
This is what I have called the "fear of permanent minority
status" hypothesis. It is similar to the more familiar "relative
deprivation" hypothesis which has been used to explain civil
disorders ranging from riots to revolutions. However it differs in
some significant ways. First of all minority status does not automatically bring with it relative deprivation. 16 The ruling class of whites in
South Africa are in a minority position of great wealth and power and
have selected to defend their wealth, power and position by apartheid
and division of the Republic of South Africa into "homelands." 17
Second, permanent minority status is not necessarily accompanied by

15. Thomas A. Reilly and Michael W. Sigall, Political Bargaining And Introduction To Modern Politics, !San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1976), pp. 170-171.
16. Ted Curr and Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions Of Civil Violence; First
Tests Of A Causal Model, (Princeton: Center of Inti. Studies, Princeton University,
Research Monograph No. 28, 1967). See also Haa, Types of Asymmetry with Social and
Political Systems General Systems 1967, p. 12.
17. Evans, "Partition and South Africa's Future," 18 J. INTL. AFFAIRS, !No. 2.,
1965), p. 251.
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violence while relative deprivation generally is. Minority group
members may adopt either cultural or structural assimiliation
strategies to become part of the host majority. The members of a
permanent minority may also seek to claim a diaspora relationship
with ancient or modern, distant or nearby, external groups. Through
this process, the minority group members claim equality with the
culture of the host-majority through assertions of being the legitimate carriers of an equally valuable and significant culture. This
culture is that of the "mother country." When minority group
members seek attachment to a mother country they are performing
in a manner similar to what E. E. Schattschneider referred to as
expanding the conflict. 18 When a minority claims to be related to an
external mother country and also demands political partition, it may
find itself in a position of translating the legitimizing role of the
mother country into an interventionist role of providing logistical,
tactical and supportive asylum during the secession stage of the
partition process.

GREAT POWER POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
STATUS OF DIVIDED NATIONS
The international status' of partitioned and divided nations
(multi-system nations), according to many observers, rests with the
politics of the great powers or super-power nations. 19 These observers
also report that the status of divided nations has varied as the world
moved from a balance of power system to a bi-polar system. As great
powers settle their disputes among themselves, according to these
reporters, they create and destroy nations. Germany and Korea are
the products of this conflict resolution between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Historically the status of the Benelux nations was

18. E.K Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, (New York: Holt Rinehart
and Winston, 1960) pp. 1-19.
19. Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950, <Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1967!. See the work of Thomas Hachey, "Terrorism, Guerilla Warfare
and the Legacy of Partition: Ireland a Case Study of Third World Nations," Divided
Nations Internet Working Paper, prepared for and delivered at the Annual conference
of the International Studies Association, St. Louis Mo., 1974. See also John William
Rooney, "The First Partition Conference 1830-1839," Divided Nations Internet
Working Paper no. 36; ISA, University Center for International Studies, Pittsburgh.
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a product of the exigencies of the Concert of Europe which reduced
the Benelux nations to pawns in the game of international balance of
power politics. "The partitions of Poland in 1772 and 1795 which saw
the status of the Poles reduced to a subject people was as much a
product of external politics as it was of internal politics. The status of
the Poles was determined by a handful of influential people in
Russia, Prussia and Austria."20
It is common parlance in the United States for academics and
practitioners alike to speak of the status of Korea, Taiwan and Berlin
as if it is something to be decided by the U.S. Executive.
In no small way, the politics of national security of great powers
is coterminous with the politics of economic supremacy and economic
imperialism in world markets. To gain marginal increases in the
command of units of world energy, the super-powers are likely,
according to several observers, to sacrifice divided nations and do so
under the rubric of national security and assuring world peace. Thus,
several scholars have been led to suggest that changes in the balance
of trade or balance of military power will find the great economic
powers advocating partition, reunification, or amalgamation of lesser
power nations and related territories. One observer advances evidence for the hypothesis that the larger powers would deliberately set
about to bankrupt the economies of smaller, divided nations and
thereby force them to either reunify or to capitulate to demands of
annexation to larger and more dominant powers. 21
Six different forms of political partition appear in the history of
great power politics, dating back to the Empire of Alexander the
Great. There is, speaking of empires, the ancient technique of
creating satrapies - these are generally partitions intended to give
significant subordinates of a political regime a vested interest in
governing a territory and people. Closely related is imperial pyramiding of administrative authority which can occur in both private and
public empires. This pyramiding describes the governance of the

20. Pounds, "Perspective on Partition," supra, note 9. See also W. Gordon East and
J. R. V. Prescott, Our Fragmented World; An Introduction Geography, (London: The
Macmillan Press Ltd., 19751, p. 126.
21. Gregory Henderson, "Factors of Hostilization in Division," a paper prepared
for and delivered at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association,
1973. See also Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow and John Stoessinger (eds.l,
Divided Nations in A Divided World, New York: David McKay, 19741, pp. 433-54.
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Roman Empire among others including modern multinational corporations. The technique, as most of us know, grants universal
citizenship to all peoples (e.g., everyone is a Roman) while they
simultaneously remain members of rather autonomous local tributary states or administrative units. Under this system, members of an
empire owe loyalty to many different masters. Balkanization is a type
of political partition frequently imposed by external powers upon a
people and territory. Those who impose these divisions do so by
rationalizing it in the name of nationalism or national selfdetermination of nations. The term is derived from the break up of
the Balkans prior to and as a consequence of the peace settlements of
the First World War. Balkanization, in those days, divided people
along linguistic, cultural and national claims of sovereignty. This
status of national sovereignty is frequently in need of guarantor
superpowers. The original balkanization was probably motivated out
of the desire of the protagonists of the First World War to create
buffer zones. The creation of buffer zones, an idea much older than
balkanization, among great powers may well be the second most
frequent cause of political partition. Colonialism is a familiar form of
great power political partition. The colonial process divides people
and territory with almost no regard for the legal status of regimes
therein. Colonialism as "the scramble for territory" explains most of
the conflicts resulting in boundaries and boundary disputes in North
and South America and in Africa. Nationalism and national movements are the most frequent form of political partition in the world
today. It can be argued that nationalism is a process that both causes
and overcomes partition and division, which makes an excellent
subject for still another paper. The final form of partition associated
with great power politics is in fact a sub-national form of functional
and territorial decentralization of power and authority. At the
national level, federalism may be considered such a form of territorial
decentralization of power and authority, since each federation
consists of regional units of political authority. Feudalism is not
considered a form of partition since the above six processes all
contributed to the age of Feudalism in Europe.

THE DURABILITY OF POLITICAL PARTITION
AND POLITICAL BOUNDARIES
The international status of divided nations is based in part upon
the durability of boundaries and divisions. The political geographer
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has long been interested in the durability of political boundaries.
Gilfillan in 1924 and Boggs in 1940, among others, have traced many
of the major European boundaries backward to the period roughly
around 1500 A.D. However, cogent arguments can be made that one
need look at much older disputes to understand the partitioning of
nations and the durability of partition. Tracing the German sub-unit
boundaries and the disputes they resolved or exacerbated, one finds
that many of them date back to the Carolingian Empire. Similarly, a
historical look at the North and South American boundaries shows
them to be measured in centuries. For example the Papal Bulls of
1481 and 1493 along with the Tordesillas Treaty of 1491 fixed the
boundaries and settlement of South America until the present time.
The Partition of North America- the major divisions of Canada, the
United States and Mexico - aside from border disputes now dates
back two centuries. The sub-unit partition of the North American
federations has proven durable and measures several centuries for
those along the eastern seaboard, states and provinces.
Note well that insofar as all these historical boundaries represent partition in the strict sense as I have defined it above, divided
nations tend to take on a rather durable status. Insofar as these
boundaries provide a basis for predicting the future status of more
recent boundaries, the historian, as gambler, would place his bets
on their durability.
The underlying motive for this durability is that international
boundaries constitute walls of partition among people. International
boundaries become administered and guarded; they become less
permeable with time; and, they become fixed in the minds of men.
"The real partition those which are the most stable and least flexible
are in the minds of men." 22 The very existence of boundaries between
the parts of a former nation-state represents differences among men,
serving to distinguish competing elites. If these differences are not
virulent and present-day in character, they are, at least, embedded in
the immediate history of the partition. Where contemporary divisions
are drawn along older, inveterate boundaries, the resulting partition
should be most durable. This durability is based in part on older,

22. Jean Gottman, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at
Analysis", as cited in W. A. Douglas Jackson and Marwyn S. Samuels, Politics And
Geographic Relationships Toward A New Focus, <Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, Inc.,
19711 p. 271.
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historical divisions, and seems to be a part of the character of the
status of such "dual system" nations as China/Taiwan and Germany.
What lies at the foundation of this durability of boundaries and
ingrained divisions which re-appear historically? If the world is
marked by movement of people and materials and such movement
contributes to instability and change, then it always has an
established order favoring a certain pattern of flow and resisting
change. Political partition and order is established first; then the
favored pattern of flow is institutionalized; and, finally, the resistance to re-unify, amalgamate and annex emerges:
What lies at the foundation of this resistance? [sic] Economic
vested interests? That would be difficult to demonstrate; no
actual economic interest can be proved theoretically to be
developed to its full, ideal optimum. An established order,
however, normally has a tendency to defend itself, insofar as it is
a structure within which those at the upper levels are afraid
change may bring them a different less enjoyable level. Moreover, any social and political structure has some abstract values to
preserve; those on which it is founded. 23
Boundary disputes and partitions of the 20th century have
tended to be very old fights and have resulted from the settlement of
very old disputes. For example, the politicians and generals who sat
down to "hastily draw up" the occupation zones of Germany at the
end of Second World War appear to have either wanted to settle some
very old scores dating back a thousand years or to have read their
history well. At least the resulting boundary suggests that much
older conflicts than those commonly assumed played an important
role in contemporary decision-making. If the boundary is to provide
an indication of these war leaders' knowledge of history, then the
status quo ante bellum which they sought dates back to the Treaty of
Verdun in 843 A.D. This boundary which now divides East from West
Germany is one of the oldest in European history. Moreover, it calls
to my mind that partition and division, rather than national unity,
has been the common state of affairs for Germany. This observation
is shared by Professors Gottfried-Karl Kinderman and Jurgen Domes

23. Ibid.
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who argued that German national unification is the rare exception to
the German rule. Equally important is the idea that the study of
boundaries provides a clue to recall capabilities of the "collectivity".
There apparently are those among us who would like to rectify some
very ancient arguments. 24
Boundary disputes alone suggest that the collectivity keeps in
mind very ancient struggles and is willing to return to them upon
occasion. For example, the continuous shifting of the boundaries of
the Alpes Maritimes suggests that the quarrel of today dates back to
at least 1630. The Alpes Maritimes dispute suggests that the
rancorous quarrelling over territory is never dropped. The disputants
have shifted and reshifted the boundary over the 351 years but
seldom more than ten miles at the widest. 25
Still another aspect of the durability of partition is that once a
boundary- administrative or nationalistic in origins- is drawn, it
takes on meanings of its own and can serve a multitude of ideological
purposes. For example, probably few partitions have been more
arbitrary and capricious than those Germany drew around the
Kameroons of Africa. No indigenous community was provided
political expression by these boundaries and in fact no political
community even existed prior to the establishment of a boundary.
The boundaries were drawn, as suggested earlier, simply to mark an
exclusive trading area. Even the name was a mistake of both spelling
and fact. However, once bounded, once administered, once people of at
least a "middle class" social standing benefited from the existence of
the boundary, then a myth of nationhood was successfully fabricated
to historically legitimize its existence and perpetuation. 26
The status of some of the current dual system nations or divided
territories is less the result of a political partition than a conquest
and nationalization of frontiers. In many respects, both Israel (or
Palestine Eretz Israel) and Taiwan fit this description. In the case of
Israel, the most elementary reading of history shows that neither
nationalism nor colonialism had been given much expression among
the peoples of the areas prior to the First World War. The Ottoman

24. I owe thanks to both Professors Kinderman and Domes who so eloquently
made this argument at the meeting for which this paper was originally prepared.
25. Pounds, Political Geography, supra, note 4, p. 422.
26. Evans, "South Africa," supra, note 17, pp. 241-52.
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Empire had incorporated most of the territory and people until the
end of the war. Prior to the Ottoman Empire modern nationalism was
no real force in the area. As a result of the peace settlements, the
area was cast up as mandated territories by the League of Nations.
The area remained in mandated status until the end of the Second
World War. Once again Palestine was mandated or entrusted to
Great Britain. Modern, sovereign statehood for this area of the world
had to await Israeli expression in 1949. For the case of Taiwan, I will
present a much longer discussion below.
APPLICATION OF CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
TO REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ON TAIWAN
In order to understand the status and potential future of Taiwan
with respect to the government in Peking, it is necessary to
understand that political boundaries are not part of Chinese political
tradition and thought. Moreover, China has always been a landbased and land-directed society. The sea and coastal mountain
ranges (coastal slope) formed, until most recently, both natural
boundaries and barriers for China. 27 The Chinese of the early empires
viewed those people living on the seaward side of the coastal slope as
neither critical to China nor Chinese. The Chinese people were those
living within the hinterlands of the Hwang-ho and Yangtze-kiang
river valleys. China's expansion was inland and its trade routes were
westward, across India and Asia Minor, to Europe. "The Great Wall
itself is not in fact a linear frontier; it is more the most important
delimitation of what is in fact a zonal frontier, of which there are also
other minor delimitations." What could not be included in the
Empires had to be excluded. 28
This was especially true on the north, vis-a-vis the peoples of the
steppes. China's southern frontier was one on which the Chinese
mode of agriculture could expand; that on the north could be
crossed only by adopting another mode of life. The Chinese state
was built on the base of irrigated agriculture. In Wittfogel's

27. This argument is based on the lectures of Professor David N. Sopher,
Sacramento State College, 1958·1959.
28. Owen Lattimore as cited in S. Whittimore Boggs. International BoundariesA Study Of Boundary Functions And Problems. INew York: Morningside heights.
Columbia University Press, 1940!, p. 136.
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terminology, it was an agromanagerial despotism, ruling a
hydraulic society. Its organization was incapable of the steppes.
But the ideal of a linear boundary between China and the
steppes was never fully realized in practice. . . .29
China's organization was also unsuitable for both the steppes and the
sea regions. Moreover, neither could be conquered without drastic
changes in the Chinese mode of life.
Even today, Taiwan can be viewed as a frontier area which
China has never properly incorporated. The longest period of Chinese
administration was between 1683 and 1895. Before that, except for
Dutch and Spanish colonial rule, Taiwan was a retreat for Japanese
pirates, Chinese bandits, refugees and fleeing war lords. As a matter
of fact, and despite earlier Chinese forays and sporadic emigration
from Fukien Province, Taiwan had to await Portuguese discovery in
1517 and Dutch colonization in 1624 before the Chinese government
became seriously concerned over the population and management of
the Island.
Even during the period if Imperial rule, from 1683 to 1895, the
Island was ruled as a part of Fukien Province. The aborigines were
either assimilated into the Chinese population or pushed back into
the Mountains. The Imperial government treated the Island with
little, if any, attention. From 1884 with the French Blockade and
1895 with the Japanese rule, the Island passed out of Peking's
control. The Chinese on Taiwan refused to accept it and declared
their independence and claimed to be a republic. In 1949, the
remnants of the Kuomintang under the leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek retreated to the Island claiming it to be a province of China
and the Kuomintang to be the legitimate government of China. 30 By
tracing the expansion of the Chinese Empire outward and southward
and by contrasting the incorporation and development of Canton with
the awareness and administration of Taiwan, further evidence is
provided for the claims that Taiwan was never politically incorporated into China and that it remains a disputed frontier area. Its
republican government of 1895 was dominated, ignored, and has been
conveniently long since forgotten.

29. Jones, "Boundary Concepts in Setting of Place and Time," 49 Annuals Of The
Association Of American Geographers 243, <19591.
30. Worldmark Encyclopedia Of The Nations, <New York: Harper and Brothers,
19601, p. 933.
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Table 3: The Status of Taiwan and Canton During Historical Periods of Chinese
Expansion31
Period

Status of Taiwan

Status of Canton

1. Chou Dynasty West-PreCh'in; China limited to Yellow River Basin - a germinal hydraulic society. (c.
1122-771 B.C.)

Unknown

Undeveloped

2. Chou Dynasty East; Pre-

Unknown

Undeveloped

Unknown

Undeveloped as
part of China
concept.

Unknown

Expansion into
Canton with
Han Armies
reaching Viet
Nam.

Unknown

Arabic settlements
established by
Arab Merchants.

Unknown

Canton now became a part of
China proper.

Qin China was not expanding and was divided within.
(c. 770-256 B.C.)
3. Ch'in, The Great Wall and

unified metric system was
adopted; expansionist
period included Han Former (c. 221 B.C. to 9 A.D.)
4. Han Later was a divided

period of the three Kingdoms and War Lord competition, (c. 220-280 A.D.l
5. Tsin, Sui, and Tang War-

lord competition. Tibet was
brought into China (c. 280906 A.D.l
6. Five Dynasties, Song North

and Song South, internal
conflict and division and an
expanded definition of China was incorporated into
the political tradition. (c.
907-1279 A.D.)

31. See Yung Wei "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations..
Chapter III for unity and disunity periodicty tables.
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7. Yuan expansionist period,
Ghengis Kahn and Mongolia brought into China (c.
1260-1368 A.D.l.

Unknown

Marco Polo visited
Fukien and
Chuan Chou
and compared
it to Alexandia; later stage
Arabic merchant riots
were put down
and Chuan
Chou
was
closed.

8. Ming Dynasty ended with
Manchurian revolution (c.
1368-1644 A.D.).

Portuguese discovered Formosa in 1517 - Dutch
Ruled Pescadores and
Taiwan.

Developed

9. Ch'ing (Manchu rule)
Dynasty (c. 1644-1912
A.D.>

Bandits, Pirates, Chinese
and Japanese ruled Formosa and Independence
is declared.

Developed

10. The Republic of China (c.
1912 A.D.->

Japanese ruled Formosa as a
colony <1895-19451.

ROC Rule Since
1945

11. Mao Tse-tung, People's Republic of China (c. 19491976 A.D.)

ROC rules Taiwan as a
Province of the Republic of China.

Mao Tse-tung
Communist
Rule.

A political geographer could argue from this chronology and
physical location, that the Republic of China is to be in possession of
a "frontier territory" upon which they have established a viable
community, which operates a viable sovereign state, but which
through its founding ideology still claims legitimacy over all of
China. The Taiwan Straits still form a natural boundary and barrier
between China proper and Taiwan. No legal national delimiting
boundaries have yet been established between the two governments
and their people.
The recent China/Taiwan debate reveals at least seven primary
factors against procedural re-unification. First, political partition and
political division create independent political power structures whose
perpetuation is of primary importance to the elite members of each
part. Reunification or reconquest signifies the demise of at least one
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elite-regime. Second, most divided nations in the world today are
supported by external nations who are in opposition to each other.
Third, these competitive relations among the external blocs are
inversely related to bi-lateral negotiations between the intra-elite
units. Fourth, the regimes and elites of the parts of a divided nation
tend to ascribe to each other antithetical political formulas which
deny reconciliation and compromise. Fifth, the potential for one part
to lose military power measured in terms of minutes of firepower,
keeps other parts from seriously negotiating toward some form of
reconciliation. As Kenneth Boulding pointed out, if one side begins to
remove itself from the field of conflict, there is little incentive for the
other to move. Again, in this case, the dominant military power can
begin to actively remove the other by conquest and retaliation. Sixth,
the relative disparities of standard of living among members of the
parts and differences of issue attitudes intensifies the desire for
continued partition. Seventh, when people begin to act, live and
think as members of different political states then the members no
longer find reunification attractive or desirable. 32
On June 14, 1981, Secretary of State Haig was reported to have
said that the United States wanted to "beef up" its military as well as
its non-military relations with China while continuing to relate to
Taiwan on an informal (businesslike) basis. Haig also reported that
the United States would continue to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan
in the amount of about 700 million dollars a year. The United States,
according to the Secretary, would like to find out what kind of
military hardware China would want through technological exchanges. Opposing Soviet imperialism now appears to have taken
precedence over the countering of international communism in U.S.
strategy. This conclusion of precedence arises from Haig's claims that
the Soviet threats to both China and the United States compelled him
seek to strengthen U.S.-Sino relationships. This is but one of the
many conclusions that may be drawn from Haig's diplomacy.
On the other hand, if the United States includes the defeat of
communism as a critical element in its world strategy, then Taiwan
and the Republic of China become important. Taiwan has over the
years proven to be a strong and unwavering friend to the United

32. Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict And Defense: A General Theory !New York:
Harper 1962!, pp. 305-28.
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States and a staunch foe of communism. However, American strategy
now seems to be one of "having our China and keeping Taiwan, too".
No matter, the international status of Taiwan and the Republic of
China on Taiwan is inextricably intertwined in the cold war politics
of the United States and the Soviet Union and equally intertwined
in U.S.-Sino politics. 33
What should U.S. policy toward Taiwan be? Most Chinese mainlanders, those from Hong Kong, or those from Salinas, California and especially those from Taiwan - would advise the Americans
to rid themselves of the idea that Taiwan belongs to the United
States or that it is something to be negotiated away by the U.S.
government. Second, and perhaps even more important is the advice
offered by many that the leadership of the United States should place
the China/Taiwan problem in the context of a U.S. world strategy
rather than in the narrower U.S.-Sino strategy. United States
leadership should not hold the mistaken view that any American
policy toward Taiwan is non-negotiable in terms of U.S.-Peking
relations. In short, Peking or, more specifically, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), cannot afford to take a non-negotiable stance
with America on Taiwan issues.

33. I would like to make an observation which is worthy of a longer and more
detailed analysis. The verdict is now coming in on the trial of communism throughout
the world. While communism will remain attracti·ve to many parts of the world,
especially the poor nations emerging from colonial rule, the record of communism is
not that impressive. Wherever the communist party has gained power and rulership,
the verdict is that it forms a ruling class rather than a democratic party of the
proletariat. With the emergence of the ruling class party, the people lose freedom, life
becomes harsher, feudal practices are established, and people lose all hope. Even those
who followed the party for its revolutionary promises, which were kept for the top of
the party in Russia and in China, have lost hope after a generation of sacrifice. This
past year, Leonid Brezhnev apologized to the Russian people for not making Russia the
greatest consumer economy in the world, a promise he made 20 years ago. This year
the Polish workers acknowledged the need for a union and collective bargaining as
protection against the Polish Communist Party which acts like a ruling class vis-a-vis
labor. During the past few years, China has stepped away from Mao's 30 some years of
movement and countermovements that pitted Chinese against Chinese. that brought
hardship and death in the hundreds of thousands, that set China back for many. many
years in terms of intellectual and. scientific development. An entire generation of
scholars was sacrificed in that bloody cultural revolution. Marxism may work well as a
means of critical evaluation of the shortcomings of capitalism; but. communism and the
communist parties have offered little in the way of practical working alternatives.
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In formulating U.S. strategy our leaders must keep in mind that
the CCP must face the Soviet and Vietnamese borders with or
without U.S. concessions on Taiwan policies. Moreover, China is
faced with four-fifths of a billion people tied to the land in a
subsistence economy and a generation of youth clamouring for a
chance to work and make a meaningful life. China needs agricultural
and industrial technological help from the United States. The
government of China literally has to bring about an industrial-urban
revolution in a very few years. This has been an ever present and
unsolved problem of the CCP. The Party needs help if it is to retain
its legitimacy among the populace. It needs strong support from the
United States. These needs give the United States a great deal of
decision-making latitude vis-a-vis Taiwan. The Party in Peking
knows this, though it hopes the party in Washington D. C. does not.
Another question arises: What should U.S. world strategy be
vis-a-vis China and Taiwan? Surprisingly, the answer I obtained
from talking with mainland Chinese, and the most recent arrivals
from China and Hong Kong, is that the most important element of
U.S. world strategy should be "winning the battle against communism; and, especially the Soviet brand of communism." The Soviet
brand of communism is viewed by both communist and noncommunist Chinese as most aggressive and imperialistic and is
militarily the most threatening to American and Chinese national
security interests.
Many Chinese agree that the United States should continue its
relations with Peking while at the same time continuing to enhance
the international status of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Many
Chinese believe that the Chinese people can have more than one
government and one country. They argue that the goal of American
policy should be to help establish Taiwan as a sovereign unit. Why do
Chinese, many of them citizens and loyal to China, hold these
seemingly contradictory views? Again, many Chinese throughout the
world desire to see a strong China. While they would like to see
China become stronger and stronger, there are few Chinese anywhere
who would like to be "liberated" by the Chinese Communist Party.
The Chinese cannot forget that for more than 100 years, they have
been denied citizenship, safe passage, passports, property ownership,
and they cannot forget they have been forced into coolie positions,
suffering under the yoke of servitude, slavery and subjected to
pogroms in the most recent of times. This suffering, to a great extent,
has been at the hands of foreigners. The Chinese have longed for a
stronger "motherland" which could offer them solace and protection.
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As one Chinese citizen from Canton said, "If China is weak, the
foreigner will continue to bully [the] Chinese; but, if China is strong,
the Chinese in Hong Kong and even those in San Francisco will have
a stronger motherland to prevent this bullying."
The contradiction of attitudes is also explained by the fact that
Mao's policy on Vietnam and Deng's war with Vietnam finds the
overseas Chinese once again forced to flee their homes without
citizenship or hope, to migrate as refugees and boat people. There
exists the belief that if China had a strong government, countries like
Vietnam and Cambodia could not simply set Chinese communities
adrift upon the ocean. A strong Chinese government, one of great
international status and repute, could simply say "stop" and such
practices would cease. As strong as China presented itself during the
60s and 70s, Mao could not prevent the pogroms that occurred in the
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Overseas Chinese will accept a
strong Motherland despite the ideology of the ruling party.
American's are currently having a romance with China. The
United States and Peking have some very profound differences
regarding Taiwan. In the romantic efforts to woo China, Americans
should see the place that the Kuomintang and Taiwan play in the
reforms now going on within China. Since the death of Mao, China
has been undergoing many wrenching changes. Many of these
changes and trends have been directed toward the West. In fact, the
Chinese Communist Party has permitted direct American influence
to occur within China. This American influence, or even the same
kind of foreign influence from any country, was unthinkable in
Maoist terms.
Taiwan is difficult for the CCP to swallow. The Party is
embarassed by Taiwan's brilliant economic, cultural and industrial
successes. Despite the Party's accusations that the Kuomintang is a
reactionary force, more and more of the informed Chinese are
becoming aware of the personal successes and individual freedom
afforded in Taiwan. These Chinese people know that there is much
more freedom there than the Party has offered; and, consequently
they push for even more reforms within China. It is now "old hat" to
speak of"windows" and "showcases" of the West, but the fact remains
that Taiwan has been and remains a very attractive and influential
window.
In my interviews with informed observers, I am told that the
party will take a military solution to a problem like Taiwan
whenever it thinks it can do so without retaliation or fear of being
impugned. These respondents have pointed out that the use of
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military force is a common Party practice. The fact that Peking is
willing to agree to settle the Taiwan question in the future and by
other than military means suggests that the CCP has already
assessed the costs of a military solution to be prohibitive. Taiwan's
independence is difficult for the Chinese Communist Party simply
because, as one respondent said, "Taiwan is a rich, beautific and
abundant gem. Given our action toward Tibet, we would annex
Taiwan in a moment and do so simply out of greed." But for now,
China cannot.
SOVEREIGNTY OF TAIWAN
Integration and community development theories provide yet
another means for assessing and evaluating the international status
of nations born of political partition and division. I have already
suggested that the political partition and integration are parallel
processes and are not mutually exclusive. For example, as a nation
divides or is divided, integrative processes begin to occur in each of
the fragmented parts. This process can be seen in the cases of the
break up of the Malaysian federation when Singapore seceded in
1965, or in the rare case of the peaceful partition of Norway and
Sweden in 1905. The integrative process is true of all divisions which
result in political partition. Kristoff suggests in his discussion of
boundaries: "The boundaries bind an area and a people which live
under one sovereign government and law are, at least presumably,
integrated not only administratively and economically but also by
means of a state idea or creed."34
In measuring the level of integration within recently partitioned
national fragments, we must keep in mind that few states are
coterminous with nations. For example, the nation of Jews is not
completely included in the modern state of Israel. The Socialist
Republic of Armenia does not include all of the Armenian nation. The
nation of Ireland reaches beyond the borders of that state as does the
Chinese nation reach beyond the borders of China proper. These are
only a few examples which illustrate that with respect to populations,
most states exhibit national heterogeneity, normally with one
preponderant national group. The elite of the state tend to represent
the preponderant group.
Sovereignty or sovereign nation-state status is the product of
successful integrative and national-community development proces34. Ladis Kristof, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," In Jackson and
Samuels, Politics And Geographic Relationships, supra, note 22, pp. 134-144.
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ses. Moreover, international law is also primarily concerned with
states that are "sovereign" or independent, regarding them as legal
personalities whose relationships it seeks to define and regulate.
While the concept of sovereignty has been subjected to the most
severe of criticisms by many political scientists, it nonetheless
remains a basis upon which both the international legalists and
representatives of divided nations frequently act; therefore, it
becomes a reality which is not to be denied in evaluating the status of
divided nations. In this evaluation of status as sovereign or
non-sovereign, Mendelson argued that "sovereignty is more like a
spectrum or continuum, with different states lying at different points
on it."35 Critics have argued that states, being subject to various
restraints, are not in fact sovereign. East and Prescott cogently state:
"certainly many states appear to suffer from limitations of sovereignty as do members of the European Economic Community, Czechoslovakia in respect to the Soviet Union pressure, and both Switzerland
and Austria which are subject to the duty of permanent neutrality.
(i.e., they have no legal power to make war.... ) Such limitations do
not however prevent these states from being classified as independent, if only because they stand in sharp contrast to those (units or
systems) which are legally dependent, lacking the right to engage in
certain political activities, notably in the field of foreign affairs."36
Sovereignty claims can be settled without annexation or reunification. I want to introduce the idea of "sovereignty disputes" as a
form of international conflict. Like boundary disputes, sovereignty
disputes can be settled with varying levels and qualities of conflict.
Among these variations one can find amicable negotiation among the
disputants. The varying levels of conflict are found by contrasting the
recent detente between East and West Germany and the somewhat
more rancourous and sporadically violent border conflict that continues between North and South Korea. These cases are tentatively
advanced as instances of sovereignty disputes which are being settled
through negotiation and agreement on the part of both sides to
recognize the right to disagree while they respect the integrity and
autonomy of each other. More important is the idea or suggestion
that "sovereignty disputes" or even the treatment of divided nation
disputes as "sovereignty disputes" may serve as a first step and a
fresh approach toward the development of a new integration at the
international leveta7
35. W. H. Mendelson, "The Two Germanies.," The Times, 14 November 1972 as
cited in East and Prescott, Our Fragmented World, supra, note 20, p. 102.
36. Ibid.
37. The introduction of new terms, alone, frequently help negotiated resolutions of
conflict.

30

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

How do we practically and empirically measure the degree of
sovereignty? An insightful response to this question is that those
parties to the dispute have their own measures and have applied
them successfully to their own dissatisfaction. It is this mutual
dissatisfaction which produces the sovereignty dispute. Karl Deutsch
provides a conceptual beginning for the development of objective
measures of systemic sovereignty. My interpretation of his work
provides the following criteria:
1. Sovereignty is a product of the entire community and rests
there rather than being the invention and possession of some
individual, faction, or class.
2. Sovereignty is a reflection of the ability of the polity to learn,
to change and adopt to a changing world. This I believe is what
Deutsch means by "self-steering" and "self-control," or autonomy.
3. Sovereignty is illustrated by the ability of those who man the
institutions of a political system to close the decision-making
processes to any further information by which a particular
decision might possibly be modified. This is the exercise of
Deutsch's "system will."
4. Sovereignty is also a product of the power of a system to
implement and apply decisions so as to obtain membership and
non-membership compliance with new rules.
5. Sovereignty is seldom concentrated in a single group and
when it is, the system is weakened by the inability of it to
survive the destruction of that group. 38
In a study conducted prior to and during 1978, I attempted to
apply these criteria of sovereignty to the Republic of China on
Taiwan by operationally defining these criteria in terms of measures
of political integration, social mobilization and assimilation. I
conducted a series of interviews with Chinese-American citizens,
Chinese from Taiwan, and Chinese from other parts of the world.
Most of my respondents either studied or worked in academics. I have
presented this work in another report and will summarize its
relevant findings as they show the international status of divided
nations.
38. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism And Its Alternatives. <New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1969), pp. 127-66. See also The Nerves Of Government, (New York: The Free
Press 1966), pp. 55, 210-220.
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The integration process is one through which villages, baronies,
and countries merge into larger and larger units and eventually
become nation-states. This is accomplished through six parallel
processes which are as follows:
1. Several peoples (of varying origins) or population clusters
become united through an infra-structure of communication and
economic activity, and therefore, begin to think of themselves as
a country.
2. There is an integration and consolidation of language.
3. There is an integration of elites as an accepted model of
reference, or, put another way, there is an elite whose members
serve as role models for mass behavior.
4. There is an expansion of a feeling of kinship from kin groups
to the whole people.
5. There is the development of a sense of trust, a "we trust each
other more than we trust some foreigner".
6. The integration of administrative districts and the making of
a state. 39
In the process of becoming a country, two different groups of
people formed on Taiwan. The first group are those whose ancestors
migrated to the Island over the past four centuries. The second group
known as "Mainlanders" are those who followed Chiang Kai-shek in
1949. The first group will be referred to as Taiwanese and they
number about 15 million. The Mainlanders, about 2 million, bring
the total population of the country to about 17 million. The
Taiwanese see themselves as having an identity separate from China
proper. Most of my respondents said that they refer to themselves as
"being from Taiwan", and not as "being from China." When
Taiwanese respondents were asked to judge the position of the
Mainlanders of the Island, they generally responded by saying that
the Mainlander is separate from China. The Mainlanders themselves
tend to agree that they have a separate identity from China proper.
These Mainlanders from whom most of the political elite is recruited

39. Ray E., Johnston, "Taiwan's Misplaced Sovereignty," a paper prepared for and
delivered at the 1979 annual conference of the International Studies Association, in
Toronto, Canada.
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and who form an "upper structure" of society on the Island continue
to see Taiwan as a part and parcel of China proper. The Kuomintang has contributed to the development of a separate identity, rather
unwittingly, by its thorough and constant anti-communist propaganda and through its continued successful and separate economic
development.
Language consolidation was implemented by the adoption of
"New Peking" as the official governmental language. Despite this
adoption of an official language, some 80 percent of the population
still uses local dialects in their daily lives. These local dialects are
different from the official language in both accent and grammatical
structure.
Integration of the elites is still an ongoing process. At the time of
this writing, two groups of elite members serve as behavior models
for most of people. The first group is the political elite, drawn
primarily from the Mainlanders. The second group is an elite of
professionals, scientists, entrepreneurs and celebrities drawn from
both the Mainlanders and Taiwanese and serving both groups.
Most of my respondents felt that this dual elite structure persists
as one of the important problems of nation building in Taiwan.
However, these same respondents agreed that no single monolithic
social structure exists on Taiwan and that useful aspiration models
do exist in the minds of the mass members of society.
The next criteria, feelings of kinship occur along class lines and
class cleavages. Members of both the major groups when traveling
abroad identify themselves as Taiwan Chinese to the outsider. Some
draw class distinctions between themselves and the other groups
reporting that they are either "Mainlanders" from Taiwan or
"Taiwanese" from Taiwan. However, in general they present a
common front to the outsider. To the extent that this common front
suggests that the two groups are beginning to feel or share a common
identity there are growing feelings of kinship.
Feelings of trust were measured by asking and doing research on
preferences of who receives employment, promotion and property and
who is delegated responsibility in public and private pursuits. Like
the feelings of kinship the data here are inconclusive. There seems to
be a growing sense of social trust between members of the two
primary groups especially in private sphere of workaday life.
Finally, the government has long ago integrated the administrative districts, the bureaucrats and the police. They have recruited
local district administrators (at the party level) from both major
groups of the population. I asked all of the respondents about the rule
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of law and sense of civility. From their reports, I concluded that there
appears to be a growing sense of civility among members of society
and between members of society and the ruling leadership. Most of
the respondents, despite their background, felt that the rule of law
and civility were relatively greater on Taiwan than on the mainland.
This was reported by respondents who had been in both countries for
extended periods of time. These visits were during the past five or ten
years.
Most of the respondents regarded questions of assimilation as
irrelevant to Taiwan. They argued that the answers would show
greater levels of mass mobilization and assimilation then the elites
could in fact draw upon. Westerners who apply western sociological
techniques would thus obtain a halo effect produced by the measures
and not actually found in the population. Despite these reservations,
the respondents answered all questions and seemed to think they
made sense. Their answers suggest that the entire population is
capable of mobilization to support the government in cases of (a)
external threats and (b) actual invasion. When domestic disruptions
occur, enough of the population remains out of the fray so as to
permit the government to effectively maintain civil and political
order. These observations suggest some degree of assimilation has
occurred. In comparative terms, the people living on Taiwan have a
feeling of more individual freedom then do their Chinese counterparts on the mainland.
Governmental services have become more and more satisfying.
The government provides more health care stations, mobile units and
public transportation each year. There has been an equalization of job
opportunities and an encouragement of the expansion of the private
sector. The economy is a "state directed" economy largely influenced
by private enterprise.
In the opening paragraphs, I said that most states exhibit a
national heterogeneity, normally with one preponderant national
group. I conclude this section by noting that Taiwan, under the KMT,
has developed the requisite structures and functions of a sovereign
state. It has a mobilized population, an effective leadership structure
and an effective administration and military. Its leadership can
survive generational replacement. Taiwan - at minimum - has all
the necessary elements of sovereignty if not sovereignty itself.
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POLITICAL PARTITION: A NEGATION OF
UNITY OR A NEW UNITY?
Political division, secession and partition are generally viewed as
evils to be avoided; while consolidation, amalgamation, integration
and the "art of getting bigger" are viewed as virtues to be sought.
Only in the case of nationalism does one find a large body of
literature favorable to one type of political partition. The hypotheses
are that political partition demands lead to hostility and hostility in
turn leads to riots, organized irredentist movements and finally to
civil war. While consolidation demands or international integration
demands or unification demands lead to modern, rational, effective
and efficient governments. Interestingly, no one, to my knowledge,
has compared the costs in human lives of movements that call for
political division and movements that call for political amalgamation
and international integration. If the Nazi experiement is reflective
of the latter, we know that the human costs of a single world
government runs into the millions. Those who have an ideological
stake in the reunification, or even continuation of partition while
giving lip service to re-unification, are generally the first to attribute
human costs to division. Among the costs frequently cited are those of
human lives, break-up of families, the breakdown of cultural and
ethnic identification and autonomy, the disruption of production and
distribution of economic goods and services, and increasing amounts
of bigotry, dogmatism and hostility.
N.J. G. Pounds has said that the «term 'partition' is a perjorative
one, carrying with it overtones of outrage or abuse, as if the act which
it describes were itself contrary to the established order of things.
The suggestion is always present- overt or implied - that it results
from a show of force and that in carrying it out either the rights of
the people or the intentions of the diety have been violated. 40
Measuring hostility in existing divided nations led Gregory
Henderson to conclude that the price paid for political partition is
tension, war, duplication and waste of dwindling resources, perhaps
even civilization itself. However, we would probably need a new set of
measures to test the costs of "bigness". Recent concern with the
environment, multinational corporations, and the third world have
led to some scholarly attempts to focus on these costs. E. F.
Schumacher's Small is Beautiful is one effort in this direction.41 We find in his, and others' environmentalist literature,
40. Pounds, "Perspective of Partition," supra, note 9, p. 161.
41. E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1973), pp. 59-70.
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that the costs of bigness (without a Hitler on the scene) are ecological
damage and callousness toward humans, alienation of the individual
from community and from the family, normlessness, social and
psychological drift, system anomie, political repression, mass exploitation, and a high death count that results from all sorts of
technological accidents.
The negative view of political partition and division - balkanization - is puzzling, since many nation-states in the world today
are a product of partition. Some, it is true, are products of old empire
break down and others of empire building. Whichever is the source,
the nations of today are a product of partitioning and bounding.
Perhaps this negative view of political partition can be understood by considering man's search for immortality, a search which
leads him to romanticize about the possibilities of a world wherein
everyone is the same and there is no conflict. Such utopian views
generally contain the idea of global security and peace. The desire for
immortality is reflected in man's long romance with the rights and
rituals of tribalism, the clan, the family and finally the nation-state.
Our twentieth century movement for universal world order overcoming the conflicts of rampant nationalism - reflects but one
more level of the founding of a "Golden Age" of peace and
immortality. The desire is similar to Eric Berne's notion that when
most of us get on the marital couch we do so in hope of founding a
new "Nation of Abraham." 42 This hope is filled with many paradoxes.
What one has, his immediate possessions, his family, his language,
his culture and his race become mystically endowed as symbolic of
God's Ways. Those individuals who are different are the enemy, the
"spawn of the devil", "the significant other" who diabolically cheat
the chosen few of their immortality. Upon this myth nations are built
and wars are fought. In the desperation of disparate situations,
people are generally willing to recognize the myth and give it up
rather than die for it.
This paradox is again reflected in Snyder's observation that the
ancient community was based on primitive people's ancient and
tribal instincts centering on fear and hostility toward the stranger. 43
While making searches for a universal peace in a modern community
42. Eric Berne Sex in Human Loving, (New York, Simon & Schuster: Pocket
Books, 1971), p. 35, and passim.
43. Louis Snyder, "The Historians Meaning of Nationalism, 1954", in Louis
Snyder Ced.l, The Dynamics of Nationalism, (Princeton, New Jersey: D. van Nostrand &
Co., 1964), p. 25.
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- as he did in days of old - mirroring the conditions of nature and
producing the "natural man", modem man is at the same time driven
to revere his differences from his fellow. This reverence of differences
continues to be a primary motive in national political partition from
the times of ancient theocracies to the modern state. In our efforts to
explain the re-unification of divided nations, we should remember
that the Phoenix of the Old State has never risen from the ashes of
political partition and division; rather, what has always risen has
been a new unity, a new order both similar and dissimilar to the past.
COMMENTS

Hungdah Chiu
Professor Johnston's statement on the historical development of
Chinese settlement in Taiwan 1 is not based on correct historical facts
and legal theory. As to the historical facts, I would like to quote a
recent study on the history of Taiwan by Professor Yu-min Shaw of
the History Department of the Notre Dame University, 2 which
provides well-documented information on tth subject.
There are documentary evidences indicating that by 1171,
P'eng-hu (Pescadores) had become a Chinese military outpost,
and at least by 1225 it was administratively incorporated into
the Chinese Empire-placed under the jurisdiction of Tsin-kiang
County of Ch'uan-chou Prefecture, Fukien Province. 3 As for
Taiwan, no massive settlement began until General Cheng
Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga, 1624-62) expelled the Dutch from Taiwan
in 1661.
From 1662 to 1683 Cheng Ch'eng-kung and his successors
ruled Taiwan for 21 years. Cheng Ch'eng-kung died only five
months after his victory over the Dutch, but during his brief rule
1. See pp. 20-22.
2. Yu-ming Shaw, "Modern History of Taiwan: An Interpretative Account," in
Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and the Taiwan Issue, (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 8-15,
18-19.
3. For the early history of Taiwan and the Chinese penetration into P'eng-hu, see
Kuo T'ing-yee, T'ai-wan shih-shih kai-shuo (General history of Taiwan) (Taipei:
Cheng-chung Book Co., 1965), pp. 1-8. See also Wen-hsiung Hsu, "Chinese Colonization
of Taiwan," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1975, pp. 15-24; and Fang Hao,
"Looking at the Chinese Sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu from Some Historical
Documents," in Chung-yuan wen-hua yu T'ai-wan <Chinese Culture and Taiwan)
(Taipei: Taipei Historical Commission, 1971), pp. 355-79.
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he set up guidelines for the governing of Taiwan that survived
his demise. After his death his son, Cheng Ching, took over the
reign. With Ch'en Yung-hua as his chief adviser, the Cheng
government began to concentrate on the development of Taiwan.
The administrative policies of the Cheng government and its
achievements throughout its rule in Taiwan can be summarized
as follows: First was the recruitment of Chinese migrants to
Taiwan. . . . with the influx of both settlers andsoldiers,
Taiwan's population increased to about 100,000 by the end of the
Cheng rule in 16824
In September 1683, [the Ching government surrendered to
the Ch'ing government and Taiwan became part of the Fukien
Province.] Taiwan came under the rule of the Ch'ing dynasty for
212 years, until 1895.
In terms of assessing the administrative efficiency of the
Ch'ing, its rule of Taiwan can be devided into two periods: from
1683 to 1870s and from the 1870s to 1895. Before 1874 the Ch'ing
government carried on a passive attitude toward Taiwan. It tried
to maintain only a semblance of law and order and made
minimum effort to develope the island. However, after the
Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1874, the Ch'ing govermnent
realized that only the energetic development of the island would
forestall further foreign incroachment there. Therefore a series of
able administrators were sent to Taiwan and many reforms were
undertaken. . . .
Taiwan's economic development took an upward swing after
the mid-nineteenth century, especially in the production of the
three major export items: sugar, tea and camphor. Between the
1860s and 1890s, tea production and exportation increased 50
times, sugar exportation grew 2.5 times, and camphor 5 times.
This boom in foreign trade was also facilitated by the presence of
western commercial firms in Taiwan after the 1850s. 5
Technological development was made possible by a succession of able Ch'ing administrators, such as Shen Pao-chen, Ting
Jih-ch'ang, and Liu Ming-ch'uan, who came to Taiwan after
1870. Among them, Liu Ming-ch'uan's contribution was the

4. Hsu, "Chinese Colonization," p. 97.
5. Ramon H. Myers, "Taiwan under Ch'ing Imperial Rule: The Traditional
Economy," Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong
Kong 5, no. 2 (1972); 375-77.
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greatest. They promoted mining and foreign trade, set up
telegraph lines, improved transportation both inside Taiwan and
with the mainland, established postal and electricity transmission systems, built railways, opened up modern schools, and
engaged in land survey and tax reform. By the 1890s Taiwan had
become the most modern and progressive province in China.
Besides material progress, Taiwan by the end of the
nineteenth century had also achieved a high degree of educational advancement. . . .
Besides traditional-style schools, two modern-style schools
were also established: a Western Academy (1887) offering
modern subjects, such as foreign languages, mathematics, physics, chemistry, in addition to Chinese studies; and a Telegraph
Academy (1890). 6
In 1894 war broke out between China and Japan over the
question of Korea, and China was defeated by Japan. In the
Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in April 1895, China
agreed, along with other concessions, to cede Taiwan and
P'eng-hu to Japan.
When the news of this imminent cession broke out, it
triggered a strong wave of protest throughout all of China and
Taiwan. In a memorial written in blood and submitted to Peking,
the delegates of the Chinese gentry of Taiwan solemnly declared
that they would prefer to fight to death than to live under
Japanese rule. This helped to stimulate K'ang Yu-wei, the noted
late Ch'ing intellectual leader, to lead the famous May protest
movement in which more than a thousand Chinese literati
participated. They lodged a petition with the Ch'ing court
opposing the cession of Taiwan and demanding reforms. But
these emotional outbursts couldnot alter the fate of Taiwan. The
Chinese government, bound by treaty obligations, could not offer
much help for Taiwan's defense. . . .
After the failure of all earlier actions and in final desperation, the Chinese patiots in Taiwan decided to try the strategy of
declaring Taiwan a "republic" under the title of "T'ai-wan
Min-chu Kuo" (Taiwan Democratic Republic). By declaring
Taiwan a republic, they hoped to win international sympathy
and SUJ>pOrt and force Japan to give up Taiwan. To assuage any
6. Kuo, General history, pp. 178-209. On Taiwan's educational system and its
various educational institutions, see Wang Ch'i-tsung, "On literary academies and
learning centers in Ch'ing Taiwan," in Chiang-i hui-pien <A collection of instructional
materials) (Taipei: Taiwan Historical Study Society, 19771, Chapter 7.
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suspicions of their loyalty to China, they designated the reign
name of the new republic as "Yung-Ch'ing" (Forever Ch'ing), and
in their public announcements they never used the term tu-li
(independence), but tzu-li (self-sustaining) or tzu-chu (selfgoverning). Further evidence of their loyalty to China was that
T'ang, the president of the republic, offered to continue to serve
as the acting governor of Taiwan for the Ch'ing government.
The resistance movement was certainly heroic. But the most
impressive thing in the whole movement was the outpouring of
loyalty by the people of Taiwan toward mainland China. Despite
tensions, this manifestation of loyalty testifies to the basic racial,
cultural, and political bonds between the Chinese people in
Taiwan and their compatriots on the mainland.
Another salient aspect of this movement was that it revealed
the intensity of modern nationalism among the Chinese people
on Taiwan. One Western scholar made this succinct comment:
It is clear that the prolonged defense of Taiwan and the
establishment of a republic and it vestiges were manifestations of a rising nationalist spirit among the Chinese. The
backers of the republic evinced a marked degree of patriotism in their utterances. Furthermore, their resistance effort,
conducted in the name of the people and on behalf of China,
certainly was indicative of an outgrowth of modern
nationalism. 7
With respect to the international law aspect of the question, I
think that under any principle of international law, the 212 years of
control of Taiwan by the Ch'ing dynasty would definitely have
conferred a valid title to the territory. If not, then the whole territory
of the United States, which has only existed for 205 years, would be
of questionable title.
As to multi-system nation problem, I think Professor Johnston
missed a major crucial point - it is the Communist life style that
makes the non-Communist part of a nation unwilling to unite with
the Communist part. On the question of Taiwan, the people on
Taiwan are ethnic Chinese and they share same cultural, historical
and emotional identification with the people on the mainland. The
reason why they do not want to unite with the mainland now is
because of their dislike for the Communist system. It has nothing to
do with the Chinese historical and legal claim to Taiwan.
7. Harry J. Lamley, "The 1895 Taiwan Republic: A Significant Episode in Modern
Chinese History," 27 Journal of Asian Studies, 761 fNo. 4, Aug. 19681.

Chapter 2
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION
AND MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS- WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO CHINESE (MAINLAND-TAIWAN) CASE
Hungdah Chiu
I.

In a domestic legal system, the issues of whether a corporation
has been duly incorporated or its board of directors has been legally
selected can be easily determined by reference to domestic law. These
disputes can be authoritatively decided by a domestic court. In the
international legal system, writers and state practice generally agree
on the essential qualifications of a state, namely: (1) a permanent
population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government; and, (4) a
capacity to enter into relations with other states. 1 However, because
the international legal system is a decentralized one, there is no
centralized authority to render an authoritative decision on whether
an entity does possess these qualifications. As a result, the decision is
left to the individual states of the international community. Ideally,
each state should treat this question as a legal one and make its
decision on objective criteria recognized by international law. But the
practice of most states shows that this decision on recognizing an
entity as a state is treated much more as a question of policy, rather
than of law.
Whether or not a government can represent a state (by domestic
analogy, whether a board can represent a corporation) is also a
complicated question in light of the fact that neither writers nor state
practice has defined the applicable criteria for such a determination.
Some consider that the decisive criterion should be whether a
government has effective control over its population and territory,
while others would like to introduce additional elements, such as a
government's popular support within the state or its willingness to

1. See, e.g., Article 1 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States,
Montevideo, December 26, 1933. League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 165, p. 19.
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honor international obligations, or others. Again, like the question of
identifying an entity as a state, the determination that a government
can represent a particular state is left to the decision of the
individual states of the international community which, as state
practice shows, generally make their decision primarily on policy
grounds rather than on legal considerations.
In view of this, it is clear that the law of recognition is a highly
politicized part of public international law. This may partially
explain why the question of recognition of states and governments
has neither in theory nor in practice been solved satisfactorily. In
practice, because of the discretionary nature of recognition, a state
acts perfectly legally in not granting recognition to an entity which
in fact possesses all the necessary qualifications of statehood or to a
government which is in fact in effective control of a state's population
and territory. Needless to say, the lack of congruity between politics
and law as regards recognition of states and governments has created
difficulty and inconvenience in international relations.
Although in law a state can deny the existence of an unrecognized state or government, in reality such a denial is sometimes
impossible. And, under certain circumstances, domestic courts have
held that it is even impossible in law not to adjust the rigid rules on
the legal consequences of non-recognition of a de facto state or
government. Thus, in the case of Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic (234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (Ct. App.
1923)), in which an action was brought against the unrecognized
RSFSR, the court dismissed the case on the ground that "whether or
not a government exists . . . is a fact, not a theory." In another case
concerning an East German corporation's right to sue in the United
States, a New York court observed:
A foreign government, although not recognized by the political
ann of the United States Government, may nevertheless have de
facto existence which is juridically cognizable. . . . The lack of
jural status for such government or its creature corporation is not
determinative of whether transactions with it will be denied
enforcement in American courts. . . . (Upright v. Mercury
Business Machines Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417
(1961)).
In certain cases, a state has found it necessary in practice to deny
the legal effect of non-recognition of a foreign state or government.
For example, after the United State de-recognized the Republic of
China (ROC) on Taiwan on January 1, 1979, it was compelled to

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION

43

enact the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979,2 the effect of which
was to treat Taiwan as a state and the governing authorities there as
a government, despite the lact of formal recognition for the ROC.
With respect to the legal status of Taiwan, the TRA provides:
Sec. 4 (b) . . . .
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with
respect to Taiwan.
(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition
with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny,
or otherwise affect in any way rights or obligations (including
but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property
interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States
heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the
United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States,
shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise
affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or
recognition.
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the
laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of
diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with
respect to Taiwan.
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the
United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of
all treaties and other international agreements, including
multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and
the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United
States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in
force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until
terminated in accordance with law.
(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for
supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued
membership in any international financial institution or any
other international organization.
In international political relations, the need to disregard the
legal consequences of non-recognition is sometimes more compelling.
2. U.S. Public Law 96-8-April 10, 1979, United States Statute at Large, Vol. 93, p.

14.
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For instance, international agreements have frequently been concluded between a state and an unrecognized state or government. As
Dr. Maijorie Whiteman observed in 1959:
It is possible for bilateral treaties or agreements entered into not
to constitute recognition. Thus, during the years 1919 and 1920 a
number of bilateral treaties or agreements providing for the
repatriation of prisoners of war and nations were entered into
with the [unrecognized] Soviet government. . . . 3
Official contacts between two countries or governments not
recognizing each other have also, sometimes, become necessary in
international relations. For example, between 1955 and 1971, the
United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) had engaged
in more than one hundred ambassadorial talks between them despite
-the fact that they did not recognize each other until January 1, 1979. 4
Similarly, between 1973 and 1978, the United States and the PRC
maintained official liaison offices in each other's capital, despite the
absence of mutual recognition.

II.
Applicable rules concerning recognition of multi-system nations
or divided states or their governments, such as Korea, Germany and
China, are even more complicated. Before further exploration of the
subject, it is necessary to say a few words on the use of the term multi-system nations or divided states. The term "divided states" is
usually used in international law or by scholars in international
relations to describe the situation in Germany, Korea and China. 5
There is, however, one serious problem in using this term. This term
implies a more permanent legal separation of two parts of a state,
though none of the so-called divided states has so far accepted de facto
separation as permanent and all of them have continued to insist that
unification is still the ultimate national goal. Even in the German
case, where both parts of Germany - the Federal Republic of

3. Majorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law, (Vol. 2, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 52.
4. See Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United
States Experience, 1953-1967, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
5. See, e.g., Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, (4th ed., New York and
London: Macmillan, 198ll, pp. 67-70.
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Germany (FRG: West) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR:
East)- were admitted to the United Nations on September 18, 1973
and have normalized their relations through the Treaty of December
21, 1973 on the Basis of Intra-German Relations and accompanying
documents,& the Constitutional Court of the FRG held that the Treaty
did not conflict with the FRG Constitution, i.e., Basic Law of the
FRG, May 8, 1949. The preamble states that the Constitution was
enacted "on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was
denied [i.e., East German people]" and the "entire German people is
called upon to achieve, by true self-determination, the unity and
freedom of Germany." The Constitutional Court affirms the tenet
that Germany in its entirety has not ceased to exist as an
international entity, despite its lack of an active governmental
organization. It held that the FRG-GDR Treaty merely accepted the
existence of two parts of Germany with separate statehood, i.e., of
"two states in Germany," whose relations inter se are governed by the
rules of international law as well as by special rules flowing from
their character as parts of Germany. 7 For that reason, the FRG
Constitutional Court expressed the view that the territory of the
GDR is not foreign territory within the meaning of statutes of the
FRG and remains eligible for intra-German judicial assistance. 8 In
view of such a serious and difficult problem in using the term
"divided states," a more neutral term "multi-system nations" will be
used to describe the situation in Germany, Korea and China. The
advantage of this term is that it does not explicitly or implicitly
challenge the national goal of unification of these states. 9 Rather, it
correctly reflects the political, social and economic situations in these
states - the co-existence of communist and non-communist systems.
The term "nation" is used here instead of "state" to avoid challenging
the position of Korea and China as each part of these countries still
refuses to recognize the other part as a "state," though they all insist
that both parts are one nation.
6. International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 (1973l, pp. 16-24.
7. Hermann Mosler and Rudolf Bernhardt, <editors), Fontes Juris Gentium.
Series A, Section II, Tomus 7 [Decisions of German Courts relating to Public
International Law 1971-1975, Vol. 7], <Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag,
1979l, p. 348, 365, cited in Stefan A. Risenfeld's review in American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 75, No. 1, January 1981, p. 186.
8. B. Verf G., Judgment of March 27, 1974. 37 B. Verf G. E., Fontes Juris
Gentium, Vol. 7, p. 380, cited in Risenfeld, supra note 7, at 186.
9. See Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-system Nations: A
Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues. and Approaches," paper delivered at
Symposium on Functional Integration of Divided Nations, Seoul, Republic of Korea,
October 6-7. 1980, reprinted in Chapter 3 of this book. pp. 60-61.
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Generally speaking, international law has not yet developed
adequate rules to deal with the special case of the recognition of
multi-system nations and many countries have dealt with this
question by somewhat arbitrary application of existing rules or by
political expediency. So far as the recognition question is concerned,
there are several peculiar characteristics of multi-system nations
that deserve attention. In the first place, each part of a multi-system
nation had formerly belonged to a unified country; and while divided
now, each part still maintains the national goal of unification.
Second, until very recently each part of almost every multi-system
nation, with the possible exception of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR or East Germany), had claimed to be the sole legal
government of that country in international relations. Thus, the
representation of a multi-system nation in an international conference, until very recently, was given to one part only, while the other
part was totally excluded from participation in that conference.
Third, under the existing rules of the international law of recognition, each part of a multi-system nation can be recognized as an
independent state because it possesses all the necessary attributes of
a state in international law. However, this has not been the case in
practice because each part, with the present exception of Germany,
has declared that it would not be satisfied with such an arrangement.
On the contrary, each government has insisted on being recognized as
the sole legal government of both parts of a multi-system nation,
including that part over which it has no effective control. Moreover,
each part has used political pressure from its allies to prevent the
other part from being recognized as a state or to prevent the
government of the other part from being recognized as the legal
government even within the territory under the latter's effective
control. Fourth, despite the avowed goal of national unification, at
least in the last decade or so, there has been no serious attempt, with
the exception of Vietnam, by either part of any multi-system nation
to achieve unity. This is because each part of a divided country has
been in alliance with or under the de facto protection of a super-power
-the United States or the Soviet Union- (or, like the case of the
People's Republic of China, is itself a potential superpower) and any
attempt to upset the existing division would risk a serious global
confrontation. Although the 1954 United States-Republic of China
Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated on Janyary 1, 1979, under
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. has made it "clear that
the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future
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of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means," considers "any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States," and maintains "the capacity to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." 10 It is
generally agreed that despite the lack of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the ROC on Taiwan, any PRC attempt to take
Taiwan by force would invite strong reaction from the United States.
As a result, the divisions, though challenged by one or both parts of
each multi-system nation, are rather permanent and are generally
expected to be so at least in the forseeable future.
Needless to say, this peculiar legal and political nature of
multi-system nations has created difficulty and inconvenience in
international relations for the many countries which have had to
choose one part to the total exclusion of the other - an unhappy
choice. Moreover, this choice is, in most cases, the result of political
pressure or expediency. It does not have any basis in international
law insofar as that part which is denied recognition is in every aspect
as qualified as a state in international law as the part that is
recognized. Since the division of a multi-system nation is, as stated
before, almost permanent for all practical purposes and since the
situation is not likely to be changed without resorting to the use of
force, international law should not allow such an abnormal situation
to continue without developing new rules to deal with this new
situation.
The most objectionable part of the existing practice of recognition
is the treatment of the decision to render recognition as a political
act. This almost totally disregards the fact that, in making such a
decision, a state concurrently fulfills an international duty for the
international community, namely, identifying whether an entity does
possess the qualifications of a state or whether a government does, in
fact, exercise effective control over its territory and population.u
Under existing practice, one or more states can ignore an entity
which, by any objective criterion, is a state. Similarly, a government
which is, in fact, the only effective governing authority over a
10. Sec. 2(bl of the Taiwan Relations Act, supra note 2.
11. See generally, H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1947, in which he argued strongly in favor of treating
recognition as a legal act.
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territory and its population can also be denied legal capacity in the
international community. On the other hand, an entity which has
already lost one or more of the essential qualifications of a state, e.g.,
the loss of its territory for a considerable period of time, can still be
recognized as a state, in total disregard of realistic conditions (e.g.,
the three Baltic states- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Similarly, a
government which is no longer in effective control of a part or all of
its territory for a considerable period of time can still be recognized as
the legal government of a state (e.g., the former Spanish Republican
Government).
It is submitted that a sound principal of recognition is to treat
recognition as a legal act; furthermore, the exercise of this legal act
should be strictly in conformity with the reality of the situation.
Thus, if an entity in fact possesses all the necessary qualifications of
a state for a considerable period of time, it should be recognized de
facto and de jure as such. Similarly, in the case of recognition of a
government, the only relevant criteria should be whether the
government is in fact the only effective governing authority over a
territory and its population and whether there is a serious continuous
challenge to that authority. In both cases, recognition only verifies a
factual situation and signifies neither approval nor disapproval of the
recognized state or government, or its policy or territorial or other
claims.
If one applies the above-stated principle of recognition to the
multi-system nations case, then their recognition problem can be
satisfactorily solved. Each part of a multi-system nation should be
recognized as an independent state or international entity by third
countries. In the meantime, the national goal of unification of each
part of a multi-system nation remains unaffected by the act of
recognition. The domestic structure of each part of a multi-system
nation can also remain intact because recognition will have nothing
to do with the domestic structure or policy of the recognized state.
Domestically, the government can still claim to be the only legal
government of both parts of a multi-system nation, but such a claim
should not prevent a third country from entering into diplomatic or
other relations with the other part of a multi-system nation.

III.
In recent years, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has
taken an approach toward the German unification problem similar to
the principle of recognition suggested above. While the FRG domestically is still bound by its constitution to represent all Germans, it has
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abandoned its long-held policy of the Hal stein doctrine by recognizing
the legitimacy of the GDR. A treaty on intra-German relations was
concluded in 1973, in which both German states agreed to continue to
work toward unification by peaceful means. 12 Article 3 of the treaty
contained not only a pledge to settle the differences existing between
the two parties exclusively by peaceful means but also emphasized
the inviolability of their common border. On September 18, 1973,
both German states were admitted to the United Nations; the next
day, the foreign ministers of both, speaking before the General
Assembly, renounced, on behalf of their countries, the use of force in
their relations. On June 20, 1974, the two German states opened
formal relations with each other.
In the case of Korea, in recent years the Republic of Korea (ROK,
i.e., the South) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK, i.e., the North) have also moved to normalize their relations
and their former rigid claims to represent all Korea in international
relations. In August 1972, Red Cross officials from the ROK and
DPRK began a series of meetings in North Korea to negotiate an end
to the separation of millions of families, and on October 12, 1972,
both Korean states began political conferences at Panmunjom, with
the object of improving their mutual relations and reunifying their
country by peaceful means. Both series of meetings, however, soon
collapsed. Nevertheless, both the ROK and the DPRK now have
observer status at the United Nations and both are now members of
many international organizations. 13 Moreover, in recent international
conferences convened by the United Nations, both Korean states were
invited to participate.
The most difficult case among the multi-system nations is China.
Because of the disparity of population and territory between the
Republic of China (ROC, i.e., Taiwan) and the People's Republic of
China CPRC, i.e., the mainland)- many countries have been subject
to pressure by the PRC to "derecognize" the ROC. The ROC has been
expelled from the United Nations and its specialized agencies and
from almost all international conferences convened by the United
Nations. At one time the ROC was recognized by 60 or more countries
of the world, but the countries that now maintain diplomatic
relations with her number only 23. 14 The PRC's present policy is to

12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. See Von Glahn, supra note 5, pp. 69-70.
14. See Appendix 1.
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step up diplomatic pressure on the ROC to make it a non-state and to
insist on its right to liquidate the ROC by all means, including the
use of force (See Appendix 2 of this chapter).
While the ROC is now isolated in international political relations, it has continued to develop economic, trade and cultural
relations with more than 140 countries of the world. The ROC is the
20th largest trading country in the world and its annual foreign trade
of about 40 billion U.S. dollars is more than that of the PRC.
However, despite its continued growth in economic development and
international trade, the ROC is confronted with a great number of
practical difficulties as a result of its derecognition by many other
states. 15 For example, some countries go so far as to treat ROC
citizens abroad as stateless persons, in flagrant violation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which explicitly provides in
Article 15 that "everyone has the right to a nationality."
It is submitted that the ROC population of 18 million, while
small when compared with the PRC's 1 billion, is nevertheless larger
than more than 100 other countries of the world. By any objective
criterion, the ROC is a full-fledged subject of international law and
should be recognized as such so as to comply with the principles of
international law, justice and human rights. 16 In resolving the
Chinese case, however, one should also consider political reality as
well as the legitimate interest of the PRC. It is believed that the

15. For example, Taiwan's delegate, whether from private enterprises or from the
ROC government, cannot negotiate directly with the EEC's Textile Commission
because the EEC does not recognize the ROC as a state in the international
community. See Hungdah Chiu, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's
Republic of China," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 2
(Spring 1979), p. 406.
16. Only a few international lawyers discussed T~iwan's international status after
U.S. derecognition in their works. One recent work considers Taiwan a sui generis
entity having international status similar to Vatican City. See Louis Henkin, Richard
Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter and Hans Smit, International Law, Cases and
Materials, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 208-209. Similarly,
Professor Ian Brownlie also put Taiwan in entities sui generis, similar to Vatican City,
in his discussion on the subject of international law. See his Principles of Public
International Law, (3rd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 68-79.
Professor Von Glahn wrote that "from a factual point of view, the Republic of China
continued, of course, to exist as an independent entity, even though it was recognized
by only twenty-two members of the family of nations." Von Glahn, supra note 5, at
68-69.
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overriding national interest of the PRC is to prevent the emergence of
an independent Taiwanese Republic which would foreclose its
ultimate national goal of unification. This is also the national goal of
the ROC. However, at least in the forseeable future, the PRC could
not achieve its goal of unification through peaceful means because
both the government and the people on Taiwan do not want to give
up their higher standard of living and their substantially more
democratic political, economic and social system in order to achieve
unification. Although the PRC has offered to maintain the social and
economic system on Taiwan after "unification" in exchange for a
promise by the ROC to relinquish its sovereignty, the people and
government on Taiwan have very little trust in the PRC. Moreover,
once the ROC has given up its sovereignty in exchange for the PRC's
terms for unification, it could not trade, purchase arms or engage in
any external activities without the approval of the PRC, nor could it
prevent Peking from sending military forces to Taiwan. There would
also be no legal restraints to prevent the PRC from reneging on its
promises to Taiwan at the time of unification. In this connection the
case of Tibet is a vivid example.
Under the threat of an armed invasion of Tibet, an agreement
was concluded between the PRC and Tibet on May 23, 1951Y
Pursuant to this agreement, the PRC promised, among other things,
not to "alter the existing political system in Tibet" or to change "the
established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama," and
further pledged that all "officials of various ranks shall hold office as
usual." The agreement also provided that the "Tibetan people have
the right of exercising national regional autonomy." Despite this
agreement, the PRC ruthlessly took Tibet by force in 1959, killing
thousands of Tibetans and driving large numbers of refugees to India.
The Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama was dissolved. The
atrocities committed by the PRC in Tibet were condemned by the
International Commission of Jurists as "genocide" and by the United
Nations General Assembly as well!8 This example of the PRC's

17. Text in Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's China and
International Law,(VoJ. 1, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.
392-393.
18. See ibid., pp. 393-394 and Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic, A Report to
the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet,
Geneva, 1960.
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inauspicious record vis-a-vis Tibet precludes any peaceful reunification with Taiwan.
If peaceful unification is not possible, the only other alternative
of the PRC is to take over Taiwan by force. However, such an
adventure would risk a major confrontation with the United States
and possible intervention by the Soviet Union. It is believed that, at
least in the foreseeable future, it is not in the national interest of the
PRC to do so since it is now badly in need of U.S. support to develop
its economy and to diminish the alleged Soviet threat. Therefore, it is
believed that the status quo between Taiwan and the mainland will
be maintained indefinitely.
At present, the PRC continues its political campaign to isolate
the ROC internationally, pursues subversive activities against
Taiwan, and reiterates its threat of use of force in the hope that it
may force Taiwan to accept its terms of "unification." 19 It is believed
that such a policy might have an adverse effect. In desperation, the
ROC might resort to radical measures such as developing a nuclear
capability, or adopting a "two-China" policy rather than adhering to
the goal of unification. Such a desperate situation would also provide
opportunity for Soviet intervention.
On the other hand, if the PRC adopted a more realistic and
reasonable policy toward the ROC, it could, in the short run, avoid
pushing Taiwan toward radical measures and might, in the long run,
achieve its goal of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. Since
politics can never be divorced from reality, the PRC must acknowledge that within the state of one China there are two different
political, social and economic systems, one on the mainland and the
other on Taiwan. So far, the ROC system on Taiwan is the more
successful by far; unless the Chinese people on Taiwan see the clear
benefit of their continued adherence to the concept of one China,
there will be a tendency to move away from the goal of unification.
The present PRC policy of armed threat, international isolation and
subversive activities can only further alienate the Chinese people in
Taiwan and make ultimate reunification more difficult.
In view of the above analysis, it would be in the interest of the
PRC to stabilize the Taiwan situation within the context of the
ultimate national goal of unification. To achieve that objective, the
PRC must tolerate Taiwan's acquisition of appropriate international
legal status in the community of nations. This is essential since it is

19. See Appendix 2.
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the only way for the PRC to prevent Taiwan from moving toward a
"two-China" policy to seek international status. If Taiwan could,
within the context of the policy of one China and ultimate unfication
with the mainland, maintain appropriate international status
through official or consular relations with other countries and
through participation in inter-governmental organizations or conferences, the pressure for the people of Taiwan to urge the ROC
government to a "two-China" policy would be drastically reduced.
The PRC could tolerate such appropriate international status for
Taiwan on the express condition that if Taiwan were to declare itself
an independent republic, the PRC would immediately use force to
unify Taiwan with the mainland. Other countries could also help to
stabilize PRC-Taiwan relations by basing the establishment of
official or consular relations with Taiwan on the condition that
Taiwan not declare itself an independent republic to provoke a PRC
attack.
If the ROC on Taiwan could gain appropriate international
status vis-a-vis the PRC within the context of one China and if the
PRC could attain a certain degree of political stability and economic
development and the people there enjoy considerable political and
economic freedom, then mutually beneficial relations could gradually
develop between the mainland and Taiwan, thus making the peaceful
unification of the two parts of China a more realistic possibility.
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Appendix 1
· Countries Maintaining Diplomatic Relations
with the Republic of China
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Holy See
Honduras
Ivory Coast
Korea, Republic of
Lesotho
Malawi
Nauru
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
St. Vincent
Saudi Arabia
Swaziland
South Africa
Tuvalu
Tonga
Uraguay
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Appendix 2
A List of Important Chinese Statements on the
Use of Force Against Taiwan After January 1, 1979
- the Date of Establishing Diplomatic Relations
between the U.S. and the PRC
(1)

January 5, 1979- Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping said:
"President Carter indicated the wish that the solution of the
Taiwan question be accomplished through peaceful means. . . .
We make clear that the solution of this question is China's
internal affairs . . . . We cannot commit ourselves to use no other
than peaceful means to achieve the reunification of the motherland. We cannot tie our hands on this matter."

Beijing Review,* January 12, 1979, p. 17.
(2) January 29, 1979- Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping said:
"The way to resolve the question of bringing Taiwan back to the
embrace of the motherland is China's internal affairs." (The
phrase "internal affairs" amounts to a code word in Chinese
parlance signifying that force may be used. Thus, in 1959 when
Chinese forces massacred thousands of Tibetans in the name of
unification, the action was characterized as an "internal affair"
of China.)

Beijing Review, February 9, 1979, p. 11.
(3) January 31, 1979 interview:

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping said in an

"If we are to commit ourselves to not using armed forces at all,
then that will be equivalent to the tying of our own hands Ion the
question of reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.l"

Beijing Review, February 16, 1979, p. 20.
(4) June 20, 1980- An official Xinhua News Agency Commentary
said:
"The Chinese Government has declared time and again that the
settlement of the Taiwan question is China's internal affairs
which brooks absolutely no foreign interference."
*

Official Chinese government publication published in six languages.
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Beijing Review, June 30, 1980, p. 25.
(5) November 1, 1980 - Shijie Zhishi <World Knowledge) widely circulated magazine in China - wrote:

a

"If China resorts to non-peaceful means to settle the Taiwan
question, it is China's internal affairs and the U.S. has no right
to intervene."

Shijie Zhishi, 1980, No. 21, p. 14.
(6) December 1980 statement:

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman's

The spokesman stressed that the principled stand of the Chinese
Government on the Taiwan issue [i.e., that force can be used to
take over Taiwan] is irreversible.

Beijing Review, December 29, 1980, p. 7.
(7) January 12, 1981 readers' enquiries.

The official Beijing Review's answer to

"if we . . . resort to non-peaceful means to solve the [Taiwan 1
issue, that is entirely China's internal affair which the United
States has no right to meddle in, let alone claim that it poses 'a
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area.'"

Beijing Review, January 12, 1981, p. 9.
(8) February 19, 1981 -Professor Wang Tieya of Beijing <Peking)
University and an adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry said:
"If the Taiwan authorities insist on maintaining a stubborn
attitude against communism and refusing the offer of peace, and
if the United States continues to build up the military capability
of Taiwan, we have no alternative but to resort to nonpeaceful
means to solve the Taiwan problem. This is also China's internal
affair, and the United States has no right to interpose."

Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, People's Republic of
China, February 24, 1981, p. U3.
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(9) July 1, 1981 -An article in the first issue of the Guoji wenti
yanjiu (Studies in International Problems) quarterly attacking
the Taiwan Relations Act and claimed that "whatever means
the Chinese use in bringing Taiwan back to the motherland to
achieve national unification is entirely China's internal affairs.

"
Reported in Dagongbao (Impartial Daily, a Hong Kong Communist newspaper), July 6, 1981.
(10) July 4, 1981 - The People's Daily attacked the Taiwan
Relations Act as amounting to obstructing Taiwan's unification
with the mainland and "as a result, China may be forced to
resort to nonpeaceful methods to settle the Taiwan problem."

Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), July 4, 1981.

Chapter 3

THE UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF MULTI-SYSTEM
NATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
BASIC CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND APPROACHES
Yung Wei*
The division of China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany into
communist and non-communist political systems has been a major
development since the end of the Second World War. The emergence
of divided nations is not only a most unfortunate experience for the
peoples of these nations but also one of the primary destabilizing
factors in international politics. The Berlin Crisis, the Korean War,
the Quemoy Crisis and the Vietnam War all involved the divided
nations and the major powers of the world. What are the prospects for
reunification of divided nations? How can governments and peoples of
the divided nations work toward the goal of national unification?
What kind of concepts and conceptual schemes can we use to best
analyze the problems relating to divided nations? These are but a few
of the questions which have been raised frequently by political
leaders and scholars of the divided states. 1
The purpose of this paper is to examine critically the basic
concepts and approaches which have been applied to the study of
multi-system nations, to compare the similarities and differences of
various divided nations, to identify the major factors prohibiting or
conducive to the reunification efforts, and finally, to make some
projections into the future. A special section is devoted to an analysis
of the problem of division and unification in the Chinese setting
which historically has affected political developments in neighboring
states such as Korea and Vietnam.
I.

The comparative study of divided nations has been a late
development in political science. Critical interdisciplinary study of
* Originally delivered at Symposium on Functional Integeration of Divided Nations,
Seoul, Republic of Korea, October 6-7, 1980.
1. See John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic
Impact," Asian Survey, 15 !Nov. 19751, pp. 957-970.
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divided nations from a social science perspective rather than from a
policy angle did not emerge until the 1960s.2 Prior to that, the studies
of the unification of various states into a larger unit were focused on
Western Europe and the emerging nations. Using concepts such as
"social communication," "political integration," "security community," "overlapping membership," "multiply loyalty," and "nationbuilding," scholars like Karl W. Deutsch, Earnest A. Haas and
Lucian W. Pye have made much contribution to our understanding of
the process of unification efforts among national and sub-national
political entities in many parts of the world. 3
Yet a survey of literature on divided nations reveals two basic
problems. First, there is the lack of a commonly accepted term which
is neutral and precise enough to be an effective operational concept
for empirical research on "divided nations." Second, there is a failure
in differentiating two separate types of division and unification
processes, i.e., those which involve communist political systems and
those which do not involve the confrontation between communist and
non-communist systems.
As for basic concepts, a host of terms including "the partitioned
nations," "the divided states," "the divided nations," and "two China's
(Korea's, Germany's)" has been used. All of these terms designate
certain features of the "divided nations," yet none is accurate and
broad enough to reflect and include all the cases. For example, the
term "partitioned nations" can not be used to refer to countries which
were divided, not through international intervention or by international agreements, but through internal war, such as the case of

2. The formation of a "Divided Nations Internet" in the Comparative and
interdisciplinary Studies Section of the International Studies Association in 1969 was a
pioneering effort toward empirical study of divided systems and peoples. For some
examples of the results of this intellectual endeavor, see Yung Wei (ed.l, "Political
Partitioning, Migration, Minorities, and Non-State Nations: Models, Propositions, and
Intellectual Exchanges," (CISS working paper no. 49, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburg, 1975) and Ray E. Johnston (ed. I, The Politics of
Division, Partition, and Unification (New York: Praeger, 19761.
3. For a sample of the ideas of these scholars, see Karl W. Deutsch, Political
Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 19541; K.
W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of
Nationality (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 19551; Ernst B. Haas, the Uniting of
Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 19581; Lucian W. Pye, Politics,
Personality, and Nation-Building (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 19621;
and Amitai Etzioni, Political Integration (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965).
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China. The concept of "divided states" is broader than "partitioned
nation," yet many of the leaders and scholars of the so-called "divided
states" are very reluctant to accept the word "state" in the concept
because it implies a more permanent separation of a nation into two
or more legal entities under international law. The government of the
Republic of China (ROC), for instance, has resisted the idea of calling
today's China a "divided state." Similarly, most of the "divided
states" resent terms such as "two China's," "two Korea's," and "two
Germany's." As for "divided nations," it is a term used most often by
scholars; however, it also has the misleading connotation that there
are two or more nations in a "divided" state - an idea which is
detested by most leaders and scholars of divided systems.
In order to avoid the shortcomings of the above-mentioned
concepts, I propose that we substitute "multi-system nations" for
"divided states" and "divided nations." There are several advantages
in using this new term. First, it clarifies the fact that the reality in a
so-called "divided nation" is not the separation of one nation into two
or more nations, but the emergence of more than one political system
within one nation, either as a result of international arrangement or
as the product of internal wars. More significantly, the term
"multi-system nation" reflects faithfully the true nature and cause of
division, i.e., the confrontation and competition between noncommunist systems and communist systems in various countries.
In fact, if it had not been for the expansion of communist forces
with the support of the Soviet Union, all the three multi-system
nations probably would have been united at the end of the Second
World War. For in none of three multi-system nations was there
serious cultural, ethnic, and geographical cleavages which could have
prevented the restoration of a united China, Korea, and Germany
after both Nazism and Japanese militarism were crushed. Both
China and Korea had been united countries with thousands of years
of history. As for Germany, it also had a history of political
unification for about one hundred years. It is the emergence of
communist regimes in these three nations and the failure of the free
world to act decisively which has led to the continuation of competing
political systems with different political ideologies, economic systems,
and life styles. The key issue here then is not the creation of
conditions for hitherto separate geographical units to develop common cultural and national identity, but a decision as to by which
system - the non-communist or the communist - that multisystems should be re-unified and restored to their previous state of
national unification.
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II.
Having clarified the concept of "multi-system nations" and the
nature of their re-unification efforts, we may proceed to compare the
similarities and differences among the multi-system nations. In
terms of similarities, all the three multi-system nations historically
have been composed of people of common background and have
shared a common culture. The multi-system nations also share
common features such as ideological cleavage along a communistanti-communist line, military alliances or arrangements with opposing superpowers of the world, and frequent border incidents coupled
with occasional large scale military confrontations. In addition, all
the non-communist parts of the multi-system nations have been the
recipients of refugees who have chosen to leave their homes to escape
communist rule. The non-communist parts all also have higher living
standards than the non-communist side. 3 Data in Table 1 clearly
illustrate the case.
There are, however, different patterns in the relations between
the different parts of multi-system nations and between multi-system
nations and other states. The two Germanys have somewhat
"resolved" their problems, or to put it more accurately, reduced their
mutual hostilities, which has led to: (1) the exchanges of representatives between Berlin and Bonn; (2) dual recognition of the two
Germanys by other states; (3) dual representation of both Germanys
in the diplomatic corp of other states; (4) membership for both East
and West Germany in the United Nations; and, (5) direct trade and
tourism between the two systems. 4
The situation between the ROC and mainland China represents
the opposite end of the German arrangements. Here we find that
there is virtually no interaction between two systems. Both political
systems claim to be the sole legitimate government of China, and
insist that they oppose the division of China into two legal entities. In
October 1971, the Republic of China withdrew from the United
Nations after the "important issue" resolution was defeated in the

4. See Willy Brandt, "The State of the Nation in Divided Germany," Relay from
Bonn <New York: Germany Information Center, January 24, 1974!; Berenince Carrol,
"The Partition of Germany: Cold War Compromise," in Thomas E. Hachey <ed.l, The
Problem of Partition: Peril to World Peace <Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1972>;
Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik <London: Oxford University Press, 1971>;
and John H. Herz, "Germany," in Gregory Henderson (ed.l, Divided Nations in a
Divided World (New York: David Mckay, 1974!, pp. 3-42.
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U.N. General Assembly. Since then, Communist China has been the
sole delegation representing China in the United Nations. In
December 1978, the Carter Administration of the United States
unilaterally recognized mainland China and abrogated the ROC-USA
Mutual Defense Treaty on January 1, 1980. The government of the
Republic of China (GRC) strongly protested the United States' action
and asserted that "it will impair the long term interests of the United
States and endanger the peace and stability of the Asian-Pacific
region." 5 A "Taiwan Relations Act" was passed by the U.S. Congress
which led to the creation of two "private" organizations- American
Institute in Taiwan and The Coordinating Council for North American
Affairs in Washington D.C. - to conduct practical interactions
between the two countries. In addition to their admission into the
U.N. and the recognition by the United States, the Chinese
Communists also made substantive advances in gaining recognition
from other countries. But the GRC has been able to retain formal
recognition by 23 nations.
The case of the two Koreas falls somewhere in between the two
Germany's and two China's. Thus far, North and South Korea have
not formally recognized each other. But a North-South dialogue has
been maintained intermittently since July 1972. The "detente"
between the two Koreas has not reduced significantly and hostility
between the two Korean political systems. 6 It did, however, lead to
dual recognition and dual representation of the two Korean governments in a number of countries. It is hard to assess which side has
gained more by opening up dialogue. But the digging of underground
tunnels into the South by North Koreans definitely reduced the
mutual trust essential for the success of this type of endeavors. Table
2 illustrates the different levels and extent of contacts between
various parts of multi-system nations.

5. "Foreign Minister Tsiang Yen-si's Remarks at the Opening Session of
Sino-U.S. Talks, December 28, 1978," (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China,
December 28, 1978).
6. Numerous studies have been done on the question of reunification of the two
Korean political systems, particularly by Korean scholars themselves. For a more
optimistic view, see Hak-joon Kim, "Present and Future of the South-North Talks,"
Korea and World Affairs, 2 (Summer, 1979), pp. 209-222. For a somewhat pessimistic
analysis, see Yong Soon Yim, "The Prospect of Peaceful Unification of Korea in the
1980's," Korea and World Affairs, 1 <Spring, 1980l, pp. 187-208; see also Young Whan
Kihl, "International Integration Theories and Problems of Unifying a Divided Nation:
The Case of Korea," in R. E. Johnston fed.), op. cit., pp. 55-66; Dong-Hyun Kim,
"Building a Model of political Systems Integration - Toward Korean Unification,"
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The continuing existence of multi-system nations creates unique
problems for international law. According to conventional international law, there are three types of international personalities: the
states, the belligerents and the insurgents. Judging by the criteria
specified in international law, political systems in the divided nations
fall between "state" and "belligerent." In terms of the qualifications
of a state, such as a government, a population ruled by that
government, a territory under effective control by that government
and the ability of that government to carry out international
obligation, almost all the systems within the divided nations qualify
for state status. Yet, confrontation between various parts of multisystem nations in political, economic and sometimes military arenas,
plus the impact of East-West bloc politics, have prevented a full
recognition of all parts of a multi-system nation by other states.
Other than mutual hostility and cold war situations, another
element which has prevented multiple recognition and multiple
representation of the divided nations, or multi-system nations, has
been the problem of overlapping claims of sovereignty and territorial
control. By "overlapping claims," it is meant that various systems of
a divided nation make claims that they represent not only the people
and the territories which are under their effective control, but also
the part of a divided state which they do not control. Consequently,
diplomatic recognition and representation for the divided nation have
become a "zero-sum game" in which other states are compelled to
choose one of the political systems of a divided nation as the only
legitimate government of all the territory of that nation despite the
fact that it controls only a part of it.
The German solution almost amounts to the creation of two
separate states. The Korean situation seems to be moving toward the
German model. Whereas, before 1971, that is, before mainland
China's entrance into the United Nations, the ROC had been the
beneficiary of the "zero-sum game," with the majority of states
recognizing only the government in Taipei. Since 1971, however,
Communist China has fully utilized the conventional international
law to gain diplomatic recognitions at the expense of Taipei.;
Korea and World Affairs, 1 (Spring, 1979), pp. 67-96; and Joungwon Kim, Divided
Korea, the Politics of Development (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1975).
For opinions of Western scholars toward the Korean Unification problems, see
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "the New South-North Dialogue," Korea and World
Affairs, 2 (Summer, 1979); Everett Klainjans, "Reunification of a Nation," Korea and
World Affairs, 2 (Winter, 1978), pp. 529-543; and Gregory Henderson, "Korea," in
Henderson. op. cit., pp. 43-98.
7. For a more detailed discussion on the legal status of divided nations under
international law, see Yung Wei, "Divided Nations and International Law: Political
Reality and Legal Practice," (paper presented to the Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association, St. Louis, Mo., U.S.A., March 16-20, 1977).
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The government and the people of The Republic of China fully
realized the plot of the Chinese Communists in trying to isolate
Taiwan from the outside world. Every effort is made to strengthen
existing diplomatic ties as well as to open new ones. Premier Sun
Yun-suan's visit to Panama, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic,
coupled with increased contacts with European countries represent a
growing dynamism in the external relations of the ROC.

III.
After a comparative analysis of the various multi-system nations, an examination of problems of division and unification of China
is in order. One of the prerequisites in studying the problem of
unification and division in the Chinese setting is to take a look at
China's long history. During more than three thousand years of her
recorded history, China as a nation has gone through many periods of
unity and disunity. Dynasties and empires have emerged, prospered,
degenerated, and disintegrated; yet the Chinese nation has always
survived. An examination of the history of the dynasties and periods
of China led to our discovery that there have been almost equal
periods of unity and disunity, throughout the three thousand years of
recorded Chinese history.
As data in Table 3 reveal, of the 3097 years of Chinese history
covered by our survey, 1963 years, or 63.4 percent of the total years,
were periods of unity. Whereas 1134 years, 36.6 percent of the total,
were years of division. Given the fact that there were considerable
periods of internal wars and uprisings even in the supposedly unified
dynasties, the actual years of division should approach a parity with
the years of unification. The implication of this historical fact is that
most Chinese who have some knowledge of the history of China
understand that the unification and division of China as a state has
been a repetitive, and even cyclical process. With this kind of
understanding, the Chines people who happen to live during a period
of division do not easily run into despair, for they can patiently wait
for the eventual unification of the state at some point in the future.
Other than the cyclical oscillations of unification and division
throughout Chinese history, another distinct feature of the Chinese
experience has been the emphasis on cultural assimilation and
unification. Since ancient times, the Chinese people have always
been looking at their environment with a distinction between the
"world of the Chinese" which was in the center, and the "world of
non-Chinese" which was surrounding regions. Until contacts with
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Western powers, leaders of China considered the sphere of influence
of the Chinese civilization- the "T'ien-Hsia (under the sky)," or the
world. Within this cultural sphere, the Chinese had, at times, rather
elaborated "international systems" composed by smaller states. As a
matter of fact, there were such detailed codes of behavior among the
contending states during the Ch'iin-chiu period (722-481 B.C.) and
Warring States period (403-211 B.C.) that a multi-states systems was
actually in existence. 8
To both ancient and modern Chinese people, the existence of
multiple political systems within the cultural sphere of the Chinese
civilization does not mean the discontinuity of the "Chung-kuo (the
Middle Kingdom)." A far more serious threat to the Middle Kingdom
would be the invasion of foreigners (non-Chinese) with the intention
of eliminating the Chinese culture. Hence, we may say that the
Chinese people placed more emphasis on the perpetuation of cultural
unification than territorial unification. Given different types of
political systems in China, the Chinese people would probably rate
and prefer, in descending order: (1) a unified Chinese political
system; (2) a divided multi-system Chinese nation; (3) a divided
China with both Chinese and foreign states; (4) a political system
ruled by foreigners yet maintaining Chinese cultural patterns; and,
(5) a completely foreign political as well as cultural system in China.
(In order to illustrate this process of unification and partition along
its various outcomes, a flow-chart analyses is presented in FiiDJ.re 1.)
Several tentative conclusions or propositions can be drawn from
this analysis. First, the Chinese consider cultural unification more
important than political unification. They generally assumed that
with a common cultural basis, a multi-system nation will sooner or
later be reunited again. Second, as a people who are highly conscious
of their history, the Chinese fully realize the cyclical nature of
unification and division throughout the history of China. As a result,
the Chinese generally demonstrate more patience when living during
a period of division with the conviction that their nation will
eventually be reunited. Finally, although the Chinese tend to treat
their territorial domain as the "world," they also are painfully aware
of the constant threat posed by neighboring foreign systems which
have invaded China many times in the past. Thus, the preservation
of the Chinese political system and Chinese culture against foreign
invaders has preoccupied the Chinese. 9
8. Richard Walker, The Multi-State System in Ancient China (Hamden, Conn.:
The Shoe String Press, 1953).
9. For a more detailed discussion on this subject, see Yung Wei, "The Division
and Unification of Chinese Political Systems," <CISS working paper no. 35, University
Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburg, 19751.
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Figure 1

UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF CHINA:
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Having clarified some basic concepts in regard to "unification"
and "division" in the Chinese context, we can now turn to the more
concrete questions of unification or division of the ROC and
Communist China. First of all, it should be pointed out that the
present division of China into two hostile political systems is the
result of more than fifty years of fierce struggle between the Chinese
Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. From an historical
perspective, we may view the present confrontation as a phenomenon
comparable to the competition between different elite groups in the
early part of dynastical change.
Several basic issues are involved in the prolonged struggle
between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists. First, there
is the political issue focusing on the question: "Which is the better
form of government for the people of China?" The nationalists have
followed the teaching of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and have adopted a
constitutional government since 1947. The Chinese Communists, on
the other hand, have adopted the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and
adhere to the idea of a "people's dictatorship" as the basis of
government. Since the fall of the "gang of four," and the start of the
"Four Modernization" program, the political structure on Mainland
China has undergone rapid and drastic changes, yet the principle of
proletarian dictatorship has persisted. At the present, there is no sign
whatsoever that either side would accept even part of the political
ideal and political structure of the other side.
Other than the political issue, there is the issue of the attitude of
the political leaders toward the traditional social structure of China.
The GRC basically accepts the social structure of traditional China,
although it tries to improve, through land reform and a social welfare
program, the lot of the poor sector of the Chinese population. The
Communists, on the other hand, view the traditional society of China
as a class society with the "exploiting class" on one side and the
"exploited class" on the other. It is the task of the Communists to
carry on class struggle to suppress and to eliminate the so-called
"exploiting class," and to elevate the workers and peasants in China
to the position of a ruling class. In short, while the Chinese
Nationalists call for a mild social reform, the Communists seek for
radical social revolution in China. On this, there is very little room
for compromise between the two opposing political elites.
A third important issue between the Nationalist and Communist
political systems is to be found in their attitude toward economic
activities of the people. The Nationalists recognize and protect
private ownership, although they do have programs to discourage
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excessive use of property rights to the extent they may be detrimental to the interests of society. The Nationalist leaders also
recognize and appreciate the role played by the entrepreneur in a
free-market economy.
The Communists detest and prohibit private ownership and run
a tight state-controlled economy in which there is little room reserved
for the pursuit of profit by private businessmen and industrialists.
Recently there have been some indications that the Chinese Communists have relaxed somewhat their suppressive hold on the
economy. It is, however, unlikely that Communist China will go all
the way towards the so-called "Market Socialism," as practiced by
Yugoslavia, which is still considered a restricted economy by Western
standards.

IV.
Having examined the issues between the Chinese Nationalists
and Communists, we may proceed to conduct a probabilistic analysis
on the endogenous as well as exogenous variables on the future
relations between the ROC and mainland China. Let us first turn to
the endogenous variables. As a closed system, mainland China's
moves toward Taiwan will largely be determined, not by the attitude
of the people, but by China's political elite. At the present time, the
leaders of mainland China seem to be temporarily satisfied with a
peace offensive coupled with psychological warfare against Taiwan.
But if a power struggle occurs, it is possible that a new leadership
may try to consolidate its rule by adopting a far more militant
attitude toward Taiwan.
Since its recognition by the government of the United States, the
communist regime on mainland China has become quite aggressive
in its political propaganda and psychological warfare against the
ROC. On January 1, 1980, a so-called "letter to compatriots in
Taiwan" was released by the Chinese Communists in the name of the
standing committee of the People's Congress. In that letter, the
Chinese Communists offered to open up trade, postal service and
tourist service arrangements with the government and people of the
ROC. These offers were categorically rejected by the GRC. On
January 11, 1979, Premier Sun Yun-suan issued the statement that
unless the Chinese Communists abondon Marxism-Lenism and class
struggle, restore the human rights of the people on mainland China
and respect private ownership by the people, there was no room
whatsoever for any dialogue. The Premier warned the people of the
ROC that "peace talks proposed by the Chinese Communists are only
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a form of class struggle through which the Communists seek to
induce us to surrender . . . . We have learned from history that those
who place their trust in Communists falsehoods face a tragic end. The
usurpation of the Chinese mainland and the fall of Vietnam are
tragedies that are fresh in our memories. " 10
From the statement of Premier Sun, and many similar statements issued by the GRC, it is clear that the government and people
of the ROC have no inclination to start a dialogue with the Chinese
Communists. The government of the ROC has ruled out trading with
mainland China. With the exception of contacts between Chinese
students both from Taiwan and from Mainland in Western countries
and occasional rendevous between scholars from both sides at
international academic meetings, there is no contact between the two
separate systems.
The government and people of the ROC are confident that their
path toward. modernization is more scientific, effective, revolutionary
and humane than the Chinese Communist approach. As the Chinese
Communist leaders have already admitted that in "economic matter[s], we will learn from Taiwan," the people in the ROC reminded
the communist leaders on mainland China that in politics, they also
should learn from Taipei. 11 This is followed by the slogan, "learn
everything from Taipei. National unification will be easy to attain."

v
Looking to the foreseeable future, several general projections
may be made on the question of unification of multi-system nations.
First, short of a major war, it is unlikely that any of the divided
nations will be able to reach total national unification in the near
future. The forceful and brutal annexation of South Vietnam by
North Vietnam through the so-called "war of national liberation"
should serve as a painful reminder to the non-communist side of the
multi-system nations that the communists never rule out the use of
force as a means of solving "domestic" issues.
Second, the communist side will continue using "unification" as
an instrument to expand its influence into the non-communist side,
10. See "No Deals with Communism," (Statement by Premier Sun Yun-suan on
January 11, 1979). For similar analysis on Chinese Communist negotiating tactics, see
Kenneth T. Young. Negotiating with the Chinese Communists (New York: McGrawHill, 1968).
11. See Premier Sun Yun-suan, "Closing Remark at the Second National
Development Seminar," (Taipei, November, 1979).
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just as it has used nationalism as a means to carry out its "united
front" tactics. It always tries to manipulate the sentiment toward
national unification whenever it sees fit, but will back out from
substantive steps toward unification whenever it finds conditions
unfavorable to its interests. Furthermore, Communists in various
countries constantly talk about national unity but will never hesitate
in establishing separatist movement and local illegal regimes such as
the Soviet regimes created by the Chinese communists in some
remote regions of China while the Nationalist central government
was engaged in a bitter war of resistance against the Japanese
during the Second World War.
Third, the economic gap between the non-communist and communist sides of multi-system nations will be enlarged, making
unification efforts even more difficult. As a matter of fact, poor living
conditions and a lack of political and social freedom have been the
two major reasons which led to millions of people leaving the
communist part of divided nations. In the final analysis, it is
essential for the non-communist side to keep a strong economy, to
develop a solid base for political cohesion and stability and to
maintain a military force which is strong enough both for self defense
against communist aggression and for preparing to respond to the
request for freedom from the compatriots on the communist side.
More than any other method and process, these are probably the
three sure ways not only for safeguarding our security but also for
preserving the opportunity for eventual unification of our motherland.
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The Multi-Systems Nations: Comparative Data on Territory, Population, GNP, and Per Capita Income
Territory
under Control
Percent
Thousands
Sq. Mi.
of Total
China
ROC
Mainland
Germany
FRG (West)
GDR (East)
Korea
ROK
North

14
3,700
96
42
38
47

Population in 1976
(in millions)
Percent
Figure
of Total

GNP (1976)
(in billions of
U.S. dollars)

Per Capita
Income (1976)
(U.S. dollars)

0.38
99.62

16.3
835.0

1.9
98.1

17.1
307.0

1,050
370

59.6
30.4

61.5
16.7

78.7
21.3

461.0
75

7,510
4,520

44.7
55.3

35.8
16.2

Source: 1978 World Bank Atlas, (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1978).
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Relations Between Multi-System Nations: A Comparative Paradigm

Stationing of Formal
Representative In Each
Other's Capital
Dual Representation In
The U.N.
Direct Trade And Exchanges
Of People
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Table 3
UNIFICATION AND DIVISION OF CHINA:
A CHRONOLOGICAL CHART
Periods (dynasties) of Unity

Periods of division

Chou Dynasty, West
(1122-771 (B.C.)
Chou, East (770-249 B.C.)
Ch'un-chiu period (722-481 B.C.)
Warring State period (403-211 B.C.)
Ch'in (211-202 B.C.)
Han, Fonner (202 B.C. - 9 A.D.)
Han, Later (9-220 A.D.)
Three Kingdoms (220-280 A.D.)
Tsin, West (280(265)-317)
Tsin, East (317 -420)
South and North Dynasties (420-590)
Sui (590-618)
Tang (618-906)
Five Dynasties (907-960)
Sung, North (960-1126)
Sung, South (1127-1279)
Yuan (1260-1368)
Ming (1368-1644)
Ch'ing (1644-1912)
Republican China, 1912Total years of unification: 1963 years. Total years of division: 1134 years.
Percentage of the total years covered:
63.4%

36.6%

Data source: Dun Li, The Ageless Chinese, A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 562-568.

Chapter 4
MULTI-SYSTEM NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DUTCH PRACTICE
Ko Swan Sik
Introduction
This paper is intended to present a survey of Dutch practice with
regard to the three multi-system nations constituting the main
objects of analysis of this Conference. The Dutch are not known to be
particularly adventurous in unusual situations. Their virtue lies
more in being cautious and rather conservative. Being a small
country they would rather follow the lead of bigger Powers than act
as a vanguard. Being the heirs to a great Calvinist tradition,
however, they are capable of being radical in following the imperatives of their conscience, and of legal rules. Besides they have been, of
old, the traditional merchants of Western Europe. These may be
among the reasons why the harvest of my endeavours has been
rather meager in quantity, sometimes touching for the attachment to
scruple, but also sometimes the surprising pragmatism appearing
from it.
The survey of Dutch practice will be preceded by some remarks
concerning the general aspects of multi-system nations and the
specific aspects of the German, Korean and Chinese cases.

1. The concept of "multi-system nation"1
The term refers to a territorially defined nation within the
socio-cultural sense of the word, which is for one reason or another
not politically united in one state structure, and parts of which are
under the factual authority of more than one mutually contending
governmental regimes. 2 For all its ethnic and cultural characteristics
1. See, inter alia, the following literature on "divided States": Luis MartinezAguila, "L'Etat divise", 91 Journal de droit international (Clunet) (1964) 265-284;
Gilbert Caty, Le statut juridique des Etats divises (Pedone, Paris 1969); J. Crawford,
The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, 1979) Chapter 10: "The Divided
States".
2. Jochen A. Frowein has devoted a legal analysis of the international status of
such entities in their relations with States which have not recognized them as a
separate State or as the legal government of an existing State. See, Das de
facto-Regime im V6lkerrecht [The de facto regime in international law] (1968) p. 7.
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the nation in question could normally constitute one state and in
most cases it actually has in the past. Consequently, the contending
regimes in some form assert their endeavour to achieve reunification. This means that for the parties directly involved the
current divided situation is not considered to be final. The causes of
such situations may be internal, such as a civil war, either for
governmental supremacy or secession; they may also be external,
such as an international war and the accompanying impact of, or
pressure by, outside Powers and ideologies.
In themselves, these elements do not present evidence of a
special, legally relevant situation, nor the need to create a new legal
category. Unconstitutional change of government, partition, transfer
of territory, and other kinds of change in the existence or dimensions
of a State are familiar phenomena to the law of nations. It is
submitted that from the international law perspective, the relevant
distinction lies in the indefinite and prolonged length of time during
which it has not been possible to reach a settlement which is
conclusive enough to serve as the basis for future legal relationships
under general international law.
2.

The variety of multi-system nations

A comparison of the actual cases of multi-system nations reveals
a number of differences in the attitude of the contending regimes. For
a better understanding of the nature of these differences and of their
legal implications, a categorization like the one drawn up by John H.
Herz in 19743 appears to be a useful point of departure. In terms of
recognition between the contending power centers, the following
three categories may be distinguished: (1) mutual non-recognition, (2)
unilateral recognition, and (3) mutual recognition.
In category 1, the "purest" one, each of the power centers claims
jurisdiction over the whole country, and the factual division is
consistently seen as a purely intermediate phase in a civil war in
which the parties struggle for control over the entire country.
Consequently, the contending regimes will not, and in fact cannot,
move to the recognition of the opponent since that would imply the
relinquishment of its claims.
In the second category, one of the parties does claim jurisdiction
over the whole country as well as the right of sole representation, but
the other strives for a legally independent and separate status of the
3. John H. Herz, "Korea and Germany as divided nations: the systemic impact",
15 Asian Survey (1975) pp. 957-970.
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territory under its de facto control. In legal terms this may amount to
either secession or dismemberment, depending on whether or not the
party claiming control over the whole country considers itself
identical to, and the continuation of, the original nation State. While
the regime aiming at a separate existence is, of course, prepared to
recognize the other one as an equally separate entity, a similar
attitude would be self-destructive for the claims of this latter regime.
Finally, in the third category, both power centers claim a
separate existence for each within the limits of its actual control.
Consequently, each will be prepared to recognize the other. But for
the more distant aim of re-unification, the resulting situation may
here too be legally defined as dismemberment or secession. In view of
the professed striving for re-unification, it might be said that the
phenomenon of multi-system nations could continue to exist politically even when it has already ceased to have legal relevance. The
developments since the early seventies with regard to the two
Germanies seem to confirm this in principle.
Among the three multi-system nations which constitute the
object of analysis at the present conference China is up till now a
clear example of the first category. The facts and arguments used in
the debate are sufficiently known and need not be repeated here. One
could of course speculate about future developments which are, so far
as the legal alternatives are concerned, not excitingly new. Briefly
the two possible developments are: (a) unification, either peaceful or
by force; and, (b) further and continuing separate development of the
two parts, either resulting in formal separation or continuing the
present ambiguous status of Taiwan in international law. Under the
first alternative one could envisage a constitutional structure allowing for autonomy to some extent. So far as international law is
concerned, such autonomy goes farthest where the autonomous part
would have competence to enter international relations. The UN
membership of the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia offers an example.
However, since the ideological and economic ties would be absent in
the Chinese case its feasibility remains remote. With regard to the
second alternative, since Mr. Clough has analyzed this problem in
detail in Chapter 7, I will not be repetitive here.
The Korean case may at least historically be included in the first
category. Originally, both contending regimes claimed jurisdiction
over the entire peninsula! While the North based its claim on the
4. G. Henderson, "Korea", in G. Henderson, R. N. Lebow and J. G. Stoessinger,
Divided Nations in a Divided World (1954), p. 77.
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"Joint Conference of Representatives of North and South Korean
Political Parties and Social Organizations" of April, 1948, and the
elections of August, 1948, of deputies to the Supreme People's
Assembly, resulting in the Proclamation of the DPRK in September,
1948, the South referred to the May, 1948 elections and the relevant
UN resolutions. 5 The all-Korean claims were consequently included
in the constitutions, particularly Art. 3 of the ROK constitution of
19486 and Art. 103 of the 1948 DPRK constitution. 7 On the
international level the claim was expressed in some sort of Hallstein
Doctrine.
Later developments show that the apprehension for political and
economic survival, and the efforts to prevail over the ideological
adversary provided stronger motives for the policies of both the ROK
and the DPRK than the upholding of the banner of all-Korean
national unity. Even the long-time objections of the DPRK against
the idea of simultaneous UN membership of both Korean partialStates are not sufficient proof of a consistent one-Korea policy on the
part of the DPRK. Reference could be made, inter alia, to the
competition between the two Korean regimes in entering into
diplomatic relations with other States, whether or not combined with
the suggestion of "cross-recognition", and, especially since the
general decrease of tension in the early seventies, the simultaneous
membership of several international organizations, and the idea of a
peace treaty or non-agression pact between the two power centers. So
far as the ROK is concerned, the evolution in its policy with regard to
the intra-Korean question has been characterized as one from
"legality" to "legitimacy".8
It seems that the pursuit of re-unification remains alive but does
not take first priority among the many concerns of State and society.
It would be achieved rather as the end-result of a time-consuming
process that should commence with the consolidation and normalization of intra-Korean relations.
Germany, finally, could well be classed in the second of our three
categories. Apart from the various theories that German scholarship
5. Resolutions 112 (II) of 14 Nov. 1947, and 195 (III) of 12 Dec. 1948.
6. "The territory of the ROK shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its
accessory islands".
7. "The Capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the City of
Seoul". This provision was changed by the constitutional amendment of 1972:
Pyongyang instead of Seoul is now mentioned as the State Capital.
8. J. H. Ha and G. M. Luebbert, "A Korean Settlement: the Prospects and
Problems", 17 Asian Suruey (1977) pp. 735-752.
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has elaborated on the legal nature of the post-war German situation,
there is no doubt that the FRG has consistently considered itself to be
the continuation of and identical to the pre-war German Reich, while
the GDR has for all practical purposes considered itself a new State
which is at most a partial successor to a dismembered Reich.
The FRG initially claimed jurisdiction over all Germany but has
considerably watered down its views since the introduction of the
Ostpolitik and the resulting treaties. It has in fact retreated to the
initial GDR thesis of "two States and one German nation" (GDR
Constitution of 1968, Art. 1). On the other hand the GDR has now
taken a step further, and has developed the thesis of two States and
two German nations, itself embodying the separate, socialist German
nation ("sozialistischer deutscher National-staat'' - socialist German
Nation-State). 9
It may be concluded from this survey that while it is not
impossible to find situations which can fairly neatly be placed into
one of the three categories, it is much more probable to find mixtures
and transitional phenomena.
The basic legal problem involved in the multi-system situation is
the fact of competing claims to jurisdiction in the first and second
categories. This jurisdiction may refer to territory or to persons.
Internationally, the competing claims could raise various questions.
One of them is the little-analyzed question of the territorial
applicability of treaties entered into by a government claiming to
represent a divided State in its entirety. Reference may be made to
the exchange of notes between Japan and the ROC relating to the
1952 peace treaty which provided, inter alia, that "the terms of the
present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be
applicable to all territories which are now or which may hereafter be,
under the control of its Government". This example may confirm the
suggestion that, in spite of their inclusive claims, the contending
regimes will define their policies with a view to the factual control
over their part of the nation's territory 10 and that third States will
9. Note in this connection the absence of a reference to One German nation and
reunification in the GDR-USSR Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
Assistance of 7 Oct. 1975 which substituted the earlier treaty of 12 June 1964. See Th.
Schweisfurth, "Die neue vertragliche Bindung der DDR an die Sowjetunion" [The new
treaty ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union], 30 Europa Archiu (1975), pp.
753-764. See also B. Meissner, "Der Sowjetische Nationsbegriff und die Frage des
Fortbestands der deutschen Nation" [The Soviet concept of a nation and the question of
the continued existence of the German nation], 32 Europa Archiv (1977), pp. 315-324,
who indicates the Soviet interest in a definitive partition in view of the buffer function
of the GDR.
10. Cf R.R. Bot, Non-recognition and Treaty Relations (Leiden, 1968), p. 208-209.
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take due care of the factually limited authority of the regime
concerned.
Another question concerns the binding effect of such a treaty on
the competing government when the latter succeeds in taking over
power over the whole country: the question is in fact whether and to
what extent a change of government and constitutional structure
should result in a clean-slate with regard to treaty obligations. We
refer to statements made by the Peking Government in this respect 11
and to accession by the PRC to multilateral conventions already
signed by the ROCY
In the EEC arrangement with regard to Germany we find an
example of how an international organization takes account of the
claim of one of the contending parties in a multi-system nation.
Reference is made here to the Protocol on German Internal Trade and
Connected Problems in which it was agreed that "trade between the
German territories subject to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German territories in which the Basic Law does
not apply is a part of German internal trade".
Competing claims to personal jurisdiction are almost unavoidable if each of the contending regimes applies a different nationality
law. In the German case the FRG has continued to apply the old
German nationality law, and in addition much of its law uses the
category of "German" in contradistinction to the more limited
"German national" as a connecting factor. As a consequence most if
not all GDR Germans are included. Legal conflicts have increased
potentially with the introduction of a separate GDR nationality law
in 1967. On the international plane this competition has raised
questions for third States: the GDR has been trying to include a
clause in its consular treaties according to which the nationals of the
sending State will be defined as those who possess the nationality of
that State under its legislation. This raises the question whether
such clause would bar FRG representatives from acting on behalf of
such persons who are "Germans" within the meaning of FRG law and
who would under that law be entitled to claim FRG protection. 13 Some
Western European countries have refused the inclusion of the clause,

11. See infra, text at sect. 4.3.
12. For example, the accession in 1973 to the 1966 International Load Lines
Convention instead of ratification of the signature by the Taipei Government in 1966.
13. This right to diplomatic protection was affirmed by the FRG Constitutional
Court in its decision of 31 July 1973 (BVerfGE 36,1) on the legal implications of the
FRG-GDR Treaty "on the basis of relations".
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like France and Belgium, while the UK does not seem to have
insurmountable objections to it. (See the UK-GDR Consular Treaty of
4 May 1976.) 14 The Netherlands has not yet concluded a consular
treaty with the GDR and, consequently, has not yet been confronted
with the problem. It is suggested that Professor Salmon is right in
stating that the clause does not imply any partiality and does not
constitute an obstacle to a simultaneous competence of the FRG. 15
In the Korean case it is not known to what extent people
originating from the "other part" of the country are treated in terms
of nationality law. The ROK Nationality Act of 1948 does not offer
any indication in this respect by simply referring to [the territory of]
the Republic of Korea, without further clarification. So far as the
DPRK is concerned no information at all is available with regard to
nationality matters in the period up to 1963, in which year a
Nationality Act was introduced. Article 1 paragraph 1 of this Act is of
an inter-temporal character and mysteriously refers to persons who
"held Korean nationality before the establishment of the DPRK" .16 It
has rightly been suggested that the provision equally qualifies for a
restricted or an extensive interpretation. If interpreted extensively, it
would mean that all Koreans would be claimed. It is not known,
however; in which way the provision is being applied in practice.
Finally the unclear situation with regard to PRC claims to
personal jurisdiction is well-known and little improvement appears to
have been reached by the introduction of the new summary
Nationality Act of 1980. 17
14. See Jean J.A. Salmon, "L'impact de Ia determination de Ia nationalite
allemande en RFA sur les conventions consulaires passees avec les Etats tiers" [The
impact of the determination of German nationality in the FRG on consular treaties
with third States], 15 Revue Belge de Droit International (1980), pp. 187-201, and also
D. Blumenwitz, "Die deutsche Staatsangehiirigkeit und die Konsularvertriige der DDR
mit dritten Staaten" [German nationality and the consular treaties between the GDR
and third States], Politische Studien No. 221 (May.June 1975), pp. 283-292. Cf,
however, the U.S. position according to the letter of the Department of State of 23 May
1962: ". . . the position of the Department of State has been that consuls of the Federal
Republic are not authorized to act on behalf of German nationals residing in East
Germany", 57 AJIL (1963), p. 410. Apparently this position was taken to avoid
unnecessary confrontation with the other bloc.
15. Loc. cit. in n. 14.
16. Data from E. Tomson, Das StaatsangehOrigkeitsrecht der ostasiatischen
Staaten [The nationality law of the East Asian States], 1971 (being vol. 32 of the series
Sammlung geltender StaatsangehOrigkeitsgesetze, published by the Forschungsstelle fur
Volkerrecht und ausliindisches offentliches Recht of the University of Hamburg).
17. Text in Beijing Review, 1980, No. 40 (6 Oct. 1980), pp. 17-18.
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The international law framework: recognition and non-recognition

Any unconstitutional change relating to the governmental
authority in a nation State and resulting in more than one
governmental regime or "power center" claiming authority over the
whole or part of the country leads to uncertainty with regard to both
the legal relationships between the power centers themselves and
those between the State concerned and third States. This twilight
phase is usually brought to an end by the prevalence of one center
over the other, or by secession or dismemberment, and by third State
confirmation by way of recognition.
The uncertain situation referred to does not normally stretch out
over a very long time and, despite its annoying and harmful
implications, is usually sooner or later removed and its consequences
more or less neatly regulated ex post facto. Besides, when confronted
with unequivocal facts a third State as a rule cannot withhold
recognition for too long, unless it can afford to completely avoid
relations with the entity concerned. Thus, the Netherlands did not
find it necessary to recognize the Soviet Union until 1942!
Since the end of the Second World War, however, mostly but not
exclusively under the impact of the prevailing bipolarity in the world,
territorial entities which used to constitute single States in the
immediate or more remote past became factually divided for decades,
and in some cases there is still no prospect of a final settlement. In
these cases recognition has been withheld by third States for very
prolonged periods, either for reasons of bipolar politics and ideology
or because such recognition is barred by the attitude of the
contending parties concerned. The Chinese problem is a case in point.
Moreover, the policy of non-recognition in these post-war cases did
not coincide with the possibility or intention to avoid relations.
Since neither the division nor the uncertainty could be lifted, a
stalemate evolved, in which the contending power centers, as well as
third States, have tended to accommodate their attitudes and relationships to the factual situation. This has given rise to questions for
which the traditional rules and principles of international law have
not been able to provide a ready answer. These questions concern the
legal admissibility and the legal nature of relations within the
context of non-recognition, problems of implicit recognition, the
avoidance of legal incompatibility, and, finally, the legal significance
or insignificance of recognition itself. Consequently, it is suggested
that the prolonged, semi- or quasi-permanent and yet not definitive
or final character of the multi-system situation raises questions of the
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applicability of traditional international law doctrines and of the
need for new ones.
The question of the admissibility of certain kinds of relations in
the absence of mutual recognition of the international actors, and the
question when the relations or behavior in question amount to
implicit recognition primarily depend on our perception of the scope
and nature of recognition. The more fundamental the role attributed
to it, such as in traditional doctrine where practically all relations
presuppose recognition, the more acts and relations will be considered
to imply recognition. This appears hardly to be the case any more.
There is a clear tendency to consider recognition as an expression of
approval of the appearance of the recognized entity or government on
the international plane, instead of an affirmation or a constitutive
element of a legal fact. This means that many useful and practical
relations may take place without necessarily being preceded by
recognition.' 8 It also means that, as a consequence, the doctrine of
implicit recognition loses much of its import.
In 1958 the U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles, made a statement
distinguishing "recognition that [a State] exists" from "diplomatic
(or: general) recognition." Referring to the PRC he said: "We
negotiate with it. We deal with it, wherever that will serve a useful
purpose. But we do not give it all the surplus advantages which
would flow from general recognition . . . ".' 9 The "recognition that it
exists" is practically the same as an extremely liberal interpretation
of what is considered possible and admissible without recognition in
the more traditional sense of the word.
Frowein's reasoning resembles the above effort to salvage the
traditional idea of recognition as the basic requirement for all or most
relations, by introducing intermediate forms of recognition. He
proposes to demonstrate that according to the constitutive theory of
recognition it is perfectly possible to accord some status in international law to the non-recognized entity. This would amount to a
"constitutive recognition of a limited legal capacity" which should be
distinguished from the "constitutive recognition as a State or
Government". 20 Reference may also be made to H. Lauterpacht who
put it more simply and speaks of "treatment of the unrecognized
community for some purposes as if it were a subject of international
law". 2 '
18. The eighty pages (524-604) in Volume Two of Whiteman's Digest devoted to
"Acts short of recognition" bear ample witness of it.
19. 2 Whiteman p. 606.
20. Frowein, op. cit., p. 17-18.
21. H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947) p. 53.
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The extent of the freedom to enter into transactions in case of
non-recognition is hardly determined by legal logic or standards of
justice, but by political expediency, involvement, and preference. For
example, before the East-West detente of the later sixties and early
seventies the limits of the permissible scope of action vis-a-vis the
non-recognized GDR were drawn much more strictly by the Western
Allies than by the countries of the Third World. 22 Reference may also
be made, first, to the way in which relations between Japan and the
ROC were maintained after Japan's recognition of the Peking
Government, particularly to the use of the fa~ade organizations with
their hardly concealed quasi-governmental character. Second, there
is the U.S. practice with its Taiwan Relations Act which in an even
more overt way purports to ensure that the relations with a
de-recognized entity will differ as little as possible from those with a
recognized entity.
The increased significance of the state of non-recognition has
already led to attempts to distinguish between several sorts of
non-recognition. B.R. Bot thus differentiates between "legal" or
"objective" non-recognition, and "subjective" non-recognition. In the
former case "essential legal criteria" are applied, leading to the
conclusion that the entity lacks the capacity to enter into official
international intercourse. In the latter case, however, nonrecognition is the result of subjective preference. 23 Dr. Bot of course
notices that such non-recognition is used by States unsympathetic or
even hostile toward the unrecognized entity. We now know that this
is only part of the picture: non-recognition may be applied in spite of
the full sympathy extended by the non-recognizing State towards the
non-recognized entity for want of better alternatives under current
international law, which in principle still adheres to the traditional
doctrine of recognition.
The relative significance of recognition and of its implications is
clearly expressed in the following laconic account: "Should a State for
political or legal reasons consider the conclusion of an international
agreement [with a non-recognized entity] not to be in accordance with
its policy of non-recognition, it would refrain from such conclusion
and it might find a justification [for such avoidance] in the [fact of]
non-recognition. If, on the contrary, it considers the conclusion of the
agreement not to be contrary to its non-recognition policy, it would
proceed with the conclusion and announce that the conclusion does

22. See Bot, op. cit. pp. 76-78, and 86-87.
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not alter its non-recognition"! 24 We cannot but admit the correctness
of Green Hackworth's thesis that "[p]olitical recognition of a foreign
State or government is primarily a matter of intention" (emphasis
added). 25
4. Netherlands practice in respect of multi-system nations

International relations may refer to an infinite number of
subjects, but it is evident that the relations between different pairs of
States or actors need not, and usually do not, concern the same kinds
of subjects. This applies to the relations between the Netherlands and
the contending regimes in Germany (before Dutch recognition of the
GDR), Korea and China. If only because of the geographical position
of the Netherlands, its relations with the two German regimes have
been much more numerous and close than those with Korea and
China.
We have indicated before that in multi-system situations even
relations with a recognized government could raise legal problems as
a result of the claim of such government to jurisdiction over more
than the part of the country actually under its control. It is, however,
the relations in the context of non-recognition which usually give rise
to most questions.
We shall limit ourselves to reporting the instances in which the
multi-system situation has had an impact on Netherlands practice (or
avoidance of practice) of international law, and shall consequently
refrain from dealing with all the theoretical possibilities of such
impact. It may be illustrative to precede the survey with a reference
to an (admittedly very early) case in which the Netherlands acted as
a non-recognized actor in international relations, and another
reference to a remarkable case of Dutch practice towards an
unrecognized entity. The first reference is to the treaty of 1596
between France and England on the one side and the Republic of the
United Netherlands on the other, after the Republic had declared its
independence in 1581 but long before this independence was formally
recognized. The second reference is to the agreement between the
Dutch government and the insurgent Franco regime in 1938 on
mutual representation by agents, notwithstanding the fact that for
the Netherlands the Republican Government at Valence remained
the de jure Spanish Government. 26
23.
24.
25.
26.

Bot, op. cit. pp. 61-62.
See Frowein, op. cit. p. 94.
2 Whiteman p. 48.
Bot, op. cit. p. 73.
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4.1 The Netherlands and the duai-system situation in Germany

As part of the Western Alliance it was quite natural that the
Netherlands consistently supported Western views on Germany, and
followed the stand of the FRG. It consistently refused to recognize the
GDR until after the normalization of relations between the FRG and
the GDR. It was only on January 5, 1973 that a joint communique
was issued by the Dutch and GDR governments, announcing their
agreement to enter diplomatic relations at the level of ambassador. 27
There was no express act of recognition, and one can only assume
that entering into diplomatic relations is sufficient evidence for
implicit recognition and that recognition was indeed intended by the
parties. 28
In many respects the Netherlands appears to have maintained a
very strict view of the non-recognized status of the GDR. This
strictness found expression, inter alia, in steadfast refusal to call the
GDR by its official name. Following West German usage, East
Germany was called "the Soviet Russian Occupation Zone", later to
be changed into "the so-called German Democratic Republic". 29 In
view of the general tendency to allow more acts and relationships
without implication of recognition it appears exaggerated to emphasize abstention from such trivial matters like the use of a name. It
might be recalled that the United States does not consider such use to
imply recognition. 30
It is usually held that official, inter-governmental bilateral
agreements on "political" matters imply recognition. With regard to
participation in multilateral treaties together with non-recognized
entities it is said that this does not imply recognition when no
approval is expressed about the signature, ratification, or accession
by the unrecognized entity, or, on the contrary, that the implication
27. Text in Jaarboek van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken [Yearbook of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 1972-1973, Documents p. 91.
28. Cf. James C. Hsiung's interpretation of China's practice consisting of a
separation of (a strictly declaratory effect oO recognition and the establishment of
diplomatic relations, and the downplay of recognition as such: "China's recognition
practice and its implications in international law", in Jerome A. Cohen (ed.), China's
Practice of International Law (1972) pp. 14-56, at p. 20 et seq.
29. The year 1967 was more or less the watershed in Dutch government parlance
between the use of "so-called GDR" and straight "GDR". Officially, however, it was
only in 1970 that the Government consented to abolish the adjective or the quotation
marks. See replies of the Minister for foreign affairs to written questions, 12 Feb. 1970
and 2 Apr. 1970, Aanh. Hand. II 1969170 Nos. 623 and 895.
30. 2 Whiteman p. 602.
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of recognition could only be avoided by way of express reservation. 3 '
Various intermediate stages of treaty relations between a State and a
non-recognized entity may be envisaged where opinions differ as to
their implications with regard to recognition.
Multilateral treaties

In the case of multilateral treaties the Netherlands, in most
cases, made an express statement to the effect that participation
together with the GDR did not imply recognition. Such express
reservation was, nevertheless, considered superfluous in certain
kinds of cases: "Signature of a multilateral treaty, the purpose of
which requires its world-wide application, does not imply recognition
of [a non-recognized] regime". 32
When the GDR acceded to the 1949 Red Cross Conventions in
1956 the relevant issues of the Netherlands Treaty Series [Tractatenblac[J contained the following information (transl.): "On November 30, 1956 the Swiss Federal Council received a letter from Mr. W.
Pieck in Berlin, directed to the President of the Swiss Federal
Council, and expressing the wish of the East German authorities to
accede to the Convention [. . .]. The existence of the so-called
German Democratic Republic is not recognized by the Netherlands". 33
The Netherlands also made an express reservation when the GDR
signed at Warsaw (1957) and ratified (1959) the 1955 Hague Protocol
relating to the modification of the 1929 Warsaw Air Transport
Convention34 though at the time no information was provided by the
Tractatenblad. 35 Neither was reference made in the Tractatenblad to
31. See, inter alia, Helmut Alexy, "Die Beteiligung an multilateralen Konferenzen, VertrAgen und intemationalen Organisationen als Frage der indirekten
Anerkennung von Staaten" [The participation in multilateral conferences, treaties,
and international organizations in the light of indirect recognition of States], 26
Zeitschrift fii,r auslandisches offentliches Recht and Volkerrecht (1966), pp. 495-601.
32. Explanatory Memorandum to the bill of approval of the Nuclear Testban
Treaty, Bijl. Hand. II 1963/64-7511 (R385) No. 3.
33. Tractatenblad (Trb.) 1959 Nos. 10-13 p. 3. The same issues of the Tractatenblad also included information about a similar letter "from Mr. Ho-Chi·Minh at
Hanoi" with the similar addition that "the existence of the so-called People's Republic
[sic!] of VietNam is not recognized by the Netherlands", and a similar letter "from Mr.
Nam ll at Pyongyang'' with the same addition with regard to "the so-called People's
Republic [sic!] of Korea".
34. See Alexy, op. cit., at p. 520 n. 122.
35. It announced the GDR participation nineteen years later, after Dutch
recognition! See Trb. 1978 No. 31. The same belated information about GDR
participation in multilateral agreements took place with regard to GDR signature
(1968) of the Agreement of the Rescue of Astronauts, in Tractatenblad 1981 No. 37.
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the Netherlands reservation in respect of the "re-application " of the
Revised Berne Copyright Convention by the GDR (which considered
itself a successor State to the German Reich) in 1955. In reply to the
Swiss notification of the East German letter containing its declaration of re-application, the Dutch Government stated, inter alia
(transl. from original French): "As is known, the Netherlands has not
recognized the 'German Democratic Republic'. Consequently, the
Government of the Netherlands can not attach any significance to the
above-mentioned letter . . .". 36
The next cases in which the Netherlands faced the problem of
sharing participation in multilateral treaties with the non-recognized
GDR were the 1963 Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty, the 1971 Seabed Treaty,
and the 1972 Bacteriological Weapons Treaty. All these treaties had
in common the possibility of signing and depositing ratification
documents at several capitals in the world. In all these cases the GDR
signature was left out of the list of signatures in the Tractatenblad
though this carried an "information" in connection with the signature
by the "East German authorities" to the effect that "The existence of
the so-called German Democratic Republic is not recognized by the
Kingdom of the Netherlands". 37 At the time of the Dutch signature a
press communique was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
stating that "the participation by the Kingdom of the Netherlands in
the present Treaty may not be interpreted to imply recognition by the
Kingdom of any non-recognized country or regime which also
participates in this Treaty, as a State or a Government". 38
Apart from the aspect of recognition there is the question
whether participation by the unrecognized entity is considered to be
valid in the sense of being creative of rights and duties. The
Netherlands has made no clear pronouncement on this matter. In the
case of the Revised Berne Copyright Convention, it was stated that
"the Netherlands cannot attach any significance to the abovementioned letter". This might imply that no Dutch State organ would
in any way co-operate to give effect to rights of the GDR or of GDR
nationals which are derived from the Convention. In connection with
36. Le droit d'auteur vol. 69 (1956) p. 106.
37. The intentional nature of this way of publication was confirmed in the
Memorandum of Reply concerning the bill of approval, Bijl. Hand. II 1963/64-7511
(R385) No. 6.
38. See Bijl. Hand. II 1963/64-7511 (R385) Nos. 3 and 6. See for the same
procedure with regard to signature and ratification of the other treaties by the GDR:
Trb. 1964 No. 159; Trb. 1967 No. 31 p. 29; Trb. 1969 No. 203 p. 5; Trb. 1970 No. 118 p.
6 n. 3 and p. 11 n. 1; Trb. 1971 No. 116 p. 11 n. 1; Trb. 1972 No. 142 p. 14 n. 2.
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the Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, however, the Government expressly
stated: "The Netherlands accepts that the so-called GDR considers
itself a party to the Treaty to the extent that this country considers
itself bound by the universal ban included herein. The acceptance of
this fact has no further consequences". 39

Bilateral agreements
On the bilateral level the Netherlands has quite carefully
abstained from inter-governmental arrangements with the GDR,
maybe in an even stricter way than the FRG!0
The need for developing trade led to the conclusion, on a
governmental basis, of a payments (clearing) agreement and a trade
agreement between the Netherlands and the Soviet Military Administration in Germany in 1949.4' The trade agreement remained in
force till 1954 when the first agreement for the regulation of
Dutch-East German trade was concluded directly between Dutch and
GDR parties on a formally non-governmental basis. It was concluded
on September 4, 1954 at Leipzig, the site of the well-known Trade
Fair, by the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce for Germany and the
Chamber for Foreign Trade of the GDR. 42 The agreement was usually
called the "Chambers Agreement" after the parties to the
39. Memorandum of Reply concerning the bill of approval, 29 Apr. 1964, Bijl.
Hand. II 1963/64-7511 (R385) No.6. Frowein, op. cit. p. 122 n. 142, suggests that the
Dutch declaration in respect of the Nuclear Testban and other treaties, according to
which Dutch participation does not imply recognition, could be interpreted to mean, a
contrario, that the Netherlands considers the participation by the unrecognized entity
as valid.
40. Note the 1951 trade agreement between the GDR Ministry for foreign and
internal German trade and the FRG (semi-governmental?) Office of the Trustee for
Interzonal Trade. See Guenther Joetze, "The legal nature of the trade agreements
between West and East Germany", 16 Yearbook of World Affairs (1962), p. 172-196.
Cf also the inter·governmental trade agreements between the GDR and other
non-recognizing States, referred to by Frowein, op. cit. p. 101 n. 39, citing Kapsa,
Zusammenstellung der von der "Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" seit deren
Grii.ndung abgeschlossenen internationalen Vertriige und Vereinbarungen (4th ed.,
1965), unpublished.
41. The payments agreement, supplemented by an exchange of letters of April,
1952, between the Dutch and GDR central banks, basically remained valid at least till
official relations started in 1973.
42. This phenomenon of non-governmental trade agreements has already been
reported by Raymond F. Mikesell and Donald A. Wells, "State Trading in the
Sino-Soviet Bloc", 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (1959), pp. 435-453 at 440. See
also the information by Frowein, op. cit. p. 103 et seq. about similar agreements with
the Federation of British Industries and with an Austrian Chamber.
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agreement. 43 The agreement was revised several times: December 12,
1956, December 16, 1958, January 18, 1966 and June 17, 1970. From
the 1956 Agreement the Dutch side was represented by a specially
established foundation, the "Netherlands Chamber of Commerce for
Germany Foundation" which was abolished after Dutch recognition
of the GDR. 44
With regard to the preparations for the 1956 trade agreement,
which took place in the Netherlands, it is known that nothing was
left undone to keep a fa~ade of genuine non-governmental relations.
Even the site of the negotiations was carefully chosen: the main
commercial center and official capital of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, instead of the center of government activities and the actual
seat of the Government, The Hague. The Government's interest in
the agreement and share in its shaping was, however, evident.
During the negotiations regular consultations took place between the
"delegation" and a team of representatives of various ministries,
among them the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the agreement
was concluded, both the GDR Government and the Dutch ministry of
economic affairs gave their formal consent to the respective Chambers.
The contents of the trade agreements, while resembling those of
normal inter-governmental trade agreements, were adapted to the
non-governmental status of the parties. Whenever a provision refers
to the grant of licenses or other discretionary governmental acts the
agreement determined that "the parties to the agreement will
endeavour''-instead of the clear commitment to grant-the permits or
licenses. It occurred that the parties to the agreement also committed
themselves to certain acts "after consultation with the competent
authorities".
Mutual representation
Although it may be controversial whether consular representation is or is not compatible with non-recognition, the idea was out of
the question vis-a-vis the GDR so far as the Netherlands45 was
43. The same German name "Kammerabkommen" was used for a similar
non-governmental Austrian-North Korean agreement, see Frowein, op. cit. p. 105.
These "Chamber Agreements" are comparable to similar agreements between
Japanese and PRC non-governmental bodies before Japanese recognition of the Peking
government, see Frowein, op. cit. p. 106.
44. At the time of the 1970 Agreement the Germans had replaced their Kammer
with the more official Amt {ilr Aussenwirtschaftsbeziehungen der DDR [Board for the
external economic relations of the GDR].
45. As well as other Western countries. See statement by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, 12 Feb. 1970, Hand. II 1969/70, p. 2269-2270.
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concerned. This attitude was more confirmed than strengthened or
caused by the Hallstein Doctrine. As late as November 1967, the
Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that "the appointment of
consular representatives means diplomatic recognition of the GDR". 46
When representation was really needed, the Government would
invoke the services of a solicitor who would receive instructions from
the Dutch Consul-General at (West) Berlin. 47
The only real, mutual representation before recognition consisted
of the representation in the context of the "Chambers Agreement": a
representative office of the GDR Kammer was established in
Amsterdam not long after the conclusion of the first
Kammerabkommen 48 , and the representative of the Dutch Chamber
in Berlin, while living in West Berlin, had an office in East Berlin.
Though this representative was never formally given consular tasks
it seems that he was considered the first liaison between the GDR
and the Dutch side, also in matters other than trade. Cases of Dutch
nationals in distress were apparently reported to this
representative. 49

Entry of GDR nationals into the Netherlands
Before recognition GDR passports were not considered to be valid
travel documents and could therefore not be furnished with a visa.
Visas were granted on a "Temporary Travel Document" issued by the
joint U.S.-British-French "Allied Travel Office" in West-Berlin. It is
well-known how GDR sportsmen in particular suffered from these
arrangements. In order to obtain a visa they were requested to state
expressly that they would refrain from undesirable political activities, including displaying the flag or other emblems of the GDR,
acting as GDR representatives, and playing the GDR anthem.

Dutch courts
The Dutch courts have had the opportunity in a number of cases
of pronouncing an opinion on the question of identity and continuity
46. Statement in Parliament, 21 Nov. 1967, Hand. II 1967/68 B. 92.
47. Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 Feb. 1968, Hand. 111967/68,
p. 1144-1145.
48. Vertretung der Kammer fiir Aussenhandel der DDR in den Niederlanden.
49. The present writer was told of the case of about twenty Dutch riverbarges
which were stranded in (East-) Berlin as a result of the war. Initially the GDR
authorities were prepared to allow their departure only on a request to be made by the
Dutch Government. Later permission was granted through the intermediary of the
"Foundation" and its representative.
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of state or state succession. Among the three "divided States" which
concern us now, only the German case has been the subject of such
pronouncements.
In all three relevant cases the court had to determine whether
and to what extent pre-war treaties were still applicable, and in all
three of them, the court considered the German Reich to have
disappeared. One decision, of June 27, 1949, held that "in case of the
(temporary) dissolution of a state international law does not prescribe
the transfer of . . . [treaty rights and duties] to the state or states
which have (temporarily) taken over the· sovereignty over the . . .
territory". 50 The second one, taken by the District Court of Rotterdam
on January 18, 1952, endorsed the position held by the FRG: while
the German Reich had ceased to exist in 1945 that was not the case
with the German State. State authority was first exercised by the
Four Occupation Powers, and so far as the territory under control of
the three Western Powers was concerned, transferred to the FRG
which was not a new State but should be considered to be the
continuation of the German State. 51 The third decision, finally, was
taken by the District Court of Amsterdam on November 25, 1975. It
had to answer the question whether the Hague Marriage Convention
of 1905 could be considered to apply to the territory of the GDR. It
gave a negative answer to the question and considered, inter alia,
that: "It is generally known that the German Reich ceased to exist in
its original form as a consequence of the Second World War and was
split up into several parts. Most of its territory has been divided
between the present German Federal Republic and the present
German Democratic Republic . . . ". 52
4.2 The Netherlands and the dual-system situation in Korea
In comparison with the two other "dual-system nations" Korea
has presented the fewest questions relating to the bilateral foreign
relations of the Netherlands, either governmental or nongovernmental.
Following the 1948 UNGA resolution 195(111) of December 12,
1948, the Netherlands, being part of the Western world, quite
naturally recognized the ROK. 53 From the course of events at the UN

50.
51.
52.
53.

Special Court of Cassation, 27 June 1949, Annual Digest 1949 No. 87.
International Law Reports 1952 No. 13.
8 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (hereafter: NYILI (19771, p. 254.
Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1949-1950, Annex 21.
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and from the contents of the ROK constitution, particularly its Art. 3,
one could infer that so far as the Netherlands was concerned the ROK
was to be considered as the legal embodiment of an all-Korean State.
It is a rather moot question whether the branding by the UN of North
Korea as an aggressor within the terms of the UN Charter should be
considered to imply recognition of it as a State, and whether UN
Member States would automatically be included in such recognition.
In any case the non-recognition of the DPRK was expressly stated
when the DPRK acceded to the 1949 Red Cross Conventions in 1957.54
A number of treaties have been concluded between the Netherlands and the ROK, but none of them includes any reference to the
actual division of the peninsula.
·
·
The Agreement between the Benelux Countries and the ROK of
April 28, 197055 on the abolition of visas, the Netherlands-ROK
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments of October 16, 197466 , and the Netherlands-ROK Tax Agreement of October 25, 197857 refer to "nationals", but so far as Koreans
are concerned there is no indication that the term would include
persons who do not fulfil the requirements of the Nationality Act of
the ROK. 58 The first two agreements also refer to "territory" and here
the agreements offer no definition at all. Finally, the third agreement
refers to "Korea", with the following definition: "The term 'Korea'
means the Republic of Korea, and when used in a geographical sense,
means all the territory in which the laws relating to Korean tax are
in force."
There have been no bilateral relations between the Netherlands
and the DPRK, either governmental or non-governmental.S9
Reference has already been made to participation in multilateral
treaties. With regard to membership of international organizations
the DPRK was accepted as a member of UNESCO in 1974 by
acclamation60 and as a member of WHO in 1973 by secret ballot. 61 On
neither occasion did the Netherlands express its views on the matt~r.
54. See supra, n. 33.
55. Trb. 1970 No. 89.
56. Trb. 1974 No. 220.
57. Trb. 1979 No. 13.
58. See supra, p. 81.
59. Cf the "Chambers Agreement" between Austria and the DPRK, supra n. 43.
60. Application of 11 June 1974, doc. 18C/102, discussion in Executive Board on 25
June 1974, doc. 94/Ex/SR 31; resolution of Executive Board, res. 94/Ex/58; and decision
in the plenary meeting of the General Conference of 17 Oct. 1974, Records of the
General Conference, 18th sess., 1974, Proceedings, vol. 3, Part 1, p. 31-32.
61. Resol. WHA 26.28; Off. Records of the WHO No. 210: Twenty-sixth World
Health Assembly, Part. II pp. 230-245.
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Finally there is the question of entry into the Netherlands. There
are no data whether at any time a holder of a DPRK passport has
ever applied for entry. In such a. case the general criteria for
permitting aliens to enter the country would apply. The DPRK
passport would not be considered a valid travel document and,
consequently, the visa would be granted by way of a separate "visa
certificate". A residence permit would likewise be issued as a
separate document instead of by way of a stamp in the passport.
4.3 The Netherlands and the dual-system situation in China

An inquiry into the Dutch attitude towards the Chinese multisystem situation includes the question of Dutch recognition of the
Peking Government, the Dutch attitude with regard to Chinese
representation in the UN, and the Dutch treaty and other relations
with the ROC since the de-recognition of the ROC Government.
The Netherlands reacted fully in accordance with the declaratory
theory of recognition when it recognized the (Peking) Central
People's Government as the de jure government of China as early as
March 28, 1950. Fully consistent with this recognition, it voted in
October, 1950, in favor of the Indian draft resolution aimed at
substituting the Nationalist representation of China in the UN by
representation by the Peking Government of the Chinese State (then
called PRC). 62
Being part of the Western Bloc in the bipolarized world at the
time, however, the Netherlands soon changed its attitude and
followed the United States in blocking the replacement of Chinese
representation in the UN by supporting the so-called moratorium
resolution and subsequently the "important question" resolution.
Since it had then already recognized the Peking Government as the
legitimate government of China, it (together with other States in the
same position, such as the UK) placed itself in a legally dubious
position. This position was quite different from that of the United
States, for whom the Taipei Government was still the only recognized
government of China. Out of (inconceivable) ignorance, or inten62. See K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law
(1968), p. 127, who correctly refers to the irrelevance of a State's name as a test of the
State's identity and continuity. It is remarkable that Belgium, Netherlands' closest
neighbor in geographical as well as other respects, decided to maintain recognition of
the ROC Government. It is a moot question whether Benelux consultation had
preceded this "division of labor".
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tionally, the legal nature of the question of representation was not
adequately analyzed and illuminated. Among other things, the
Government said it could not see how its attitude in the UN could
possibly upset Dutch-PRC relations. 63 Anyhow, the resulting policy
was ambiguous towards the officially recognized Chinese Government, while extremely favorable towards the unrecognized entity in
Taiwan. The attitude within the UN also had its impact on the
practice elsewhere. For example, in 1964 the Netherlands had no
objection to the ROC ambassador in Brussels acting as ambassador to
the EEC in contrast to France, which had at that time just recognized
the Peking Government. 54 Nevertheless, when the replacement of the
Chinese representation at the UN could no longer be avoided in 1971,
the Netherlands representative at the UN tried simply to forget the
policy of the last twenty years, and gave the following explanation of
vote (in favor of replacement): " . . . What are the main factors on
which, after careful consideration, the Netherlands delegation bases
its position? Evidently a factor of the greatest importance is the
recognition by the Netherlands, as long ago as March 1950, of the
Government of the People's Republic of China as the de jure
Government of China, and the simultaneous withdrawal of its
recognition of the nationalist regime [. .. ] The objective of the
Netherlands Government is clear: it wishes to see the People's
Republic of China occupy the seat of China in all relevant organs of
the UN and of the UN family . . ."65
Outside the UN, the Netherlands appears to have kept rather
strictly to the consequences of the recognition of the Peking
Government, and, of course, this applied a fortiori after the China
detente of 1971. When the Government was asked in Parliament in
early 1972 whether "the Government share the opinion that after the
Chinese seat in the UN has been occupied by [the] Peking [Government], it is desirable to entertain the best possible relations with
Taiwan", the reply simply referred to the 1950 note of recognition
and the simultaneous severance of relations with the ROC Government ("Taiwan"). It then concluded: "[l]t has been impossible since to
maintain relations with Taiwan on the government level. So the
answer to the question is in the negative". 66
63. Memorandum of reply to Parliament, Bijl. Hand. II 1959/60-5700 III No.
13-14, para. 18.
64. Bot, op. cit., p. 49-50.
65. Statement of 20 October 1971, Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication No. 100,
p. 231.
66. Reply to written questions, 10 March 1971, 4 NYIL (1973), p. 309.
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The practice in the field of multilateral treaties is comparable
though not identical with the practice toward the GDR. During the
fifties and the sixties that practice reflected the ambivalent policy at
the UN. "China" or "China (Taiwan)", and even "Republic of China"
was included in the lists of signatures and ratifications in the
Tractatenblad and no Dutch declaration or reservation of any kind
was made at the time of signature, ratification, or accession. This was
contrary to, for example, the UK and Danish practice of express
declarations. 67 It was also contrary to the express statement of
non-recognition that was usually made in respect of the GDR. In 1968
the Government "explained" the inclusion of "China" in the lists of
signatures, as follows: "This signature is included because Nationalist China is a member of the UN", though the Government
memorandum added: "This information does not imply recognition". 68
When the ROC ratification of the Seabed Treaty (Feb. 22, 1972)
was published in the Tractatenblad in 1976~ the Chinese UN seat
was already occupied by the Peking delegation. The Tractatenblad
accordingly included the "information" that "China (Taiwan) is not
recognized by the Kingdom of the Netherlands". 7° Finally, in the case
of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention of 1972 we come full circle
to the GDR-model: ROC signature was not included in the list in the
Tractatenblad, and instead the now familiar "information" was given:
"The present Convention has been signed on 10 April 1972 at
Washington by a representative of Taiwan [note the different
terminology]. The existence of the so-called Republic of China is not
recognized by the Kingdom of the Netherlands". 71
Many other questions might be raised concerning the consequences of participation of non-recognized entities in multilateral
treaties, but these have not yet given rise to problems so far as the
Netherlands is concerned. For example, the participation of the
Chinese State, as represented by the ROC representative, in a
9

67. See 258 UNTS, pp. 308, 320, Trb. 1959 No. 21 p. 38; and 53 AJIL (1959), p.
898.
68. Memorandum of reply, 21 Nov. 1968, Bijl. Hand. II 1968/69-9464 No. 7 p. 2.
69. This late publication resulted from the fact that the Netherlands did not ratify
the convention until 1976. The same happened with regard to the signature by the
ROC of the Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and
flora, see Trb. 1975 No. 23, and with regard to the ROC ratification of the Agreement
on the rescue of astronauts in 1973, see Trb. 1981 No. 37.
70. Trb. 1976 No. 25 p. 5.
71. Trb. 1972 No. 152 p. 24.

INTERNATIONAL LAw, REFERENCE

DuTCH

PRAcTICE

97

multilateral treaty might raise questions concerning the territorial
application of the treaty, while a question might also be raised with
regard to the responsibility of the Chinese State in case of nonapplication of the treaty in those territories which are not under the
factual control of the treaty-making Government. No data are
available either on the Dutch views in case of repudiation by the
PRC Government of a previous "ROC participation" in a multilateral
treaty, such as the Outer Space Treaty. 72
Although the long period of non-recognition of the ROC Government at Taiwan raises expectations of a rich fabric of bilateral nonor quasi-governmental agreements, no such agreement exists. As
such agreements usually primarily serve trade interests, the simple
conclusion is that the volume or meth~ds of trade did not justify the
effort. 73 The German case has shown that there are no legal
inhibitions on the Dutch side against the conclusion of such
agreements.
Another relevant issue in the multi-system question is, of course,
that of mutual representation. As I have tried to show elsewhere/•
the paradoxical experience of the Netherlands (and, presumably, of
other Western countries as well) was that rather than (non-) relations
with the unrecognized entity, it was the establishment of diplomatic
relations with the recognized government which involved most of the
problems. These were caused, as we know, by the fact that for the
PRC the recognition of its government by another State does not
automatically imply its commitment to establish diplomatic
relations. 75
Vis-a-vis the Nationalist Government of China the existing
mutual diplomatic representation was broken off simultaneously
72. Statement of20 Oct. 1972 by the PRC representative in the meeting of the UN
General Assembly First Committee, reported by Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu,
People's China and International Law, vol. 2 (1974) No. 30-5.
73. Only since 1970 were the Netherlands separately mentioned in the ROC trade
statistics. See China Yearbook 1972-1973, p. 269. At present the volume of trade would
be no reason for the absence of a trade agreement framework. Since 1978 the
Netherlands has reached the position of the number three trade partner of the ROC in
Europe. See China Yearbook 1978, p. 343. Cf the agreement of co-operation of 1 May
1976 between the Belgian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Euro-Asia Trade
Organization of the Republic of China, which may be compared with the DutchGerman Chambers Agreement, see China Yearbook 1977, p. 345.
74. "The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Scope of Diplomatic
Experience with China", in J.A. Cohen (ed.), China's Practice of International Law:
Some Case Studies, 1972, pp. 57-85.
75. See supra, n. 28.
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with the Dutch recognition of the Central Peking Government. No
Dutch legation needed to be closed since this legation was at the time
established in Nanking, while the Nationalist Chinese legation at
The Hague was informed by formal letter that it had lost its official
status as a result of the recognition of the Peking Government. 76
Unlike the UK which already had a consulate at Taipei and
which decided to continue this form of representation, all affairs
concerning Taiwan were, so far as the Netherlands was concerned,
henceforth handled by the Dutch Consulate General in Hong Kong.
There seems to have been an arrangement with Belgium that, if
necessary, the Belgian representative at Taipei would take care of
Dutch interests. 77
No standing representative of any Dutch federation of industries
or Chamber of Commerce was posted in Taiwan before 1980. 78 In that
year, the Netherlands Centre for Trade Promotion, which is a
foundation without formal government subsidy, decided to establish
such representation: the NCH (for: Nederlands Centrum voor Handelsbevordering) Taiwan Office. The emergence of a need for .such
standing representation at such a late point of time seems not to be
the consequence of a stubborn clutching to international law rules of
conduct, but simply of the lack of such need being felt in Dutch
commercial circles.
The NCH representation seems to be a purely commercial affair
so far, and there is no reason to suspect that it has been assigned to
carry out public duties in any way. The representative was previously
employed by one of the big Dutch industrial firms, and not, as is the
case in the Japanese and United States fa~;ade organizations, by the
ministry of foreign affairs or any other State organ. It is not yet
possible to predict future developments, and we should not foreclose
the possibility that the representative will, in fact, also act as an
intermediary between the Taiwanese host society and the Dutch
Consulate General at Hong Kong.

76. Text in Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1949-1950, p. 300.
77. See the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Second Chamber, 7
Feb. 1968, Hand. II 1967/68 p. 1144. See also the Memorandum of reply to Parliament,
Bijl. Hand. II 1959/60-5700 III No. 13-14 para. 20. At that time the representation of
Belgium at Taipei consisted of a Consulate General though there was no withdrawal of
recognition till 1972. See, Revue Belge de Droit International 1972, pp. 357-358.
78. In 1979 six European countries, viz. France, Greece, Spain, the UK, West
Germany and Belgium had their (non-governmental) trade or cultural representatives
in Taipei. See China Yearbook 1979, p. 339; 1980, p. 345.
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ROC efforts to establish a presence in the Netherlands seem to
have been more persistent, but information is scarce and difficult to
obtain. Since the fifties it has been known among interested circles
that there were persons in the Chinese immigrant community in the
Netherlands who acted as a liaison with, presumably, the nearest
official ROC representative body at the time, which was the ROC
embassy at Brussels. More recently, the ROC seems to have been
involved in what was called the Sun Yat Sen Center at The Hague. 79
The involvement seems now to be terminated, and the Center itself
seems to have faded away. In any case the main representation of the
ROC is now centered in the "Far East Trade Office" at The Hague. 80
There is no doubt that this Office plays a role in the issue of
visas, though it seems less relevant for us to know whether they are
entitled to decide on visa applications or whether they act as a liaison
office. It should not be too difficult to issue documents (e.g., "letters of
recommendation") which have an informal appearance but which
have the effect of a visa for all practical purposes.
It is not known whether the Office is approached by the police in
cases involving ROC nationals, or whether the Office lends its
services to ROC nationals in their dealings with the Dutch authorities. In view of the strict posture usually taken by these authorities,
the former seems to be quite improbable. With regard to the latter, it
is equally quite improbable that the Office, which clearly tries to
keep a low profile, would present itself to be anything else than a
commercial organization rendering friendly assistance to fellow
countrymen.
Finally, I will offer a brief remark on entry of ROC nationals to
the Netherlands. As in the North Korean case, a ROC passport, being
a travel document issued by a non-recognized entity, would not be
eligible to be "visa'd" by official organs of the Netherlands. Therefore,
visas are issued by way of separate documents ("visa certificate",
visum-verklaring). Residence permits would be issued similarly.

79. See China Yearbook 1974, p. 358. To be distinguished from a weightier
ROC-sponsored body at Brussels, bearing a similar name. See China Yearbook
1972-1973, p. 394.
80. This seems one of the twelve ROC trade and cultural representative organs in
European countries. See China Yearbook 1979, p. 339. Cf the information in the China
Yearbooks on the organizations established to maintain commercial and cultural
relations with non-recognizing nations on a "people to people" basis.
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4.4 The Dutch-Taiwanese submarines deal and its legal implications

Relations between the Netherlands and the ROC at Taiwan came
into the limelight recently in connection with the sale of two
submarines by the RSV Shipyards to a "customer" in Taiwan. The
transaction raised several questions concerning the facts of the case,
the municipal law rules applying to the transaction the compatibility
of the transaction or, particularly, the involvement of the Dutch
Government in it, with the non-recognized status of the ROC and the
obligations of the Netherlands vis-a-vis the Chinese State as
represented by the recognized Peking Government.
4.4.1

The facts

So far as can be ascertained, some time in the latter half of 1980
the RSV Corporation, which includes the biggest Dutch shipyard,
succeeded in winning an option for the delivery of two submarines
and plant for a nuclear power station to a "customer" in Taiwan. This
"customer" later proved to be the official (Navy) authorities. 8 ' Under
current Dutch law relating to the export of military goods such export
is subject to Government approval. Being conscious of the sensitive
aspects involved, the matter was discussed in the full Council of
Ministers, and consultations were also held with the Standing
Parliamentary Committees for Foreign Affairs, Trade Policy and
Economic Affairs. It is known that the Dutch Government also
consulted the U.S. Government, not by way of a request for advice on
how to react, but by inquiring about the U.S. attitude towards
Taiwan in similar situations. 82 According to newspaper reports, the
U.S. Government gave as its opinion that although the transaction
would certainly raise unfavorable reaction from the PRC, this
reaction would not be too damaging and the expected worsening of
relations would not be irreversible.
The Dutch Government finally decided that the deteriorating
economic position of RSV and of the Dutch economy as a whole, and
the tremendous impact of the expected "6,000,000 man-hours, or four
years employment for 1000 workers" involved in the transaction far
outweighed the risks of the deterioration of relations with the PRC. It
81. See the newspaper report about the signing of the final contract in early
September 1981, by the director of RSV and representatives of the ROC Navy:
NRC-Handelsblad, 7 Sept. 1981, p. 1.
82. In view of the Taiwan Relations Act US-Taiwan relations can in fact never be
similar.
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considered that against the instant gains resulting from the transaction the prospects of economic co-operation with the PRC offered at
best distant and uncertain advantages. Consequently, the Government held out the possibility of an export license by way of a letter of
intent. Since the purchase agreement was not yet formally
concluded,83 and since the submarines are not due to be delivered
before 1984, no further decision was in fact required, nor applied for.
As soon as news about the transaction found its way into the
newspapers the PRC Government started to protest vehemently. It
demanded that no approval be given to the transaction, and warned
the Dutch of its serious consequences. After the Dutch Government
took its decision, in spite of the PRC objections, the latter expressed
its grave displeasure and disappointment, and announced its intention to freeze existing and future economic and cultural relations
unless the Netherlands Government reversed its decision. It also
expressed its wish to lower the level of the Dutch-Chinese diplomatic
relations to that of charge d'affaires (en pied).
When the talks on this latter issue finally started on April 28,
1981 the Netherlands seems to have tried to avoid the, admittedly
unusual, formal downgrading of mutual diplomatic representation by
suggesting that the same goal could be achieved by filling the
abassadors' posts with a charge d'affaires ad interim, and later, by
the additional proposal to change the designation of the embassies
into "diplomatic missions". These efforts did not succeed, the PRC
Government broke off the negotiations and on May 5, 1981 unilaterally changed the status of its representation at The Hague into
"Office of Charge d'Affaires" (en pied).
4.4.2 The municipal law aspects
The question to be asked is whether and to what extent
municipal law rules have an impact on transactions between Dutch
private firms and partners from a non-recognized country, particularly where the sale of weapons is concerned. No rule of Dutch
municipal law contains any prohibition nor restriction on transactions with non-recognized entities as such.
The Import and Export Act of July 5, 196284 was, according to its
preamble, intended to establish "rules relating to the import and
export of goods, in the interest of the national economy, of the
internal and external security of the country and of the international
83. See supra, n. 81.
84. Staaatsblad <Stb.l [Statute Book], 1962, No. 295.
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legal order .. ". For that purpose the Act enabled restrictive
measures to be taken by the Government with regard to the import
and export of goods, such as a prohibition of import or export without
express government permission. Under this enabling provision
several Royal Decrees have been promulgated including, inter alia,
the Export Decree for Strategic Goods 196385 as amended. 86 Annexed
to this Decree is a list of commodities which require a license for
export. 87
The license applications are to be referred to the Central Import
and Export Office of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which consults
the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs before deciding on an
application. 86 In the process, an extensive report is to be drawn up for
the assessment of the political implications. This report must deal
with the nature of the commodities (offensive, defensive, etc.), the
situation of the receiving country (existing or potential conflicts,
internal situation, human rights, etc.), the nature of its defense
requirements (replacement, expansion, possibility of re-export), the
economic and financial state of the receiving State, precedents with
regard to policy in respect of the country concerned or other, similar,
situations, the applicable international arrangements, and the employment situation in the relevant branch of industry. 89 The report
will be the subject of inter-Departmental consultations. If these
consultations lead to a positive result the license will "'e issued by the
Minister of Economic Affairs.
The license has a limited validity and may differ depending on
the kind of commodity involved. Licenses are granted "on the basis of
the prevailing circumstances". 90 The scope of this proviso is not clear;
it is said that the license could be withdrawn "in case of completely
changed circumstances". 91 This seems not to refer to withdrawal of
85. Stb. 1963, No. 128.
86. See, on the system of the Act and the Decree, 8 Netherlands Yearbook of
International Law {NYIL) (1977), pp. 331-333 and 12 NYIL <19811, p. 293 et seq.
87. See Art. 2 of the Decree. This "list of strategic goods" is being updated
whenever necessary. See for its latest version: Nederlandse Staatscourant [Official
Gazette] of 29 August 1980 No. 167.
88. See Bijl. Hand. II 1974175-13461 No. 1-2, p. 64. See infra on this document.
89. Letter of 8 Sept. 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Parliament
concerning the export of military materiel, Bijl. Hand. II 1980/81-16204 No. 3.
90. Id. p. 2.
91. Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply to parliamentary questions, 16 May 1980,
Bijl. Hand. II 1980/81-16204 No. 2 p. 4. The Ministerial letter cited supra, note 89,
refers to the case covered by Art. 10 of the Import and Export Act as the only one in
which withdrawal is possible. This article, however, provides for the possibility of
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licenses after their actual issue, but rather to withdrawal of the
commitment to grant the license. In the case of the submarines deal
the Government informed the applicant that "under the present
circumstances [the Government has] no objections against the
pursuance of the negotiations with the customer in Taiwan [. . . ].
The implementation of the foregoing will include, subject to the
proviso's referred to, the issue of the required licenses at the
appropriate times". 92 According to the Prime Minister this implies
that a withdrawal of the commitment is only possible in case of
subsequent facts or developments which could not be foreseen and
which, because of their fundamental nature, would necessitate a
reconsideration or, at least, justify such reconsideration. 93 This may
refer to a situation in which at the relevant time the application of
the relevant criteria (see infra) would lead to a license being refused.
It is striking that in a letter of September, 1980, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs deemed it useful to inform Parliament that in case of
the export of military materiel "importing countries sometimes
require certainty about the permission for export before any definite
order is placed. This means, for instance, that in the case of
ship-building the export license will be issued before the actual
building is started". 94
Under the license system, criteria must be laid down which are
to be applied when deciding on an application. In connection with the
subject of disarmament, the Government issued an extensive memorandum in 1975 which, inter alia, included a chapter on the arms
trade. 95 In it, the Government defined its policy as follows: "The
Netherlands conducts a selective arms export policy, according to
which the pursuit of peace prevails over strictly commercial interests.
[. .. ] Deliveries bound for sensitive and potentially sensitive areas
will be carefully assessed for their political implications. This applies
withdrawal of all licenses and exemptions belonging to a certain category if such
withdrawal is deemed to be necessary "for an important (gewichtig) reason". Besides
Art. 9 provides for the possibility of withdrawal in case of the license having been
issued on the basis of wrong or incomplete information being provided by the applicant.
92. Letter from the Minister of Economic Affairs of 8 Dec. 1980, informing
Parliament of the Government's decision, and quoting the letter from the Government
to the RSV Corporation, Bijl. Hand. II 1980/81-16520 No. 1.
93. Statement by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 29 Jan. 1981, Hand. II
1980/81 p. 2726. See also the letter from the Prime Minister to Parliament of 20 Feb.
1981, Bijl. Hand II 1980/81-16520 No. 14.
94. Loc. cit., supra, n. 87 p. 3.
95. Nota Ontwapening en Veiligheid [Memorandum on Disarmament and Security], Bijl. Hand. II 1974175-13461 Nos. 1-2.
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particularly to export to those countries which are involved in an
armed conflict or where there is a danger of the weapons being used
for the suppression of the country's own population. Besides, particular attention is paid to the relation between the kind of commodities
concerned and their destination. When the assessment produces a
negative result, an export license will be denied. The Netherlands
strictly abides by the arms embargoes agreed upon within the UN". 96
These criteria are still applicable 9\ as was confirmed during the
parliamentary debates concerning the submarines transaction. These
debates centered on whether the receiving country, i.e. "Taiwan",
should be deemed to be involved in an armed conflict and whether it
should be defined as a "sensitive or potentially sensitive area".
Remarkably, the prevalence of the pursuit of peace over strictly
commercial interests, the first criterion mentioned in the policy
memorandum, was hardly, if at all, referred to in the debates. It
would indeed be difficult, for the Government as well as for the
opposition, to minimize the economic advantages in view of the high
~nd ev.er increasi:pg rate of unemployment in the country and the
precarious state of the industry concerned.
Anyway, the questions which were considered relevant concerned
political, not legal evaluation of factual situations. Rightly or
wrongly, the questions were answered by the Government in the
negative so that nothing prevented the issue of a license, or at least
the promise of such issue at some future time. The non-recognition of
the area to which the delivery is to take place and consequently its
multi-system situation, is not an express factor in the law and could
only play a role in defining the area as sensitive or potentially
sensitive.
4.4.3 The international law aspects

In assessing whether and to what extent the submarines
transaction is being covered by rules of international law it is
necessary to state in advance that we are solely concerned here with
the rights and obligations of the State of the Netherlands under such
96. Loc. cit. p. 64.
97. Reference may be made to another major policy memorandum by the Dutch
Government of May, 1979, on human rights in foreign policy, which refers to these
criteria: Nota inzake de Rechten van de Mens in het Buitenlands Beleid [Memorandum
on the place of human rights in foreign policy], BijL Hand. II 1978179-15571 Nos. 1-2
p. 65, and also to the replies by the Government to questions from Parliament with
regard to this Memorandum, Biji. Hand. II 1979/80-15571 No. 5, especially paras. 79,
80, and 85.
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rules. Since the transaction is entered into by a Dutch private firm
the State of the Netherlands could be legally involved only by its acts
or omissions aiming at permitting, facilitating, abstaining from, or
preventing the transaction or its implementation. In the present case
we may conveniently concentrate on the statutory power granted to
the Government to supervice arms transactions by granting or
withholding the necessary license.
It may be said that apart from a few UN-sponsored and
"bloc-sponsored" arms embargoes, international law does not have
any effective regulation of the arms-trade in the world. Since Taiwan
does not fall under any of these limited embargoes, and assuming
that at present there is no disagreement about the arms character of
a submarine vessel, the nature of submarine vessels does not, in
itself, constitute a bar to the delivery. Consequently, the remaining
questions relate to the unrecognized status of the country of
destination, the fact that the unrecognized entity is one of the
contending parties in a "mutual non-recognizing" kind of multisystem nation, and, finally, the specific legal aspects in the particular
case of the Netherlands vis-a-vis the PRC and the ROC.
The unrecognized status of the entity as such appears to be
irrelevant, and to gain relevance only if looked at in relation to the
recognized counterpart. Under general international law any recognition of a new international subject is perfectly lawful as soon as the
entity to be recognized has fulfilled the requirements for its
eligibility for recognition. Admittedly, opinions may differ about the
exact nature of the requirements and about their fulfilment, but
these uncertainties do not alter the validity of the main thesis. The
recognition is not unlawful vis-a-vis the de-recognized entity though
it may be considered an "unfriendly act". After recognition, all
relations with the newly recognized entity are governed by general
international law, and as a rule no obstacles would prevent the sale
of arms to that entity.
It is generally agreed that instead of express recognition certain
acts may be considered as implicit recognition. Admittedly, there is
much doubt and controversy about what amounts to such implicit
recognition, but there is undoubtedly complete freedom for the
recognizing State to consider its own acts or transactions, such as the
sale of weapons, to imply recognition. Finally, we now know of the
possibility that the third State concerned may not consider "diplomatic recognition" to be a requirement for most relations with another
entity.
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The specific international law aspects of the submarines transaction involves the dual-system situation of the two contending centers
of Peking and Taipei and consequently, the question of the Netherlands attitude to the legal government of China and the status of
Taiwan.
We have already referred to the recognition of the Peking
Government as the de jure government of China in 1950, the
subsequent support for the exclusion of the recognized entity from the
UN and the factual acceptance of the participation of the unrecognizied entity in international relations, followed by the effort to wash
away the traces of twenty years of policy by laconically referring
to the 1950 recognition in the 1971 statement in the UN.
The next milestone on the road of Dutch-Chinese relations
consisted of the Netherlands-PRe joint communique of May 16,
1972.98 This communique contained, inter alia, the Dutch reaffirmation "that it recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal Government of China". Finally, we also refer
to a recent statement of January 29, 1981 made by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in Parliament in the course of the "submarine
debates": "In all my conversations with Chinese diplomats and in the
conversations of the [Dutch] ambassador in Peking it has been
emphasized that there has not been any change in the policy of the
Netherlands which start from the assumption of one China only and
that this [China] is represented by the Government at Peking", and
"It also means that officially there are no contacts with the regime at
Taiwan". 99
These expressions appear to put the Dutch position on the matter
of the de jure government of the Chinese State, however named,
beyond any doubt. Yet there remains the following, separate
question: what, in the Dutch view, does China consist of, and, more
specifically, what is the status of Taiwan?
There is no need to repeat at length the various arguments put
forward in supporting the thesis of the "undetermined status" of
Taiwan. It follows from the foregoing that in the period since the
support given to the Indian draft-resolution in the UN General
98. Joint communiqu~s had by then become the standard form of bilateral
document allowing for agreements and disagreements on various issues to be
expressed. It allows more freedom in respect of the formulation of the common purposes
of the parties than a formal treaty, and besides it otTers the opportunity to also record
existing disagreements. In short, it may be used to catalogue the state of relations
between the parties without becoming too explicit.
99. Hand. II 1980/81, p. 2734, and p. 2735, respectively.
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Assembly in 1950 the Netherlands did not feel any compelling need
to express quite unequivocally its stand on the legal status of Taiwan,
and it preferred to join the Western policy of ambiguity. This attitude
was not legally reprehensible in every respect, since the Netherlands
had, after all, not granted any official recognition to the entity nor to
the ruling government at Taiwan. On the other hand there did not
occur any compelling factual necessity to express itself unambiguously vis-a-vis the Peking Government. 100 During the parliamentary
debates on the submarines transaction, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs looked back into history and recalled: "Subsequent [to the
Dutch recognition of the Peking government] the status of Taiwan
has been rather ambiguous. By the Peace Treaty [of 1951] Taiwan
was renounced by Japan and occupied by the so-called Republic of
China. In fact the future status of Taiwan was not yet decided" 101
(emphasis added).
The 1972 joint communique, finally, contained the following
sentence on Taiwan: "The Chinese Government reaffirms that
Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China. The
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands respects this stand of
the Chinese Government . . .". As we know this well-known clause,
with some variations (takes note, acknowledges, fully understands
and respects, etc.), occurs in all the joint communiques that have
ushered in recognition of the Peking Government by many Western
States and Japan, beginning with Canada in October 1970, and
including the US-PRC Shanghai Communique of February 1972, the
Japan-PRC Communique of September 1972, and the more recent
US-PRC recognition communique of December, 1978.
The wording implies the striking reluctance of all the States
concerned to endorse expressly the claim of the recognized government of China to full jurisdiction over Taiwan. Among the several
reasons given for that aversion we mention but two: it would imply
the freedom of' the Peking Government to use force in bringing the
island under its control, and: it would imply the risk for the
population of the island of having the whole socio-economic organization of their society changed. The unwillingness indicates that the
States concerned basically prefer not to see Taiwan coming under the
100. It should be noted that the Dutch position differed legally from that of the
United States. The latter did recognize the Taipei-based government as the de jure
Chinese government, and has never gone as far as considering that government to be a
government in exile. Consequently, the territorial seat of that government has, it is
submitted, to be considered Chinese territory.
101. Hand. II 1980/81, p. 2746.
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complete legal and factual control of the Peking Government. The
evident alternative, viz., the recognition of Taiwan as an independent
international subject, however, is difficult to realize, because the
prevailing international situation requires reasonable relations with
the PRC Government, and, from a legal point of view, chiefly because
those holding authority, and consequently acting as spokesmen for
the entity of Taiwan, have up till now consistently refused to claim
an existence for the entity separate and independent from the
Chinese State.
Despite the reluctance apparent from the wording of the
Communiques referred to above the question may be asked, whether
and to what extent the expressions and clauses used do bona fide
imply a unilateral commitment not to deny, and consequently not to
oppose, the Chinese position. Or, in other words: do the expressed
attitudes constitute acquiescence and estoppel to future contrary
behavior? While we will not go into the question any further, it
deserves attention from a legal point of view. So far as the
Netherlands is concerned reference must be made to the quite explicit
and unambiguous statement made in Parliament by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs on January 29, 1981: "One cannot say that the
Netherlands has not recognized the claim of the People's Republic on
Taiwan. [What has happened is that] the Netherlands has not
expressed its opinion on the matter before 1972. [. . . ] We recognize
one China that includes Taiwan the Government of which has its seat
at Peking. This means that there are no contacts with the authorities
at Taipei" 102 (emphasis added).
We must finally turn to the question whether the Netherlands
must be deemed to have committed a wrongful act against China-asrepresented-by-the-Peking-Government. The premise is that the
Netherlands has committed itself to consider (and treat) the Peking
Government as the legal government of the Chinese State, and that it
has equally committed itself vis-a-vis the Peking Government to
consider (and treat) Taiwan as part of the Chinese State. The
Government at Peking, however, considers the factual authorities at
Taiwan (as part of its de jure territory) to be "rebels", and while it
allows many relations between Taiwan and the outside world it
raises insurmountable objections against the delivery of arms to the
"rebels". While one could possibly argue about such objections it is
submitted that in the absence of a recognized state of belligerency
there is fairly general agreement about the right of the legal
102. Hand. II 1980/81, p. 2747.
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government vis-a-vis the State which has recognized it as such to
privileged treatment as compared with "insurgents", i.e., factual
rulers not recognized as legal authorities by the legal government. 103
But, even if such privilege were not granted, it is inconceivable that
third States would be entitled to deliver arms to rival authorities who
are considered as insurgents by the legally recognized government or,
to grant express permission for such delivery. It is particularly
difficult to see how one could avoid drawing conclusions as to the
wrongful character of a sale of submarines to such rival authorities
having their "stronghold" on an island, or, of an express permission
for such a sale.
The wrongfulness may of course be precluded by various
cricumstances, the most evident among which is the consent of the
legitimate government. 104 The consent may be granted expressly, but
it may be asked what acts or behavior should be deemed to be
considered implicit consent. The question is particularly important in
the case of U.S.-Chinese relations, where the formal recognition of
the Peking Government as the de jure government was accompanied
by the most unorthodox piece of legislation ever enacted in relation to
non-recognition. I refer, of course, to the American Taiwan Relations
Act with its purpose of practically undoing all but the verbal
implications of de-recognition of the Taipei Government. This, taken
togethet with the fact that the Peking Government did not react
more vigorously than it did, raises the question whether one could
draw the conclusion that, legally, Peking has apparently grudgingly
consented or acquiesced to the contents and promulgation of the Act.
As we know, the Act provides for, inter alia, the supply of weapons
although in the 1979 US-PRC communique the United States only
asserted its intention to maintain "cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations" with the people of Taiwan. In the Dutch case,
however, there are no indications, either on the Dutch side or on the
Chinese side, which could possibly be interpreted as consent by
Peking to the sale of submarines to Taiwan.
Finally, it may be observed that the Taiwan submarines deal
shows that even States belonging to the traditional Western world of
103. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, (1947), p. 230 et seq.
104. For a definition we borrow from Art. 29, para. 1 of the ILC draft articles on
State responsibility: "The consent validly given by a State to the commission by
another State of a specified act not in conformity with an obligation of the latter State
towards the former State precludes the wrongfulness of the act in relation to that State
to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent". See Yearbook of
The International Law Commission (1979), Vol. II, Part II, p. 93.
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international law may find themselves in a position in which
economic considerations are considered weightier than legal obligations, and may act accordingly.

COMMENTS

Hungdah Chiu
In Dr. Ko's analysis of the Dutch submarine sale to the Republic
of China (ROC) on Taiwan, he reached the conclusion that such a sale
is contrary to international law. With this I could hardly agree. First,
Dr. Ko applied the traditional international law rules relating to
insurgents or rebels to the Chinese case, which is hardly appropriate.
In the Chinese case, the rebels were originally the Chinese Communists who rebelled against the ROC government and finally gained
control over the Chinese mainland in 1949. The legal government the ROC government- withdrew to Taiwan in the same year. As a
matter of fact, until1971, more countries in the world recognized the
ROC government as the legal government in China than recognized
the People's Republic of China (PRC). The ROC represented China in
ali international organizations. After 1970, of course, more countries
have recognized the PRC than the ROC. However, even today
there are 23 countries which have continued to recognize the ROC
government. As far as I know, there has never been such a case in the
traditional rules of international law concerning a legal government
and insurgents or rebels. In view of this, the Chinese case is a unique
one and should not be based on rules applying to insurgents or rebels.
Second, in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC,
almost all Western countries carefully used words such as "take
note," "respect" or "acknowledge" in referring to the PRC's claim to
Taiwan. None of them used the word "recognize," which clearly
demonstrates that Western countries did not want to legally recognize the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan in order to avoid giving the
PRC a legal excuse to invade Taiwan or interfere with those
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countries' economic, cultural and other relations with Taiwan. In the
1972 Dutch joint communique with the PRC on establishing relations
at the ambassadorial level, the Dutch asserted that they merely
"respect" the Chinese stand that "Taiwan is a province of the People's
Republic of China." In this connection, one should only refer to the
Japanese formula in treating the Taiwan question in the 1972 Joint
Communique with the PRC on establishing diplomatic relations.
Japan stated that it only "fully understands and respects" the PRC's
claim to Taiwan, and the Japanese government sources indicated
that Taiwan had not yet been returned to China under that wording. 1
The United States also took a similar position. On January 1, 1979
(released on December 15, 1978) a U.S. Communique on establishing
diplomatic relations with the PRC only "acknowledges the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Roger Sullivan told the Taiwan press on December 27, 1978,
that the United States did not recognize the PRC's sovereign claim to
Taiwan, in the Joint Communique. 2 Since the Dutch government does
not formally recognize the PRC's claim to Taiwan, there seems to be
no international law rule which prohibits Dutch private companies'
sales of submarines or any other items to Taiwan.
Third, in reference to the question of "estoppel" created by such
wording as "respect," for the PRC claim to Taiwan, the application of

1. See "Tokyo Still Asserts Status of Taiwan Is Not Detennined,'' The New York
Times, November 6, 1972, p. 22. See also J. A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, People's
China and International Law, (Vol. 2, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1974), pp. 1612-1613.
2. (China Times), December 28, 1978, p. 1, Chung-kuo shih-pao cited in Hungdah
Chiu, editor, China and the Taiwan Issue, (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 184-185.
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such a principle should be applied equally to the ROC case. For many
years the Dutch government supported the United Nations General
Assembly resolution to consider the ROC as the representative of
China. Under such circumstances, how can the Dutch government
now deny that there are legal authorities in Taiwan. Moreover, the
ROC possesses all four of the essential elements of statehood in
international law, namely: (1) a defined territory; 3 (2) a permanent
population; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to enter into
international relations. According to a well-known authority on
international law, Hackworth, former Legal Adviser to United States
Department of State and later a Judge of the International Court of
Justice, "the existence in fact of a new state or a new government is
not dependent on its recognition by other states."4 In international
relations, it is not unusual for countries or governments not
recognizing each other to engage in various relations, including arm
sales.
Finally, the human rights aspect of the submarine deal should
not be overlooked. Inasmuch as the submarines will be used by the
people of the ROC to defend their fundamental human rights and
freedom guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and not for aggressive
purposes, the sale can also be justified under the principle of
international protection of human rights.

3. Whether the ROC's territorial claim includes the Chinese mainland is not
legally relevant since countries dealing with each other do not have to recognize each
other's territorial claim. For instance, the Western countries almost unanimously deny
Soviet Territorial claims to three Baltic states though they continue to deal with the
Soviet Union.
4. See his Digest of International Law, (Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 161.

Chapter 5
THE CASE OF GERMANY
Gottfried-Karl Kindermann
In the 1,970 years of its recorded history, Germany has had only
74 years in which it represented a politically unified, integrated state
system- the period from 1871 to 1945. This period of unification can
be subdivided into three systemic phases: the first 47 years falling
under the period of the Second German Empire created by Bismarck
and lasting from 1871 to 1918; the second fifteen years being the
period of the Weimar Republic, spanning from 1918 to 1933; and,
finally, the twelve years of Hitler's Third Reich from 1933 to 1945. In
the many centuries before this and in the subsequent era starting
with the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949,
Germany has represented the almost classical type of multi-system
nation.
After 1945, the four Allied occupation powers had no unified
concept about the long-range future of Germany and Germany was
divided into four occupation zones that were to exist and be
maintained until an international peace conference was convened to
divide the boundaries and address the other problems of Germany. As
in the case of liberated Korea, the outbreak of the east-west conflict
prevented the occupying powers from ever creating joint decisions
and joint strategies for the reconstruction of some form of national
unity in Germany and in Korea.
With the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949
and with Russia's simultaneous establishment of a separate communist state system in former Central Germany, now East Germany,
Germany had reverted to the structure and pattern of a multi-system
nation, in which the divided city and former capital of Berlin was
given a special legal position of its own. Until1974 the constitutional
documents of both German states implied that they considered the
existence of this system, representing only a part of Germany, as a
transitional condition to be overcome in the future. East Germany's
constitution of 1968 still mentions in its preamble hopes for the
"entire Germany nation," and condemns the division of Germany
caused by American and West German capitalism.
The German constitution defined its own state system as "a
socialist state of Germany nationality." These references were deleted
with the 1974 constitutional changes, effected in East Germany 22
months after the basic treaty of relations between East and West
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Germany had gone into force. Prior to that, West Germany maintained a claim to its exclusive representation of the entire German
nation, a claim that was based on the idea that legitimacy should
have a democratic basis. This was backed up by the so-called Halstein
Doctrine, by which Germany used its economic power and its political
and cultural influence throughout the world to threaten other
countries who wanted to recognize simultaneously both German
systems with serious consequences if they did so. This was done in
the assumption that the recognition of two German state systems
tended to deepen the division of Germany and would work against an
early reunification. Finally, after twelve years of Nazi totalitarian
rule, West Germany wanted to do nothing in order to recognize the
new totalitarian regime that had emerged under the auspices of
Russia on the soil of East Germany, yet another reason for her claim
to sol~ representation.
In 1961, the East Germans began to divide the country
systematically following a manpower and brainpower drain resulting
from the attraction to freedom in the FRG. East Germany had no
way out but to seal its western borders against its own people. A new
strategy evolved by which West Germany traded the recognition of
East Germany as a state for an opening of the doors to enable annual
meetings between millions of Germans from both sides. The new
theory, in tum, was a sociological and psychological position in
contrast to an otherwise legal position; the experience of joint
'German-ness' was more important for the maintenance of Germany
than the maintenance of a legal position of exclusive West German
representation for all of Germany.
Article 4 of the Intra-German Treaty on the basis of relations
cites that neither of the signatories can represent the other internationally or act in its name. This has opened the way for diplomatic
double representations of the German states in foreign countries and
international organizations such as the United Nations. On the
· matter of citizenship, West Germany has taken the position that East
Germans are not foreigners because East Germany is recognized as
another German state. In a similar way, the two Chinese states do
not regard citizens from the other Chinese system as foreign
nationals. According to West German law, diplomatic representatives
in Third countries have the right and the duty to represent and
protect the interests of those East German citizens who ask them to
do so, a position which, although denied by East Germany, is
respected and practiced by many western states.
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Key elements of the Intra-German East-West Treaty on the basis
of relations are as follows: a mutual renunciation of force; inviolability of the present frontier and territorial respect; a pledge to develop
good neighborly relations; an agreement to disagree on the nature of
the national question; a respect for autonomy of each of the two sides;
the principle that the jurisdiction of each is confined to its own
borders; and an explicit agreement to develop and promote cooperation in a number of fields, including economics, science, sports, et al.
A number of commissions have been formed to deal with these
and have put these clauses into practice on a much larger scale than
originally envisaged. Included in this was the establishment of
millions of person-to-person contacts through travelling and communications. For instance, there is an average of 8,000,000 telephone
calls between both sides, and in addition to this, special laws were
created to enable the exchange of permanent missions that are not
embassies, in light of the West German position that East Germany
is not a foreign country. Treaties between the two Germanys are not
regarded as treaties between foreign countries. Furthermore, East
Germany has become a silent beneficiary of all the advantages that
have accrued to Germany due to its membership in the European
Common Market.
The possible application of the German model depends on the
presence of the will to apply any of it, and in the case of China, the
history of the two Chinese parties' existence has demonstrated that if
there was a will, there was a way. Negotiations always started out on
a party-to-party level, and the constitutional reality shows the
tremendous power of parties on each of the two sides.
Trade, for instance, would be one possibility that does not touch
upon the claims of sole representation. A number of spheres of
functional cooperation are feasible, such as intra-Chinese functional
commissions in such areas as humanitarian concerns and postal
affairs. As opposed to Korea, China has an area - Hong Kong - in
which families could and do meet. In these areas, East Germany
cooperates with West Germany. Thus, on issues of trade and
functional, non-political cooperation, the German model might be
applicable.
With respect to a question on how applicable the German model
might be in the case of China, in light of population and territorial
differences my use of the term "trade" was as an "initiation of
non-political functional exchanges." The emphasis would be more
psychological than in any economic sense. Furthermore, there might
be a market attraction in that, being Chinese themselves, the
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Taiwanese might have a better hand in evaluating Chinese needs
than do foreigners, and can produce many goods more cheaply. While
population and territory do stand out as factors, Taiwan has very
often had about the same, if not sometimes a greater, volume of trade
than the entire PRC.

COMMENTS
Jiirgen Domes
I agree with most of Dr. Kindermann's address. However, two
points of slight disagreement must be raised. First, the statement
that the German nation was unified for 74 of its 1,970-year history is
questioned since the German state arose from a partition of the
German nation at the Battle of Koniggratz in 1866. The second
comment is directed at Dr. Kindermann's reference to the fact that
meetings between millions of Germans from both entities continue as
people-to-people relations continue to improve. Though meetings do
occur, they occur for the most part in East Germany, for East
Germans can go to West Germany only if they are over 60 years of
age or if they are Communist cadres on missions.
In examining intra-German relations since World War II, three
stages can be differentiated. The first is from 1945 to 1955. This stage
saw both entities officially aimed at reunification. The GDR had not
developed the theory of an entirely separate entity. In the next stage,
1955 to 1969/1970, the GDR insisted upon the separate entity
doctrine in the context of one nation. The FRG, on the other hand,
considered itself the sole representative of Germany, and definitely
aimed at German reunification. From 1969/1970 to the present there
has developed a factual, though not necessarily a de facto, mutual
recognition of both systems.
In the next ten to twenty years the status quo will most likely
prevail between the two Germany's. East Germany will maintain its
two nation concept, i.e., a capitalist nation versus a proletarian
nation, while West Germany will perpetuate the concept of two states
or systems within one nation. Polls of the last two years show that
65-71 percent of the West German population still aspires towards
national reunification and 80 percent of the East Germans (insofar as
their attitudes can be measured accurately) hold to the same
aspiration. However, 87 percent of the West Germans do not see
German reunification as being likely in the foreseeable future.
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Though continuation of the status quo seems most likely, there
are the less likely prospects of reunification along either the FRG's
terms or the GDR's terms. However, it has been put forth by the
FRG, and was stated most notably by Adenauer, that if the GDR
could change into a pluralist-system state with competitive elections
and the guarantee of human and civil rights, the FRG would accept
the GDR as a separate entity.
Concerning the two multi-system nations which have not settled
into a status quo, that is, Korea and China, pluralist-system nations
have more or less accepted the claim to legitimacy of the Communist
entity of China. At the same time, pluralist-system nations have also
accepted the claim of the smaller, less economically and politically
successful part of Germany. This is an indication of the fact that the
pluralist-system nations have not held their own position in the
confrontation.

Chapter 6
DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CASE OF THE TWO KOREAS
Nam-Yearl Chai
Introduction
It seems trite and yet axiomatic to state that in the post-World
War II era certain norms of international law have been put to severe
strain. Even a cursory survey of the literature of international law of
the period reveals that the old-established nations of the East and
West, including those of Latin America, as well as those of the newly
independent Asian and Mrican states, have frequently insisted on
unilateral interpretations/applications of certain norms in their
pursuit of vital national interests. To illustrate, norms dealing with
the seaward jurisdiction of coastal states, high seas fishing, diplomatic immunities and privileges, expropriation of foreign-owned investments and diplomatic recognition - to mention a few - were
susceptible of extremely parochial interpretations by the nations
invoking them.
What is perhaps the most vexing of all to the students of
international law are the divided nations and their use or abuse of
the norms pertaining to diplomatic recognition. One of the post-World
War II anomalies of a stubborn character is the tenacity, teetering on
obstinacy, with which the divided states of the two Koreas, the two
Germanys, and the two Chinas have exploited the norms of
recognition in their unilateral claims to legitimacy.
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, we shall examine
the genesis of Korea's partition and the place of the Korean
Provisional Government. Second, we shall highlight the legitimacy
issue as advocated by the two Koreas as they relate to diplomatic
recognition. Third, we shall render some assessment of various
unification proposals from the standpoint of international law.

Genesis of the Partition 1
The Korean case is quite unlike that of the German or Chinese
case. Germany was defeated in the war and the victorious allies
partitioned the country. China's division is of its own making, i.e., a
1. For information in this section the following selected sources were consulted:
Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press 1967); Bong-Youn Choy, Korea: A History CRutland,
Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics

120

CoNTEMPORARY

AsiAN

STUDIES SERIES

civil war resulted in the creation of the two rival governments. From
the standpoint of international law, the Korean case is fraught with
ambiguities, contradictions and irregularities - especially in so far
as the genesis of the division was concerned.
Although many claim that Korea was a conquered belligerent
state after the Japanese surrender, the fact that there had been a
Korean government in exile since 1919 which, in December 1941,
declared war on Japan, would present an argument against this
assertion. However, the existence of this government was ignored by
the United States. This fact is all the more confusing when one
considers the case of Austria which was regarded by the Allied Forces
as non-belligerent, even though it had been annexed to Germany in
1938 and did not have a claimant government nor a government in
exile.
The Korean Provisional Government, which had its base of
operation in China between 1919 and 1945, functioned with implied
de facto recognition from the host country, China/ and the French
government in exile at London. 3 Particularly noteworthy is its
Legislative Assembly which consisted of representatives from all the
provinces in Korea, including overseas Korean residents in Manchuria, the Maritime Province of Siberia, and the United States and
Hawaii.
The mainstay of financial sources came from the taxes levied on
the Korean residents abroad, supplemented by the sale of Korean
Provisional Government bonds. With meager financial resources the
Provisional Government maintained a modest-size resistance army
that fought the Japanese invaders in China. A fact of considerable
of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Se-Jin Kim,
Korean Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction (Seoul: Research Center for
Peace and Unification, 1976); Warren Y. Kim, Chae Mi Hanin Osimnonsa [A
Fifty-Year History of the Koreans in America] (Reedley, California: Charles Ho Kim,
1959); Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1963); Edward G. Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951); and Robert T. Oliver, Syngman
Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960 (Seoul: Panmun Book Co., Ltd.,
1978).
2. In April 1942, the Chinese government proposed to extend an official
recognition to the Korean Provisional Government but due to U.S. opposition "the
Chinese government withheld recognition." Soon Sung Cho, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
However, note that J. A. Kim recorded that "the KPG received de facto recognition and
began to receive financial assistance from the Chinese nationalists." Joungwon A.
Kim, op. cit., p. 42.
3. Joungwon A. Kim, ibid., p. 31.

DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

121

importance is that at one time a Korean army unit was deployed
along the Burmese front in compliance with the Allied request to do

so!
To be sure, the U.S. government at no time extended diplomatic
recognition, de facto or de jure. And yet the U.S. War Department
was on record to have provided some financial assistance and advice
to the Provisional Government in China with which to train and
equip a Korean army of about 500 men. 5 Besides, in December 1945,
shortly after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Koreans in the United States succeeded in having the U.S. Department of Justice issue a special proclamation affirming the nonbelligerent status of the Korean residents in Hawaii, which was
under martial law command. 6 What was very memorable for the
Koreans in America was to see their Korean flag fly at the Los
Angeles Municipal Hall on Flag Day on August 29, 1942. 7 By June
1943, the municipal authorities of Pittsburgh, Chicago, and St. Louis
pledged to display the Korean flag on the occasions of displaying the
flags of those other nations actively opposed to the Axis powers. 8
In spite of all these, when the officials of the KPG in China set
about to transfer the seat of government back to Korea in October
1945, the American military occupation authorities in Korea refused
to allow the return of officials of the KPG as officials. Instead, they
were directed to return to Korea as private repatriates, much like
overseas refugees.
One may question the legal basis of such an act on the part of the
U.S. military government. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that
the Americans in Korea were the belligerent occupants, their actions
are subject to the 1907 Hague "Convention Respecting the Law and
Customs of War on Law" and its annexes. Article 43 calls for the
occupation authorities to respect the laws in force in the country,
unless absolutely prevented. 9 This presumes the existence of a
responsible local government which is capable of enforcing local laws
in the occupied territory. Upon signing an unconditional surrender in
September 1945, the officials of the Japanese government and its
4. The request came from the Allied Command on August 13, 1943. Warren Y.
Kim, op. cit., p. 513.
5. Joungwon A. Kim, op. cit., p. 31.
6. Warren Y. Kim, op. cit., p. 414.
7. Ibid., p. 420.
8. Ibid., pp. 423-425.
9. Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 94-100.
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nationals who lived in Korea were repatriated to Japan. It follows,
then, that the only local entity that is capable of upholding local
ordinance, excepting the American military occupants, was the
Korean Provisional Government. This is so especially because upon
entering Korea in September 1945, the American military authorities declined to recognize the Korean People's Republic, then the
existing elected local government.
There is an even more compelling reason why the American
military government should have been inclined to recognize the
Korean government in exile. In a sense, the American military
presence in Korea did not constitute a typical belligerent occupant of
an enemy territory. The U.S. military came to Korea as friendly
occupation forces with an avowed goal of liberating the country from
Japanese bondage as mandated under the terms of the Cairo
Declaration of 1943. That is precisely why the American occupation
forces were greeted by the Koreans as "liberators."
This is not to suggest that the U.S. government was in any way
obligated, under international law, to recognize the KPG. Recognition or nonrecognition of a foreign government - especially a
provisional government- is one which falls exclusively within the
competence and discretionary power of the government concerned.
What is suggested here is that had the U.S. military government
decided to accord recognition to the KPG, the decision to do so would
have been defensible in point of law and policy.
An apparent justification for the U.S. military government's
refusal to grant recognition to the KPG including the Korean
People's Republic was to allow the Koreans to form a provisional
government which would receive the broadest support of the Korean
populace under the supervision of the American military authorities.
However laudable the idea may have been in principle, the political
exigencies of the day did not lend itself to the realization of the goal.
In November 1947 - after two years of trials and tribulations
following the time when the U.S. government "dumped" the Korean
question in the lap of the United Nations- the Koreans were still
without a duly constituted provisional government.
One wonders what the outcome might have been had the U.S.
military government urged the Koreans to rally behind the Korean
Provisional Government - then the world's oldest government in
exile - as the only legitimate government deserving of popular
support. Admittedly, an endorcement of such nature would not have
come about from the State Department, if for no other reason than
the fact that, as far as Stanley Hornback and Alger Hiss were
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concerned, Syngman Rhee was persona non grata. But it might not
have occurred to these and other officials at the State Department
that their disenchantment with Rhee should not have stood in the
way of making some accommodation with the Korean government in
exile.
One can posit, though one could never prove nor disprove, that
had the Korean Provisional Government been accorded an aura of
legitimacy, it could have attracted the broadest support possible
among the Koreans of the north and south. After all, the Korean
Provisional Government personified the Samil spirit of 1919, the
indomitable collective will of the Koreans for independence. Had this
been the case, such a government could have succeeded in galvanizing a popular will strong enough not to allow the permanent partition
of the country. This is not to underestimate the determined will of the
Soviet occupation forces in the north to try to bring the area under its
sphere of domination. However it may be, the point is that had the
U.S. government given the KPG any support at all, the American
government in the 1980s will not share the odium of having been the
accessory to partitioning Korea at the 38th parallel line, even
unwittingly and unintentionally.
It would not be entirely fair to heap blame on the U.S.government. It would be just as well for the Koreans to share the blame, too.
What is very puzzling is that there was a conspicuous absence of a
vigorous and concerted opposition, on the part of the Koreans, to
what the military government did, i.e., to dismiss the Korean
government in exile in such an unceremonious way. 10 Why, one might
ask, didn't Rhee, the Princeton-educated student of international law,
dare condemn the action of the U.S. military government? It is an
irony for someone like Kim Koo, not at all schooled in international
law, to have urged the Koreans, on occasions, especially in utter
despair, to boycott the military government and rally around the
defunct Korean Provisional Government.
Looking back, one cannot help but feel a deep sense of sorrow
over the opportunity forfeited so casually. With the historical
hindsight now available, one may say that the partitioning, at least
in the initial stage, was the result not so much of shrewdly calculated
10. Also, it is not very clear as to why the Korean Provisional Government was
downgraded to become a mere political party at one point. If the change was brought
about at the dictate of the American Military Government, one may wish to clarify the
legality or illegality of this point from the standpoint of modem usage under jus
postliminium.
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strategies brilliantly engineered on the part of the Soviet Union and
United States as of the lack of premeditated plans - that is, through
clumsy indifference and sheer human inertia. It hurts even more to
think that the genesis of a human tragedy of enormous magnitude
could befall upon the Koreans as well as upon the international
community so casually.
In the meantime, the world seemed to care little as to what
happened to the Korean Provisional Government. Until 1965 few
could explain whether or not the Republic of Korea, founded in 1948,
was the successor to the erstwhile government in exile. Many
believed that Korea as an international person had ceased to exist in
1910 when it was annexed by Japan. However, the terms of Article II
of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations provides "that all treaties or
agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire
of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void." 11
From this we now know that Korea's international person remained
unadulterated throughout - even though the majority of the
members of the world community had once paid but little attention to
the Korean Provisional Government which was hung precariously in
legal limbo between 1919 and 1948.

Rivalry for Legitimacy: Diplomatic Recognition Games 12
Upon achieving independent statehood in August 1948, South
Korea declared to the world that it was the sole legitimate
11. Shigeru Oda, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and The
Republic of Korea," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61 (January 1967), p.
40.
12. For information in this section the following selected sources were consulted:
C. Y. Choi, "Korea: Security and Strategic Issues," Asian Survey, Vol. 20 (November
1980); Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1975); James Crawford, The Credtion of States in International Law
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979); Ingrid Delupis, International Law and the
Independent State (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1974); Leon Gordenker, The
United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff,
1959); M. T. Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, Vol. 5
(August 1965); A Handbook of Korea (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service,
Ministry of Culture and Information, 1979); Gregory Henderson, et al., Divided Nations
in a Divided World (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1974); J. H. Herz, "Korea and
Germany as Divided Nations: The Systemic Impact," Asian Survey, Vol. 15 (November
1975); C. Kim, "Korea's Diplomacy Toward Africa," Orbis, Vol. 11 (Fall 1967); Kim II
Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea, revised edition (New York:
Guardian Associates, Inc., 1976); Se..Jin Kim, op. cit.; Young C. Kim, "North Korea,
1979: National Unification and Economic Development," Asian Survey, Vol. 20
(January 1980); Youngnok Kim, "The Conduct of Foreign Affairs," Korean Politics in

DIVIDED NATIONs AND INTERNATIONAL LAw

125

government which represented the whole of Korea - and North
Korea did likewise in September 1948. To be sure, it is not at all
unusual for any political entity, upon entering into the community of
nations, to proclaim the legitimate character of its own polity. To do
so is a constitutional question which falls within the competence and
discretion of the sovereign government concerned. But what is
unusual, from the standpoint of international law, is for two political
entities, which emerged as a result of partitioning of what was once
one and the same political entity, to assert a claim of legitimacy to
the other half of the political entity. What is even more unusual is for
each claimant to make acceptance of the legitimate character of its
state as a precondition for entering into diplomatic relations with
other members of the world community. This poses an extremely
vexing international legal question if for no other reason than the
fact that each claimant is without actual nor even nominal control
over the other's political domain. 13
However perplexing and even fictitious such claims of legitimacy
may appear, both South and North Korea pursued, between 1948 and
1971, with single-minded determination, the diplomatic recognition
ploy not even sanctioned under traditional international law. So
strong and unswerving was South Korea's commitment to upholding
Transition, Edward R. Wright, ed. (Seattle and London: University of Washington
Press, 1975); Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Inter-System Detente in Germany and Korea
(Munche: Tuduv-Verlags-gesellschaft, 1976); Wayne S. Kiyoshaki, North Korea's
Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945-75 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1976); B. C. Koh, "Dilemmas of Korean Reunification," Asian Survey, Vol.
11 (May 1971); B. C. Koh, "North Korea: A Breakthrough in the Quest for Unity,"
Asian Survey, Vol. 13 (January 1973); B. C. Koh, Inter-Korean Relations: Seoul's
Perspective," Asian Survey, Vol. 20 (November 1980), B. C. Koh.
H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: The University
Press, 1947); Chong-Sik Lee, "Korea and Troubles in a Divided State," Asian Survey,
Vol. 5 (January 1965); Robert T. Oliver, op. cit.; Robert A. Scalapino, "The United
States and Korea: Looking Ahead," The Washington Papers, No. 69 <Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies); Robert
Simmons, "North Korea: Silver Anniversary," Asian Survey, Vol. 11 (January 1971);
and South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Society of Korea,
March 1981).
13. The rulings coming out of the Eastern Greenland, the Clipperton Island, the
Palmas Island, and the Minquiers and Ecrehos cases all confirm that as a prerequisite
of claiming title to sparsely populated or even uninhabited areas the claimant state
must display its state authority continuously in response to varying degrees of
competing claims. The two Koreas must not have been unmindful of such legal
principles. And perhaps their awareness of these legal rulings, in part, might account
fDr Kim II Sung's often-repeated pledges to "march South," or Rhee's sporadic outbursts
of "march North."
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the claim of legitimacy that it went so far as to adopt the so-called
Korean version of the Hallstein doctrine. Under it South Korea would
"derecognize" any country which extended diplomatic recognition to
North Korea while maintaining official relations with the former. In
1964 and 1965, South Korea severed diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) and Mauritania, respectively, for
their diplomatic "double dealings," as it were.
Within the first year after the Republic of Korea achieved
independence, it received diplomatic recognition from as many as 38
states,!• in contrast to only 10 for the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea during the same period. And throughout the 1950s, South
Korea was remarkably successful in preventing other members of the
international community from establishing diplomatic relations with
North Korea. The only exception is North Vietnam's recognition of
North Korea in January of 1950.
By the mid-1960s, however, the situation began to unravel. An
increasing number of the Third World nations established diplomatic
relations with North Korea throughout the 1960s and 1970s. And by
July 1981 South Korea has maintained diplomatic relations with 1i6
nations, while North Korea has done so with 101. A point of special
interest is that starting in 1973, when South Korea relaxed the
Hallstein doctrine, as many as 64 states have established diplomatic
relations with the two Koreas simultaneouslyY
Statistics aside, there are two theories concerning diplomatic
recognition. 16 According to the constitutive theory, a newly emergent
nation or government acquires international personality only if it is
recognized by other members of the international community. Under
the declaratory theory, on the other hand, the mere fact that a state
exists by performing certain governmental functions is all it needs to
qualify to be a state; therefore, its status as a state does not depend
upon recognition emanating from external sources. And yet one must
hasten to add here that one can invoke either of these two doctrines
without the fear of being pronounced as heretical or outlandish.
Quite apparently the foreign policy moves of both Koreas
between 1948-71 and beyond were dictated by the constitutive theory.
The fact that the two Koreas attached such an inordinate degree of
importance to securing diplomatic recognition from other members of
the world community speaks for itself. Both Koreas could have just as
14. Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 53.
15. "The Korean Question: Facts and Perspectives," Permanent Observer Mission
to the United Nations, Republic of Korea, Special Series 4 (July 6, 1981), p. 49.
16. See James Crawford, op. cit., p. 25.
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well espoused the declaratory theory; and they both could have
insisted on its legitimacy independently of external approval or
disapproval. Given the political exigencies of cold war days, however,
the two Koreas could have ill afforded to become so irreverent of the
doctrinal niceties of the constitutive theory. That is, each side could
not have shirked from extolling its own virtues to the point of making
the other side look like an international outlaw.
But what is puzzling is the question as to why so many members
of the world community had acquiesced in playing the "recognition
games" with both Koreas, at least until 1973, the troublesome
legitimacy clause notwithstanding. Is it not fair, then, to insist that
the international community as a whole, and not just the two Koreas
nor the two Germanys, for that matter, is to be castigated for having
perpetuated the dubiously claimed legitimacy which could have been
characterized as a legal novelty at best, or a legal perversion at
worst?
At any rate, throughout the post-independence era, the issue of
legitimacy served as a lynchpin which held in place practically all of
South Korea's foreign policy moves. One ramification of this was for
South Korea to subordinate all of its foreign policy moves to dovetail
into this all-consuming question of legitimacy without due regard to
short-term as well as long-term payoffs. Such a stance resulted in a
rigidity and inflexibility which in tum resulted in the overemphasis
on style and form rather than on substance. In essence, the tone and
style of South Korea's foreign policy sounded, as well as looked, more
like an ali-or-nothing diplomacy, instead of one finely attuned to a
variety of contingencies and nuances. One may argue that such a
blunt and boorish diplomacy served well during the cold war days.
However, one fallout of that was to make South Korea's foreign
policy quite vulnerable to outside pressures or even blackmail - not
to mention apparent contradictions in policies themselves. To illustrate, between 1953 and 1959, the Japanese government repatriated
some 100,000 Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea. To the
Korear. government, this was like being hit where it hurt the mostthe legitimacy issue! The Rhee government sent the Japanese
government a note of strong protest in a vain attempt to stave off this
diplomatic, or rather undiplomatic, humiliation of a devastating
order.
What must not be overlooked here is the apparent contradiction
in South Korea's stance. Earlier in 1953, South Korea insisted on the
freedom of choice principle whereby some 26,000 Communist Chinese
and North Korean POW's were released prior to the signing of the
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1953 Armistice Agreement. The Rhee government did just that in
spite of the fact that Articles 118 and 7 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention enjoined the belligerent parties to release and repatriate
POW's without delay and that the POWs' right to repatriation is
unconditional - not allowing them to waive such a right. 17
South Korea remained unconvinced when told by Japan that the
Koreans were repatriated to North Korea with due regard to the
time-honored principle of freedom of choice as to one's national
allegiance. So inflexible was the foreign policy stance of South Korea
that it never occurred to the Rhee government officials to simply
shrug off the whole episode by telling the Japanese government that
little mattered whether these Koreans were sent back to North or
South Korea; and that they would fare better in Korea than they
would in Japan at the mercy of the Japanese authorities. Such a
nonchalant attitude would have been in keeping with South Korea's
often-repeated stance that it, after all, speaks for both parts of Korea.
The Rhee government, hoisted with its own petard, was not able to
conceive such a flexible stance - let alone articulate some equivocation just to blunt hurt feelings.
All considered, the legitimacy issue has become an academic
question for both Koreas in law and fact; and that no amount of
bullying on the part of either government is likely to undo what the
inexorable reality has wrought upon them. To bicker about the
legitimacy question further in the 1980's would be like indulging in a
sterile exercise in futility. This ushers us into the examination of the
future role of international law in trying to bring the two Koreas
together.

Legal Analysis of the Unification Proposals' 8
As a prelude to keeping inter-Korea parleying on the right track,
the two Koreas would do well to agree to treat the legitimacy issue in
a practical and sensible way. One approach is for both parties to
agree on a disclaimer much like the two Germanys did in 1973. 19 It is
to be understood, however, that the net result of the German
disclaimer is more like a formal acknowledgment of the existence of
17. Jaro Mayda, "Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law," American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 47 (July 1953), pp. 426-428.
18. See note 12, supra, for some relevant information contained in this section.
19. See Document G10, "Treaty on the Basis of Relations between The Federal
Republic of Germany and The German Democratic Republic," in Gottfried-Karl
Kindermann, op. cit., pp. 248-250.
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the two separate states both of which are enjoined from claiming
legitimacy over the other. The one that the two Koreas might agree
upon need not be the same in terms of its wording and intent. The
Korean disclaimer, if agreed upon, should be of a kind which could
merely dissuade either side from dealing with the legitimacy issue
openly. It should be a covenant designed for the two parties to agree
to leave the disagreeable issue to rest.
The other approach is to reach a tacit understanding, even
without a formal statement, not to raise the legitimacy issue through
the exercise of self-restraint. In this way, once the cantankerous issue
is mothballed, the emotion-charged atmosphere will dissipate, thus
setting the stage for constructive parleying. Analogously put, the two
Koreas should do everything possible to keep the bull out of the
China shop!
There is some reason for the two Koreas to cheer about. Unlike
the two Germanys, the two Koreas seem to be in agreement on one
point: i.e., the one-nation, one-state, two-government notion. In the
absence of a positive demurral coming from North Korea concerning
the notion, we can surmise that the legal position often articulated by
South Korea passes unchallenged by the former. In fact, this notion of
two governments within one and the same state turns out to be one of
the welcome fallouts from the legitimacy syndrome in a sense that
both sides scrupulously refused to acknowledge the existence of the
other half as a separate state. In the case of the two Germanys, they
find themselves unable to retreat from the legal position that they
both have existed as two separate states since 1973. Prior to 1973
each was entitled to interpret the legitimacy issue in whatever
manner their legal penchants dictated.
Of course, both Koreas' adherence to the notion of one nation, one
state, and two separate governments is not without some attendant
problems. Within the context of our discussion the notion of two
governments within one state conceivably suggests a legal situation
in which two estranged governments - one of them a breakaway,
insurgent government - exploring the possibility of being reunited.
If nothing else, South Korea was ahead of North Korea
chronologically in proclaiming its independent nationhood. Hence,
the odium of being the breakaway government logically falls upon
North Korea. The argument becomes even more convincing if South
Korea should stress the point that it is the successor state to the
erstwhile Korean Provisional Government which, in turn, succeeded
the Yi dynasty Korea upon the death of the Emperor in 1919. There
is also another factor which militates against any attempt on the part
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of North Korea to turn the table around. That is, it was North Korea
which committed an armed aggression upon South Korea. To dwell
on this point further, one can argue that North Korea subsequently
acquired the status of belligerency. And then, with the signing of the
1953 Armistice Agreement, North Korea gained some degree of
legitimacy, hiding behind the protective shield of what was nothing
more than a temporary demarcation line which became internationalized. Granted that South Korea is not a party to the Armistice
Agreement, the United Nations Command under which South Korea
fought against North Korea having signed the document on behalf of
the former.
Ancillary to the one-nation, one-state, two-government notion,
there is South Korea's proposal that the two Koreas be admitted into
the United Nations simultaneously. The proposal was in Park Chung
Hi's speech of June 23, 1973. However, in the interest of preserving
the notion of one state and two governments, it would seem unwise
for South Korea to persist on realizing the idea.
When and if the two Koreas are admitted into the United
Nations, the Korean situation will resemble that of the post-1973
German model. Upon the two Koreas' admission into the U.N., the
legal fiction of one nation, one state, and two governments which
they have fortuitously or perhaps inadvertently nurtured thus far
will no longer be preserved unaltered. Moreover, on practically all
issues deliberated in the U.N. the two Koreas will find each other at
opposite poles. A sense of incompatibility will inevitably drive them
toward the road of antagonism. Oneupmanship in self-righteousness
often reflected in the U.N. rhetoric may very well serve to lower the
threshhold of mutual enmity without proportionate gains in the end.
Fortunately, South Korea's attitude toward the admission question has never been so dogmatic and inflexible. Park's proposal has a
built-in escape clause in that South Korea is ready to support the
idea of two Koreas' entry into the U.N., provided that doing so will
not prejudice the chances of achieving the goal of reunification.
In short, the two Koreas' entry into the U.N. is incongruous with
South Korea's previously held belief in the one-nation, one-state,
two-government notion. Moreover, North Korea's adamant refusal to
respond positively to South Korea's proposal is, in a sense, a blessing
in disguise.
It should be added that membership in the U.N. does not
necessarily imply reciprocal acknowledgment of diplomatic relations.
In fact, the U.N. members interact within the world body without the
slightest fear that such interactions might in any way be construed
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as having acknowledged the legitimate status of those with whom
they must deal. The relations between Israel and the Arab bloc of
nations are a case in point. But the same logic will not prevail when
it comes to the question of whether or not two separate political
entities could be admitted into the U.N. as one state.
However tenuous it may appear, the two Koreas would do well to
keep the myth of one state with two governments rather intact. And
one only needs to remember that nations for centuries have lived
with such legal fictions as extraterritorial status of embassies and
floating portions of a state territory in referring to a nation vessel on
high seas, or the cannonshot distance, etc.
Related to the above discussion, North Korea's proposal for the
formation of Koryo Confederation and its subsequent admission into
the U.N. as a single political unit calls for a careful examination. On
surface the proposal appears to be in keeping with the notion of one
nation, one state, and two governments. Upon scrutiny, however, it
becomes apparent that the proposal, too, has certain shortcomings.
To begin with, the Koryo Confederation, as envisaged by North
Korea, is to be a mere coordinating arm of the sovereign and
independent Koreas. 20 As such, the confederal entity is not bestowed
with attributes having an international personality of its own; the
two Koreas remain as sovereign and independent states. Hence, the
confederal unit falls short of satisfying the admission requirement
under the U.N. Charter, namely, a sovereign and independent state,
properly speaking.
The only way to reconcile this disparity is to bestow upon the
confederal unit all the attributes of sovereignty normally associated
with a political entity having an international personality. Herein lie
legal dilemmas. Should South and North Korea decide to create a
political entity eligible for U.N. membership on their behalf, then,
such a political entity will no longer be a confederation; it will be a
federal union or a merger of two states into one. The United Nations
has welcomed into its fold such federated or merged pplitical units as
Malaysia, Tanzania and the United Arab Republic (between 1958
and 1961); however, no confederal unit has ever been admitted into
the world body.
20. Even under North Korea's latest proposal, contained in Kim's address to the
Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party in October 1980, to establish the Democratic
Confederal Republic of Koryo, both Koreas are to retain regional autonomy. Young C.
Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son Also Rises," Asian Survey, Vol. 21 (January
1981).
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Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that South and North
Korea forged the Koryo Confederation which possessed the necessary
qualification to be admitted into the U.N. Let us further assume that
both Koreas did so without forsaking their attributes of sovereignty.
Then, the net result would show that there were created not one but
as many as three separate political entities, each with its own
international personality. To wit, in the name of preserving oneness
we ended up having three-some political entities or a "political
troika." To argue otherwise would be like having one's cake and
eating it, too. Here again, Seoul's negative response to Pyongyang's
proposal turns out to be a blessing in disguise.
At the heart of the unification talks lies the vitally important
question of U.S. troop presence in South Korea - and what to do
about it. Understandably, both Koreas attach the highest premium
to the question of presence/withdrawal of these foreign troops
on/from Korean soil. So critical is the resolution of this issue to the
satisfaction of both Koreas that any prospect for the success or failure
of eventually reunifying the peninsula as one seems to be hinged on
it.
Admittedly, the decision as to whether or not the troop withdrawal should ever take place at all is a political decision of the
highest order. The decision of such nature will be made within the
context of political dynamics affecting not only South and North
Koreas but also the United States, the Soviet Union, China and
Japan. And yet, once the decision is made to effect troop withdrawal,
how and when to implement such a decision becomes a matter for
which international law is best suited. Obviously, the parties must
sign legal instruments to effect the withdrawal; and the documents
will detail the manner in which the troop withdrawal will be
implemented. And it is here that international law comes to play a
vital role. In other words, international law will provide modality and
procedural safeguards which could facilitate troop withdrawal itself.
As is the case with many important transnational issues of our
days, law and politics are inseparably enmeshed. So is this true with
the question of reunification of Korea in general and the troop
withdrawal in particular. Conceptually speaking, were it not for the
belief that there is an equitable and fair way to realize troop
withdrawal within the framework of normative imperatives it would
never be possible for both Koreas to even explore the possibilities of
reaching a political decision to begin with. In the final analysis,
therefore, it is the conviction shared by both Koreas that it is
humanly possible for them to have an honest and fair transaction
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which will nudge them to reach an agreement. But whether or not
they could even entertain such convictions also depends, to a significant degree, on the efficacies of normative restraints. In short, South
Korea will never be disposed to agree to'the U.S. troop withdrawal
unless it is convinced that the withdrawal could be effected without
jeopardizing its security requirements. By the same token, North
Korea will be disinclined to agree on anything unless it shares the
conviction that South Korea will fulfill its pledge honestly and
scrupulously.
In practical terms, one must remember, the presence of the U.S.
troops in South Korea was never meant to be an end in itself. In as
much as the troops were stationed in Korea as a means to achieve
certain objectives, the troop withdrawal issue must be negotiable if
there are found some other alternatives which could help achieve the
same objectives.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to do more than
sketch a number of broad guidelines. One can, for instance, envisage
a number of steps involved as a preliminary to achieving U.S. troop
withdrawal. And at each of these stages pertinent procedural
safeguards provided under international law must be made to work
efficaciously. First, a legal instrument needs to be signed between the
two Koreas broadly pledging against any future use of force against
each other. And such a non-aggression pact must provide specifically
and unequivocally, for the inviolability of the existing demilitarized
zone which separates the two sides. Needless to say, the agreement
must provide for effective sanctions - sanctions that are instant and
overwhelming - in the event that violations of the terms of the
agreement occurs either through negligence or treachery.
To make the sanctions credible, a sufficient number of international forces of disengagement and observation with highly sophisticated detection devices and military wherewithal must be positioned
in and around the DMZ. The proposed International Disengagement
and Observer Forces in Korea (INTDAOFINK) should consist of no
smaller than 100,000 troop contingencies drawn exclusively from the
Third World Nations forces under the leadership of a Swiss military
personnel. Care must be exercised to include only those Third World
Nations that are acceptable to both Koreas.
Once the inviolability of the DMZ is assured to an acceptable
level, the U.S. troop withdrawal could commence. Upon completion of
U.S. troop withdrawal part of the contingents of INTDAOFINK
should set out to monitor and verify troop reduction to a level of
100,000 troops in both South and North Koreas' armed forces, as was
proposed repeatedly by North Korea.

134

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIEs SERIES

Ideally, if both Koreas could police inviolability of the DMZ and
troop reduction level, it would be wonderful. But to expect the work of
such delicate nature from the two Koreas would be a tall order,
indeed! Short of realizing this, a third-party assistance must be
sought. Third-party involvement need not be regarded as an admission of failure nor abrogation on the part of the two Koreas to try to
solve Korean problems by the Koreans themselves. The engagement
of the third party service of impartial and disinterested people and
nations is not incongruous with North Korea's often-repeated shibboleth of Korean problems for the Koreans. One must make a clear
distinction between being dictated to by the terms of the outside
forces and taking advantage of third party help.
It would seem patently unfair and even an affront to human
intelligence to admit the impossibility of engaging services of a
disinterested third party. The world is not so depraved as to be
utterly devoid of acts of integrity either by people or nations under
certain prescribed conditions. Placing confidence in the third party
integrity reflects our mutual concern for fellow human beings. Above
all, it shows the maturity as well as mutuality or commonality of
interests of mankind, the bedrock upon which the international
community of today is founded - however fragile it may be.
A word must be said about cross-recognition. Cross-recognition is
politically realistic but legally abusive in that the granting of
recognition is tied to certain conditions that are not ordinarily found
in the practices of diplomatic recognition. It is reminiscent of a big
power joint guaranteeship arrangement over a small state.
Conclusion

In conclusion, for the two Koreas to explore the avenues of
reuniting the country decimated into two halves is an imperative
goal which few other national objectives can rival. Rightly, it is a
chance, a challenge for all Koreans to demonstrate to the world that
they are capable not only of fastidiously living up to disparate
national lifestyles imposed upon them by different ideological
imperatives, but also of burying the hatchet, the handmaiden of
protracted ideological strife.
If both Koreas are to indulge in posturing rather than parleying
in earnest, there is very little that international law could do to put
them on the right track. If, on the other hand, both of them are
genuinely determined to put an end to this tragedy-laden divided
state of affairs once and for all, then international law promises to
have a definite role to play.
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International law, in spite of myriad shortcomings, is still one of
the best man-made institutions designed to provide a facilitative
framework of equitable nature - except, of course, when the victor's
justice prevails at certain parleyings. It is the instrument which both
Koreas are most likely to tum to in their search for an equitable
means to ensure a symmetrical distribution of payoffs.
So long as the two Koreas keep making proposals and counterproposals and let the dialogues continue in earnest, there is always a
lingering hope that international law may be called upon to render
its traditional role as an "honest broker." But when both sides should
retreat into frozen silence, then the gap becomes insurmountable;
and even the "ten thousand" volumes of international law books will
just lay wayward in utter disuse.
But we need not despair too much, because even in a situation
like that there still is a role for it to perform. As Maxwell Cohen once
remarked, "Law is often a useful plaster to cover the cracks in an
otherwise divisive social order until time helps fuse the parts socially
more closely together." 21 Meanwhile, it is hoped that international
law will serve precisely the role of plaster holding the divided Koreas
together until such time as when the twains may not only meet but
be fused as one.

21. See Maxwell Cohen, "From Diversity to Unity: International Law in a Bipolar
World," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (April 30-May 2,
1959), p. 102.
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COMMENTS

Seung Hwan Kim
There have been both similar and different experiences among
divided nations. All the divided nations emerged as an outcome of
Communist expansionism after World War II. These countries have
grown up on the basis of two different ideological and political
systems, western democracy and Communism, mainly under the
influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Militarily tied
with the superpowers, each has had relatively large military
capabilities. And the potential for destabilization has always existed.
Nevertheless, the Korean case has been somewhat different from the
other multi-system nations for several reasons. First, the armistice
agreement of the Korean War in 1953 still remains in force, and
therefore the Korean peninsula theoretically is in a state of war. In
this connection, the degree of hostility between the two Koreas has
been higher than that of any other divided nations, despite their
increased contacts since the early 1970s. Second, interests of the four
major powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan)
converge upon the Korean peninsula. As a result, the strategic
reality of the two Koreas has been influenced by the evolution of the
rivalry among these four powers. Third, diplomatically, the Korean
case is in some respects different from the other two cases of the
divided nations - Germany and China. In spite of the fact that South
and North Korea each claims to be the sole legitimate government
and does not recognize each other, there are dual recognition and
representation arrangements for the two Korean governments in over
60 countries.
During the past decades, one important instrument for the
maintenance of the balance of pow(lr on the Korean peninsula was
the existence of military alliances: the U.S.-ROK mutual defense
treaty of 1954, and the mutual defense treaties of USSR-DPRK and
PRC-DPRK in 1961. In accordance with the defense treaty, South
Korea has closely cooperated with the United States to maintain both
the international status quo and domestic stability on the peninsula.
In particular, the presence of American ground troops in South Korea
has played a role of defense and deterrence against the Communist
invasion.
From the legal standpoint, North Korea's treaties with the Soviet
Union and China provided a more solid degree of commitment than
one finds in the U.S.-ROK treaty. For instance, article 1 of the
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USSR-DPRK treaty and article II of the PRC-DPRK treaty stipulate
immediate military and other actions to assist the other party in the
event of war. In contrast, the ROK-U.S. defense treaty provides that
mutual defense action would be taken in case of enemy attack in
accordance with the "constitutional processes" of the two countries.
This wording could allow the United States to withdraw its military
commitment to South Korea if the climate in the U.S. Congress so
dictated.
Under the auspices of its military alliances with the two
Communist giants, Pyongyang has attempted to unify the whole
peninsula by various means. During the second half of the 1960s, for
instance, North Korea adopted a militant policy against the South,
dispatching armed saboteurs and infiltrators across the border. In the
1970s, however, it shifted its policy to a "peace offensive" against the
South and the United States, accepting the South Korean proposal for
South-North dialogue. Pyongyang hoped to undermine the U.S.
commitment to security in Korea, having perceived the weakness of
the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty of 1954 and the new U.S. Asian
policy under the so-called "Nixon Doctrine."
From the mid-1970s, the North Korean leadership continuously
made efforts to hold bilateral talks with the United States, arguing
that South Korea had neither the intention nor capability to discuss
questions of peace on the peninsula. The American government
rejected this offer. Instead, Washington proposed the so-called
"cross-recognition formula" and "three-way talks" including Seoul,
which Pyongyang catagorically rejected.
At the same time, while engaging in its "peace offensive," North
Korea pursued active diplomatic activities to improve its international recognition and to isolate the South. The first objective was largely
successful. North Korea became a permanent observer in the United
Nations in 1973 and also obtained twelve memberships in international organizations by 1980. In addition, its diplomatic relations
with other countries increased to 102 countries by 1981.
Throughout the 1970s, South and North Korea attempted to
work for the reduction of tensions and ultimate reunification of the
Korean peninsula by peaceful means. Their efforts at dialogue,
however, were unsuccessful mainly as a result of a failure to
compromise on major issues. The North demanded an excessive first
step, proposing three major themes: the end of the arms race; the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea; and confederation of the
two Koreas. South Korea on the other hand desired a "step-by-step"
approach: a cultural and economic exchange at the first stage, and
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political negotiation at the next. The position outlined by South
Korea has been, in effect, a policy of "two Koreas."
The unification of the two Koreas is not likely to occur in the
foreseeable future. The two regimes have conflicting objectives,
literally, "the same bed with different dreams," and neither makes
major concessions. In addition, the concentration of the interests of
outside powers upon Korea further complicates Korean unification.
In the 1980s, the Pyongyang regime will probably continue its
"peace offensive" against the South and the United States, while
continuing to strengthen its economy and defenses. Nevertheless, the
degree of tension and hostility between South and North Korea does
not seem likely to decline. The North Koreans have continuously
expanded their defense capability, and now the stockpile of North
Korean military equipment surpasses that of the South two-to-four
times. They are probably waiting for the so-called "decisive moment"
to achieve their strategic objective and to unify the peninsula under
the Communist flag. Indeed, a time may come when Pyongyang could
decide to destabilize the situation on the Korean peninsula by
increasing cross-border activities.
Under such circumstances, the strengthening of the economic
and defense capability of the South and strategic cooperation with its
allies (including the United States and Japan) will serve to neutralize
Pyongyang's threat and to maintain stability in the region.

COMMENTS
Se Jin Kim
In analyzing the Korean situation and for the purpose of finding
a solution to the Korean issue, three major factors must be
considered: the geopolitical environment in Northeast Asia, interKorean relations in historical perspectives and the legal norms and
political and moral imperatives that each of the divided halves are
pursuing. Let me draw a balance sheet of positive and negative forces
impinging upon the inter-Korean relations, and explain how these
forces are operating in the Korean peninsula.
On the negative side of international environment on the Korea
issue, the regional geopolitical balance or the interest that the four
powers are pursuing in the Korean peninsula, are based on the
strategic premise of maintaining the existing status quo or perpetuating divided halves. On the positive side, there is a looming system of
cooperation among Japan, China, and the United States against the
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Soviet Union. Possibly, this system of cooperation could induce north
Korea into this dominant camp. If North Korea could be lured away
from the Soviet Union, perhaps this could result in some moderating
influence in North Korea which, in turn, could create an atmosphere
of accommodation and flexibility between the two Koreas.
However, so long as Sino-Soviet conflict persists and North
Korea skillfully exploits the conflict to her advantage, both the Soviet
Union and the Peoples Republic of China, out of their strategic
requirements in the region, must remain closely tied politically and
militarily with North Korea.
Secondly, inter-Korean relations can be seen from positive and
negative realities. On the negative side of the Korean reality, unlike
Professor Kindermann's example of inter-German relationship, not
even mail is being exchanged between two Koreas. Indeed, the two
Koreas, having waged a major war less than thirty years ago, still
have fundamental psychological problems: lingering mutual animosity and distrust, particularly among families who suffered either
material or human losses. In addition, there are ideological differences from which stem systemic differences in political and economic
sectors. Moreover, there are genuine value differences between the
two halves, reflected in linguistic expressions, i.e. equality, freedom
and 'democracy'. On the positive side, however, there are some 60
countries who have recognized both Koreas, and the two Koreas have
the legal representation in various international agencies and
organizations. This reality of legal acceptance of two Koreas by the
international community could compel the two to hold bilateral
meetings for the establishment of a new modus vivendi.
There is a positive and negative reality in the internal politics in
two Koreas. North Korea has been under the reign of Kim 11-sung
since 1946 making him the longest power-holder today, while, there
has been a leadership change in the South. President Chun of the
Republic of Korea is definitely more flexible and open than Kim
11-sung on the unification issue, as has been manifested by President
Chun's January 12 and June 5 announcements to meet with Kim to
discuss inter-Korean issues. However, the ominous sign of dynastic
succession from Kim 11-sung to his son, Kim Jung-il, is inherently
problematic. Junior Kim is known to be far more adventurous and
reckless than his senior, portending a serious political power struggle
in the post Kim 11-sung era.
Thirdly, with regard to the issue of political imperatives or legal
norms, the North Korean basic policy toward the South has been
predicated on the notion of national "liberation". Regarding this
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unification policy as its supreme and absolute political imperative,
the North Korean leadership has been obsessed with unification issue
totally oblivious of the existing politico-economic realities in the
Koreas- the argument being that unification will be followed b.y peace
_and the erasure of any remaining problems thereafter. In the south,
however, the approach has been one of peace through mutual
renunciation of force, and with that creation of a peaceful atmosphere, unification would become feasible. More technically, North
Korea has been advocating confederalism for the resolution of the
Korean issue, while totally disregarding systemic, ideological and
value differences of two Koreas. North Korea, in fact, has been using
the unification issue as a political ploy rather than making an
earnest effort to create some kind workable framework whereby
unification could be possible. In short, it is a question of a top-down
system whereby all problems would be solved upon the creation of a
confederation or federation. South Korea's approach, on the other
hand, is a 'bottom up' or incremental approach, calling for simple
issues to be solved first, such as opening channel of communication,
forming a joint sports teams, starting bilateral trade and the like.
through these types of contacts, particularly in non-political and
non-controversial areas, the two Koreas could restore mutual trust
and confidence with which more serious political interactions could
be realized.
In conclusion, given all those regional and local forces militating
against the resolution of the Korean issue, present status quo is
likely to last for some years to come. In the meantime, North Korea is
being urged to accept the South Korean proposals to resume the
dialogue hitherto stalemated by North Korean obscurantism.

Chapter 7
TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Ralph N. Clough
Taiwan's international status is unique. It differs from that of
the other divided countries, Germany and Korea. Those states were
divided by international agreement between outside powers, while
China was divided by an unfinished civil war. The greatest difference
from other divided countries, however, lies in the diminutive size of
Taiwan compared to the rest of China. Each of the smaller parts of
the divided states has about the same population, around 18 million,
and each has long operated as an independent state with all the
attributes normally possessed by independent states. Each is larger
than two-thirds of the states belonging to the United Nations. But
East Germany has nearly one-third the population of West Germany
and North Korea has almost one-half the population of South Korea,
while Taiwan has less than one-fiftieth the population of the People's
Republic of China (PRC).
Among the divided countries, only the PRC has had enough
political clout to prevent other nations from establishing diplomatic
relations with both parts of the divided state. West Germany and
South Korea long ago abandoned their efforts to force others to choose
between Bonn and East Berlin, Seoul and Pyongyang. Scores of
countries now have established diplomatic relations with both parts
of Germany and Korea. But the PRC's enormous size, its importance
in world affairs, and its control of the vast majority of the Chinese
people has enabled it to enforce the stipulation that countries
wanting diplomatic relations with the PRC cannot maintain such
relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Forced to
choose, most countries, many reluctantly, have chosen Peking over
Taipei.
In terms of formal diplomatic relations, the status of the ROC
declined greatly after its expulsion from the United Nations in
October 1971. At that time the number of countries maintaining
relations with Peking and Taipei was about equal. Less than two
years later, in February 1973, only 39 countries still maintained
relations with the ROC, while 85 had relations with Peking. Today
only 23 countries have diplomatic relations with the ROC compared
to 122 with the PRC. Following its expulsion from the United
Nations, the ROC also lost its place in almost all intergovernmental
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organizations, including (in 1980) the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. Even private organizations in Taiwan have
been excluded from a large number of non-governmental international organizations as the result of PRC pressures.
Despite its loss of diplomatic links with most nations and its
exclusion from international organizations, Taiwan has prospered
and has developed unorthodox ways of dealing with the rest of the
world. 'J'his paper will discuss its techniques for survival, especially
its relations with its most important partners, the United States and
Japan since January 1, 1979 when the United States shifted its
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking. Because Taiwan's relations with the rest of the world depend in large part on the attitudes
of Taipei and Peking toward each other, the paper will first look at
the positions and policies adopted by the governments in these two
capitals.
The "One-China" Principle

Peking and Taipei have followed separate and divergent roads
for over thirty years, but both insist that China is one and that
Taiwan is a province of China. It is one of the few points that they
agree on.
The PRC insists that foreign governments recognize it as the sole
legitimate government of China and refuses ~iplomatic relations to
any government that maintains official relations with Taiwan. It
refuses to participate in any intergovernmental organization to which
the ROC belongs. Its goal is to incorporate Taiwan again into China
and it refuses to renounce the possible use of force to accomplish this
objective.
The government of the ROC also rejects the "two-China" or
"one-China, one-Taiwan" concept, holding that it is the authentic
representative of all the people of China. It preserves the constitution
and governmental structure transferred to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949 and, to the extent possible with mortals, maintains in
office those elected to national government bodies on the mainland
before 1949. The ruling party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang, continues
to affirm its commitment to final victory in the unfinished civil war,
to be accomplished 70 per cent by political means and 30 per cent by
military means.
The leaders in Peking and Taipei have compelling reasons for
maintaining the one-China position. For the PRC Taiwan is a piece of
terra irredenta, a part of China for centuries; it was wrested away
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briefly by the Japanese and returned to China by agreement among
the allied leaders at the end of World War II. Any Chinese leader who
assented to the permanent separation of Taiwan from China would
risk being swept away by the powerful force of Chinese nationalism.
Moreover, the rival government in Taiwan, while comparatively
small and weak, is a potential political threat to PRC leaders,
especially since it has been more successful in modernizing than the
PRC has been. Taiwan, allied with a superpower hostile to China,
could also be a strategic threat.
The legitimacy of the national government in Taiwan rests on
the contention that it is the constitutional successor of the government that ruled the mainland before 1949. The justification for the
dominant role of people from the mainland in that government is that
it represents all of China; that justification would disappear if the
government reduced its claim to one of representing only the people
of Taiwan. There is an additional practical reason for the ROC to
maintain the one-China position: a declaration of independence from
China would be highly provocative to the leaders in Peking,
increasing the risk that they would be impelled to use force to bring
Taiwan under their control.
Both the PRC and the ROC regard the offshore islands, the only
pieces of territory still under ROC control that were in the past
administratively attached to the mainland rather than Taiwan, as
vital links between Taiwan and the mainland. They are symbols of
national unity. Consequently, the PRC has not attempted since 1958
to interdict resupply of the offshores by the ROC; on the contrary,
alarmed by rising international support for cutting the link between
Taiwan and the offshore islands, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told
foreign diplomats in Peking in December 1958 that the PRC's policy
was either to liberate all the offshore islands, Penghu and Taiwan
together, or to preserve the status quo. 1
While both sides have maintained principled one-China positions, they have made concessions in practice when compelled to by
political realities, especially in connection with their relations with
the United States. For example, the PRC agreed in 1973, as a
temporary measure, to the establishment of liaison offices in Peking
and Washington, a form of diplomatic relations, despite the existence
of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei. As for
the ROC, the closer the United States came to normalizing relations
1. M. H. Halperin, The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (Santa
Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1966) processed, pp. 475, 483.
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with the PRC, the more willing the government of the ROC became
to tolerate the so-called "German solution", in which the United
States would have full diplomatic relations with both Peking and
Taipei. The Carter administration's commitment to maintain only
unofficial relations with Taiwan virtually destroyed hope for such an
arrangement, but the hope was revived by candidate Reagan's
statement in August 1980 that he favored official relations with
Taiwan.
The year 1979 marked the greatest shift in the relative fortunes
of the PRC and the ROC since 1950, when the United States
abandoned its hands-off policy and intervened to prevent a military
assault on Taiwan. The replacement of the ROC by the PRC in the
United Nations in 1971 and the U.S. decision to develop relations
with the PRC were heavy blows. The termination of official U.S.
relations with the ROC in 1979, the ending of the security treaty, and
the recognition of the PRC by the United States as the sole legitimate
government of China were even more damaging. These actions
appeared to remove the principal obstacles to the incorporation of
Taiwan into the PRC.
Despite the blow to the prestige of the ROC caused by the
American actions, the authorities in Taiwan held out firmly against
submitting to Peking's control. For a variety of reasons, the PRC was
not in a position to compel submission. It lacked the military
capability to assure success in a costly and risky amphibious attack
across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait. To build such a force would
divert large amounts of resources critically needed for the urgent
task of modernizing the country. Moreover, the United States had
made clear in the Taiwan Relations Act that it would be gravely
concerned by any attempt to subdue Taiwan by force. The PRC could
not foresee how and to what extent the United States might
intervene to frustrate such an attempt. The United States continued
to supply substantial amounts of weapons for the defense of the
island. The use of force against Taiwan by the PRC would shatter the
expanding web of relations with the United States and Japan on
which it relied heavily for modernization and for political support
against the Soviet Union.
Making a virtue of necessity, the PRC adopted a conciliatory
policy toward Taiwan following the normalization of relations with
the United States. It promptly announced a halt in the odd-day
shelling of the offshore islands that had continued since the early
1960s in the form of shells containing propaganda leaflets. The
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued an
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appeal to "compatriots in Taiwan" calling for talks between the
government of the PRC and "the Taiwan authorities" to end the
military confrontation along the Taiwan Strait. The statement
offered assurances that reunification would be carried out carefully
"so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses." It urged the
early establishment of postal and transportation services and trade
between Taiwan and the mainland. 2 In early January 1979 Deng
Xiaoping told a group of visiting U.S. senators that an integrated
Taiwan would be fully autonomous, retaining its existing social and
economic system and even its armed forces. It would, however, have
to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and haul down the
ROC flag. Deng said that force would be used against Taiwan only if
the Soviet Union interfered there or if the Taiwan authorities refused
indefinitely to enter into negotiations on reunification. 3
For the past two and one-half years the PRC has maintained the
basic position toward Taiwan enunciated in January 1979. PRC
media have issued a steady stream of articles and statements aimed
at encouraging unification sentiment among the people of Taiwan.
These describe the growing trade between Taiwan and the mainland
and the popularity of Taiwan-made TV sets, tape-recorders and
electric fans among the people of mainland China. They report
cordial conversations between scientists, writers, and university
professors from Taiwan and the mainland when they meet abroad
and the special treatment accorded athletes of Taiwan origin from
Japan and the United States when they visit the mainland. Mainland
TV has shown a documentary on life in Taiwan. According to Peking
radio, special reception centers have been established for fishermen
from Taiwan forced by need for repairs or approaching typhoons to
seek shelter in mainland ports. 200 boats and over 1000 fishermen
were said to have been received in Fujian province alone during 1979
and 1980. 4 The People's Literature Publishing House published a
selection of fiction by Taiwan authors; the first printing of 100,000
copies was quickly sold out. The publishing house promised royalties
to the Taiwan writers and invited them to submit original manuscripts for publication. 5
The Taiwan authorities regard the PRC's conciliatory posture as
a united front tactic aimed at undermining resistance on Taiwan to a
2. Beijing Review, No. 1, January 5, 1979, pp. 16-17.
3. New York Times, January 10, 1979.
4. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of
China, January 6, 1981, p. K-1. tHereinafter cited as FBISl.
5. FBIS, August 14, 1980, p. K-1.
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takeover by Peking. They continue to reject flatly PRC proposals to
negotiate, to open direct trade, or to establish postal, shipping, or
airline connections. The manifesto of the 12th National Congress of
the Kuomintang in March-April, 1981 reiterated the KMT's unyielding anti-Communist position and declared its determination to unify
China under Sun Yat-sen's three principles of the people. The
manifesto warned: "We know that to talk peace with the enemy
amounts to inviting our own collapse and that to compromise with
the enemy is the same as destroying ourselves."6
Despite the firm opposition of the Taiwan authorities to opening
direct links with the PRC, they have tolerated a growing indirect
trade between Taiwan and the mainland, which probably exceeded
$300 million in 1980. 7 They also permit scientists and others from
Taiwan to §it down with their counterparts at international meetings
and even encourage fraternization between students from Taiwan
studying abroad and PRC students. The Chinese crew of a Germanregistered freighter that docked at Keelung was given a conducted
tour of Taipei and a table tennis team from the mainland whose
plane had been diverted because of weatyer conditions to Taoyuan
airport for a few hours was courteously received. Thus, contact and
communication between individuals in Taiwan and the PRC is slowly
increasing, despite the fear of Chinese Communist united front
operations harbored by the Taiwan authorities.
The United States continues to be the principal target of the
foreign policies pursued by Taipei and Peking: the rivalry between
them in this regard has intensified since the advent of the Reagan
administration. Taipei, encouraged by Reagan's August 1980 campaign statements, presses hard for a greater degree of "officiality" in
relations with the United States and seeks more advanced arms for
its defense. The PRC repeats its view that the Taiwan Relations Act
conflicts with the joint communique on normalization of relations and
reminds Americans that it never agreed to arms sales to Taiwan. The
Reagan administration has responded cautiously to these opposing
pressures, seeking to develop further relations with the PRC, which it
regards as very important for geopolitical reasons, while at the same
time adopting a somewhat more cordial style than the Carter
administration did in conducting unofficial relations with Taiwan.
The politically explosive decision on whether to sell high performance
aircraft to Taiwan has been deferred for the time being.
6. FBIS, April 9, 1981, p. V-3.
7. American Institute in Taiwan, Taiwan: Economic Relations in 1980 (undated)
p. 9.
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Substantive Relations- 1971-1980
Taiwan's ability not only to survive in the face of PRC pressures,
but to prosper, is dramatically demonstrated by the expansion of the
island's international economic relations since the expulsion of the
ROC from the United Nations. Two-way trade with the rest of the
world increased ten-fold, from $3.9 billion in 1971 to $39.5 billion in
the 1980s.8 Within this total, trade with Taiwan's principal trading
partner, the United States, jumped from $1.3 billion to $11.6 billion
and that with Japan from $1 billion to $7.6 billion. All this trade is
carried on almost entirely without the benefit of diplomatic relations;
the only significant trading partners with which Taiwan still has
diplomatic relations are Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and South
Africa.
In recent years, especially since the severance of diplomatic
relations with the United States, the economic decision-makers in
Taiwan have emphasized trade with Western Europe, partly in order
to diversify Taiwan's trading pattern, but also in order to raise its
visibility among Europeans and buildpolitical support over the long
run. Consequently, trade with Western Europe has increased at a
faster rate than overall trade, from $400 million in 1971 to $5.3
billion in 1980. The EEC countries in 1980 became Taiwan's second
largest export market, surpassing Japan.
The latest effort to diversify and boost trade occurred in
November 1979 when the government removed the ban on direct
trade with five East European states: Yugoslavia, East Germany,
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Businessmen from Taiwan are
allowed to visit these countries and East Europeans are admitted to
Taiwan for trade purposes. Taiwan businessmen have now been to
Poland, Hungary and East Germany. Taiwan organizations exhibited
the island's products during 1980 at the Leipzig trade fair and at the
National Agriculture and Food Show in Budapest. A textile trade
mission participated in a garment show in Budapest in January 1981
and a Hungarian textile purchasing mission was scheduled to visit
Taiwan in March-April 1981. Although diri!ct trade with the Soviet
Union, Romania, Albania and Bulgaria is still forbidden, trade with
these destinations through third countries is permitted. Premier Y. S.
Sun announced that trade with Eastern Europe exceeded $70 million
in 1980. 9
B. Unless otherwise indicated, statistical data is from the AIT report referred to
in Note 7, supra, or from: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1980 (Taipei: Council on
Economic Planning and Development, 1980>.
9. Taipei: Sunday Times Chinese Weekly, February 15, 1981, p. 3.
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Foreign companies and banks continue to regard Taiwan as a
desirable place to lend and invest. Real economic growth has
averaged 8 per cent annually since 1971, despite a decline of 2 per
cent in the recession year 1974 brought on by the spurt in oil prices.
Taiwan's long-term foreign debt is only $5 billion, its foreign
exchange reserves about the same amount, and its debt-service ratio
is 6.3 per cent, extraordinarily low for a developing country. Because
of Taiwan's established record of economic performance, there was no
slackening in foreign and overseas Chinese direct investment after
1971. The amount of approved investment never fell below $100
million annually. It hit a record high of $329 million in 1979 and
surged to $466 million in 1980.
Foreign confidence in Taiwan's economy is perhaps best illustrated by the accelerating rush of foreign banks, particularly
European banks, to open branches in Taiwan. During 1980 alone,
eight banks, five of them European, 10 opened branches in Taipei.
American banks there now number thirteen, up from eight in 1976,
and the total number of foreign banks in Taiwan as of early 1981 was
23. More are standing in line, awaiting approval.
Taiwan's banks are also expanding their activities abroad. The
International Commercial Bank of China, which has had branches or
offices for some time in Chicago, New York, Tokyo, Osaka, Bangkok,
Panama and Saudi Arabia, opened a branch in Houston in 1981 and
is planning to open branches in Europe. The First Commercial Bank,
which has branches in Guam and Singapore, has announced that it
will open a branch in London in 1981. The International Commercial
Bank issued $20 million worth of floating rate certificates in 1980 in
Europe and the Bank of Communications followed suit with an issue
of $25 million. The Bank of Taiwan has also announced its intention
to raise funds in the Eurodollar market.
Taiwan has had no difficulty in continuing to secure loans from
abroad. The aggregate amount of all major loans ($1.5 million or
over) received during the period January through November 1980
exceeded $1.2 billion. This included loans from the U.S. ExportImport Bank ($404 million), American private banks ($308 million),
European banks ($327 million), the Japanese Export-Import Bank
($19 million) and Japanese firms ($30 million). Although Taiwan
10. These were: Grindlays Bank Ltd. CUKJ, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and
Societe General (France), European Asian Bank (W. Germany!, and Hollandische
Bank-Unie (Netherlands). Lloyds International (UK) opened early in 1981. Taiwan:
Economic Relations in 1980, p. 10; Far Eastern Economic Reuiew, Mar. 27, 1981, pp.
72-77.
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depends primarily on domestic capital for its investment needs,
Taiwan's policy-makers expect that more foreign capital will be
required in order to expand capital intensive, high technology
industry. Taiwan has received no new loans from the World Bank or
the Asian Development Bank since 1971, but its development has not
suffered from the lack of such loans, as plenty of funds were available
from other sources.
A new trend in Taiwan's foreign economic relations is investment abroad by Taiwan firms, as a means of securing access to raw
materials or access to foreign markets. For example, Formosa
Plastics has entered into a joint venture with the Louisiana Chemical
and Plastics Corporation. The plant, under construction at Point
Comfort, Texas, will produce petrochemical intermediates, part to be
shipped to Taiwan, part to be sold elsewhere. Sixty per cent of the
machinery for the plant is being manufactured in Taiwan. Tatung
Electric Company has a factory in Long Beach, California producing
TV sets and electric fans. The Sampo Company has a TV plant under
construction in Atlanta. The Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation has
entered into a joint venture to build a $357 million fertilizer plant in
Saudi Arabia and four Taiwan paper companies are building an
integrated pulp mill in Australia together with the Australian Paper
Manufacturers Ltd. 11
Taiwan is well served by international shipping companies and
airlines. At least ten airlines and a variety of shipping lines provide
service to Taiwan. Since early 1980 East European ships have begun
to make calls in Taiwan, including Polish, Hungarian and Yugoslav
freighters. Kaohsiung ship breakers bought two East German ships
for scrap.
Visitors to Taiwan from abroad more than doubled between 1971
and 1979, increasing from 540,000 to 1,340,000, despite the dampening effect of rising air fares on tourist travel throughout East Asia.
The trend has continued upward, reaching an estimated 1,600,000 in
1980. 17,000 students from Taiwan were studying at American
universities, the largest group from any foreign country except Iran. 12
Construction companies from Taiwan have participated in the
construction boom in the Middle East. By 1978 some 2000 Chinese
from Taiwan were in Saudi Arabia building roads, power and water
systems, fertilizer and sugar plants, and running agricultural
demonstration projects. Jordan, despite having shifted its diplomatic
11. New York Times, July 31, 1980; Asian Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1981.
12. Figure attributed to Institute of International Education, Parade, December
21, 1980.
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relations from Taipei to Peking early in 1977, awarded a highway
construction project to Taiwan's Ret-Ser (retired servicemen) Engineering Agency later in the same year. 13
Washington's termination of the mutual defense treaty with the
ROC at the end of 1979 caused President Chiang Ching-kuo and his
associates to doubt whether the United States would continue to
supply the arms needed for the defense of the island against a
possible attack by the PRC. Although the United States delivered
about $800 million in military equipment to Taiwan during calendar
year 1979 and approved sales of nearly $600 million during fiscal
year 1980/4 the PRC's public opposition to such sales fed fears that
the U.S. government might at some future time yield to PRC
pressures. Consequently, Taipei began to explore the possibility of
buying arms from other countries. In November 1980 Taiwan's arms
buyers succeeded in striking a deal with the Netherlands for the
purchase of two submarines as part of a package arrangement that
included equipment for a power station. Peking loudly protested the
deal and declared that relations with the Netherlands would be
downgraded to the charge d'affaires level if the Dutch went through
with it. The sale amounted to some $500 million, an attractive offer
at a time of recession and unemployment in the Dutch shipbuilding
industry. Consequently, despite vocal opposition in the parliament,
the Dutch government approved the sale. 15 The Dutch ambassador
left Peking early in March, leaving the mission in the hands of a
charge. The PRC's strong reaction to the Dutch sale of weapons to
Taiwan probably was intended as a warning to other countries not to
follow the Dutch example.

Unorthodox Substitutes for Diplomatic Relations
Taiwan's success in expanding relations of all kinds with
countries throughout the world assured its survival as an independent political entity, despite the loss of diplomatic relations with all
but a handful of nations. To replace lost diplomatic relations, Taiwan
and its partners devised unorthodox methods of dealing with each
other, without precedent in international law. The most elaborate of
these mechanisms was that established by Taiwan and the United
States, the most important of Taiwan's supporters.
13. Far Eastern Economic Review, January 6, 1978, p. 49.
14. Department of State, Review of Relations with Taiwan, Current Policy No.
190, June 11, 1980, p. 2; figure for FY80 provided by Department of State.
15. Washington Post, January 17 and February 28, 1981.
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The relationship between the United States and the Republic of
China differed from the others in three respects: the United States
had an obligation to help defend Taiwan; certain treaties and
agreements between the two governments were important to
Taiwan's survival; legislation was necessary to permit essential
relations between the United States and Taiwan to continue on an
unofficial basis.
The Taiwan Relations Act, 18 passed by the Congress in March
1979, dealt with these three matters. The Act declared that any effort
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means
would be considered a threat to peace and security in the Western
Pacific and of grave concern to the United States. The United States
would provide Taiwan with defensive arms, the Act stated, and would
maintain a capacity to resist any form of coercion that would
jeopardize security or the social and economic system of the people of
Taiwan. The Act provided that all treaties or agreements between the
United States and the ROC that existed prior to January 1, 1979
would continue in force unless expressly terminated. It also stipulated that the laws of the United States would continue to be applied
to Taiwan in the same manner that they were applied before the
severance of diplomatic relations.
The Taiwan Relations Act authorized agencies of the U.S.
government to conduct relations with Taiwan through the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the
District of Columbia. The Institute's offices in Washington and Taipei
are headed by retired senior Foreign Service Officers with long
experience in Chinese affairs and staffed largely with members of the
U.S. Foreign Service temporarily separated from government service.
The government in Taiwan established a counterpart organization,
the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), with
offices in Taipei, Washington, and eight other American cities. It has
an experienced staff comparable to that of the American Institute in
Taiwan. An agreement reached in 1980 spells out the privileges and
immunities accorded to the offices and personnel of the two organizations to enable them to perform their duties effectively. While
cumbersome in some respects compared to normal government-togovernment relations, these unofficial offices have effectively carried
on the diplomatic and consular business that would normally be
handled by diplomatic missions and consulates. It has been business
16. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and
the Taiwan Issue !New York: Praeger, 1979) pp. 266-75.
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as usual between the United States and Taiwan in substance if not in
form.
Next to its relations with the United States, Taiwan's relations
with Japan are most important. Japan severed diplomatic relations
with Taiwan in 1972 and negotiated an unofficial arrangement to
take their place. The Japanese set up an unofficial Interchange
Association to take care of their interests in Taiwan with an office in
Tokyo headed by the vice president of the Keidanren (Federation of
Economic Organizations) and an office in Taipei headed by former
Japanese ambassador. Both offices were staffed by officials on leave
from their government agencies, most of them from the Foreign
Ministry. Taiwan's interests in Japan are looked after by an East
Asia Relations Association with a head office in Taipei and offices in
Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Fukuoka. Like the Interchange
Association, it is staffed principally by foreign service personnel
assigned in a private capacity. While these unofficial offices maintained by Japan and Taiwan and their personnel do not receive the
full range of privileges and immunities accorded foreign diplomats,
they enjoy sufficiently special treatment to enable them to perform
effectively the functions of surrogate embassies. This pattern of
unofficial offices provided the pattern later copied by the United
States.
Unlike the United States, Japan had taken no responsibility for
Taiwan's security. None of the government-to-government agreements between Japan and the Republic. of China was vital to
Taiwan's survival nor was special legislation required to permit
substantive relations between Japan and Taiwan to continue with
little change. Japan has no Taiwan Relations Act; it was able to
ensure continuation of the relationship through changes in administrative regulations.
The shift from formal diplomatic relations to unofficial relations
resulted in one serious problem between Tokyo and Taipei: the
suspension of flights by their national airlines between the two
countries for more than a year in 1974-75. Slighting references by
Foreign Minister Ohira to the national flag of the Republic of China
made in announcing the conclusion of an aviation agreement with
the PRC were regarded by the government in Taiwan as an affront to
national dignity performed by the Japanese official in response to
PRC pressures. Taipei immediately ordered all flights between Japan
and Taiwan by the two airlines suspended. Long drawn-out negotiations between the Interchange Association and the East Asia
Relations Association eventually brought about resumption of flights

TAIWAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS

153

by China Airlines and a Japan Air Lines subsidiary, Japan Asia
Airways.
Aside from the aviation contretemps, caused by miscalculation
by politicians and officials of both countries, relations between
Taiwan and Japan have proceeded smoothly in their new unofficial
mode. Trade, travel and investment all have grown at a brisk pace. 17
No other country has established a substitute for a diplomatic
mission in Taiwan as large or elaborate as those maintained by the
United States and Japan. But 15 countries have unofficial offices in
Taipei and the number is increasing year by year. (For a current list,
see Annex.) Such offices promote trade, further cultural exchange,
and facilitate the issuance of visas to travellers from Taiwan. For
example, the Taipei offices of the Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee
and the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion concentrate on
promoting trade, while the Cervantes Association and the German
Cultural Center concern themselves with cultural exchange. These
unofficial offices have devised a variety of ways to provide visas to
applicants in Taiwan. The Japanese Interchange Association receives
visa applications and three days later provides visas bearing the
stamp of the Japanese Consulate General in Hong Kong. The Belgian
Trade Association telexes visa applications to the Ministry of Justice
in Brussels and usually receives a return telex within two days. On
arrival in Belgium, the traveller presents a copy of the telex and
receives his visa. The Greek trade office follows a similar practice. 18
Malaysian Airlines and Thai International Airways provide visas to
travellers wishing to visit those countries. Experienced officials
acting in a private capacity often head the unofficial offices in Taipei.
For example, the Austrian trade office, opened in January 1981, is
headed by an Austrian trade official formerly stationed in Singapore.
Taiwan has opened a large number of offices abroad to perform
the functions formerly handled by diplomatic and consular offices.
The principal network consists of the overseas offices of the China
External Trade Development Council (CETDC), a non-profit, private
organization supported by both business and government. Its 48
offices go by a variety of names: the Oficina Comercial de Taiwan
(Buenos Aires), the CETDC Correspondent in Sydney (Sydney,
Australia), the Far East Trade Service, Inc. (Brussels), the Taiwan
Trade Service (Duesseldorf). In addition to providing services to
individual businesses, the CETDC presents exhibits of Taiwan
17. For a more detailed analysis of Japan-Taiwan relations after 1972, see Ralph N.
Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) Chapter 7.
18. Asian Wall Street Journal (Weekly edition) March 30, 1981, p. 18.
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products at its exhibition hall in Taipei, organizes overseas trade
missions, and participates in international trade fairs.
The Central News Agency (CNA), originally a KMT publicity
organ but reorganized as a private corporation in 1973, maintains a
worldwide network of correspondents. Through these overseas offices
and news exchange agreements with thirteen foreign news agencies
Taiwan gathers and disseminates information throughout the news
circulation system of the non-communist world. Efforts by the PRC to
limit the activites of the CNA have had little success.
Taiwan also maintains a number of information and cultural
centers throughout the world, such as the Sun Yat-sen Center in
Madrid. Through invitations extended by the Pacific Cultural
Foundation, the Institute of International Relations, and other
nongovernmental organizations, Taiwan invites large numbers of
influential persons from many countries to visit the island. Organizations abroad, such as the Australia-Free China Society or the Friends
of Free China in the United States strengthen the links between
Taiwan and friendly countries. The USA-ROC Economic Council, to
which many leading American companies belong, promotes trade and
investment between the United States and Taiwan.
Lack of diplomatic and consular relations with most countries of
the world does handicap Taiwan in certain ways. Its officials must
travel on ordinary passports; their travel is sometimes delayed
because they fail to receive the treatment that would be accorded to
holders of official or diplomatic passports. They lack the ready access
to foreign officials that they would receive if officially recognized.
They have to put up with affronts to national dignity. Agreements on
aviation rights or quotas on exports to certain countries cannot take
the usual form of government-to-government agreements, but must
be negotiated between non-governmental organizations. It is remarkable how effectively Taiwan has learned to expand the scope of its
international relations despite these handicaps.
While the PRC has persistently sought to prevent the ROC from
maintaining official relations with other countries and tried to
exclude it from intergovernmental organizations, it has not since
1979 mounted a campaign to interfere with Taiwan's substantive
bilateral relations with other countries or with its unofficial mechanisms for promoting those relations. It is quick to protest, however,
any action that seems to raise those mechanisms closer to an official
status, such as the agreement between the AIT and the CCNAA on
privileges and immunities.
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Non-governmental Organizations
Since the time it was admitted to the United Nations, replacing
the ROC, the PRC has not only pressed for the exclusion of the ROC
from intergovernmental organizations, but has also demanded the
expulsion of private organizations in Taiwan from international
organizations. It has concentrated particularly on the three pundred
or more international nongovernmental organizations affilia~ with
UNESCO. At the eighteenth general conference of UNESCO h1 Paris
in 1974 the PRC prevailed upon the delegates to pass a resolution
urging all these organizations to exclude immediately, and break off
all relations with "bodies or elements linked with Chiang Kai-shek."
Some organizations complied, but others did not and Peking found it
necessary to have similar resolutions passed at the subsequent
biennial UNESCO conferences. The resolution passed by the twentieth general conference in 1978 "noted with satisfaction that certain
nongovernmental international organizations, in accordance with
UNESCO's resolutions concerned, have expelled the branches, sections, or elements having ties with the Chiang clique". However, the
conference also noted "with preoccupation that the branches, sections,
or elements having ties with the Chiang clique and usurping the
name of China or employing all other names are committing illegal
activities within certain nongovernmental international organizations maintaining relations with UNESCO." The resolution again
called on the organizations concerned to expel such Taiwan groups.
The PRC representative declared, however, that "we are not against
the participation in various non-governmental international scientific and technical and academic conferences by scientists of Taiwan
province in the capacity of individuals." 19
The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) has been
particularly resistant to PRC pressures to expel the Taiwan member
organization in order to make a place for one from the PRC. Many
scientists took the view that since science was a nonpolitical activity,
any bona fide scientific organization should be entitled to belong,
wherever it came from. The ICSU in May 1980 adopted a resolution
agreeing to accept separate organizations from Taiwan and the PRC
as full members representing Chinese scientists. The PRC declined to
participate in the September 1980 meeting on the ground that it
could not regard Taiwan as a full voting member of the
organization. 20
19. FBIS, December 1, 1978, p. C·l.
20. Sunday Times Chinese Weekly, September 21, 1980, p. 3.

156

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

The PRC has also worked hard to squeeze organizations from
Taiwan out of international sports bodies. The hardest-fought and
lengthiest battle was over the Olympic Games. Until the summer of
1976 teams from Taiwan competed and PRC teams stayed away. At
the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976, however, because the
Canadian Government ruled that the Taiwan team could not compete
under the name of Republic of China, it withdrew. The struggle
continued within the International Olympic Committee (IOC), in
which Taiwan was represented, but the PRC was not. Finally, as the
result of a postal ballot of all members, the IOC announced in
November 1979 a decision to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee in Peking as the national committee of China. Taiwan would be
allowed to compete also in the games provided it did so under the
name "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" and used a new flag and
anthem rather than the flag and anthem of the ROC. After an
unsuccessful attempt to fight the IOC decision in a Swiss court, the
Olympic committee in Taiwan agreed in March 1981 to accept its new
status. The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee will enjoy all rights
accorded to other national Olympic committees. With the help of the
IOC, athletic groups in Taiwan will seek reinstatement in sports
federations affiliated with the IOC, using the IOC-approved
nomenclature. The way appears to have been opened for sports teams
from the PRC and Taiwan to compete against each other in
international meets.
Conclusion

Nearly ten years after the expulsion of the ROC from the United
Nations and more than two years after the severance of diplomatic
relations between the United States and the ROC, Taiwan forges
vigorously ahead as a separate political entity, even though it lacks a
clearly defined status in international law and a predictable future.
Over the coming ten to twenty years, three outcomes are conceivable:
integration, independence, or a continuation of Taiwan's present
ambiguous status.
Integration by agreement between the two governments seems
extremely unlikely, even though both continue to hold to the
one-China principle and proclaim integration as their long-term
objective. The authorities in Taiwan and the majority of people in
Taiwan are fearful of placing the island even nominally under PRC
sovereignty. They distrust Peking's promises to leave undisturbed the
social and economic systems and the military forces of Taiwan,
suspecting that the concession in principle on sovereignty would be
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followed by a whittling away of Taiwan's freedom of action aimed at
ultimate absorption of the people of Taiwan in the Communist
system. Moreover, given Deng Xiaoping's advanced age and the
history of struggles for power among the leaders in Peking, there is
no assurance that Deng's successors would abide by any promises he
might make. Consequently, so long as the China mainland is under a
Communist system, Peking's proposals for peaceful reunification of
Taiwan with the mainland probably will attract little support among
the people of the island.
Any attempt to subjugate Taiwan by force during the next two
decades also seems unlikely, unless a radical and improbable
improvement should occur in relations between Peking and Moscow,
accompanied by a severe deterioration in Peking's relations with
Washington. Even in such circumstances- constituting a revival to
some degree of the 1950s confrontation between the United States
and the Sino-Soviet bloc - subjugation of Taiwan by force would be
unlikely, for the strategic importance of the island to the United
States would be greatly enhanced and the probability of U.S. military
intervention to prevent its conquest would be high. In the more
probable circumstance that the United States and the PRC continue
to have a common interest over the next two decades in opposing
Soviet expansionism, the two countries will probably succeed in
continuing to treat the Taiwan problem as a secondary issue between
them and the PRC will see its interests best served by refraining
from the use of force against the island.
Long-term trends seem to be pushing Taiwan more in the
direction of formal independence from China than integration with it.
By the time another twenty years have passed, Taiwan will have
existed as a separate political entity for half a century, possessing all
the attributes of an independent sovereign nation and more highly
developed economically than most countries of the world. The gap
between the standard of living on the China mainland and in Taiwan
probably will have widened substantially. The older generation of
those who came from the mainland after 1945 will have passed from
the scene, including the members of the Legislative Yuan, the
Control Yuan, and the National Assembly elected on the mainland in
the 1940s. Natives of Taiwan, together with some mainlanders who
grew up in Taiwan, will occupy the principal positions of power in the
government and the domestic political rationale for clinging to the
one-China principle will have disappeared. The appeal of selfdetermination for Taiwan will be strong; people will become more
and more restive at having to live in diplomatic limbo without a
recognized and respected position of equality among nations.
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However, the odds are heavily against the PRC's agreeing to a
formal declaration of independence by Taiwan. Rulers in Peking
seem no more likely to go along willingly with Taiwanese independence than George III was to tolerate the independence of the
American colonies or Abraham Lincoln was to acquiesce in the
independence of the Confederacy. The probability is great that they
would resort to force to prevent it. There is a third choice, neither
integration nor independence, but the continuance of Taiwan's
present ambiguous status. The Taiwan authorities have demonstrated that the island can develop and prosper and expand its
relations throughout the world without formal recognition as a state
or government. Taiwan and its partners are steadily refining and
improving their techniques for dealing with each other in the absence
of formal diplomatic relations. While this state of affairs is not
entirely satisfactory to either Peking or Taipei, the government in
Peking may for a long time prefer it to the costs and risks of resorting
to force and the government in Taipei may prefer it to running the
risk of having to fight for its independence.
The PRC could, of course, drop its conciliatory policy toward
Taiwan in favor of pressure tactics short of the use of force. It might,
for example, try to interfere with Taiwan's economic relations with
its partners. Such tactics, however, have a number of disadvantages.
The PRC's capacity to pressure Taiwan's trading partners is not
great; it might lose more than it would gain by such tactics.
Moreover, the more pressure Peking exerts on Taipei, the more it
risks pushing the people of Taiwan to abandon the one-China
principle and opt for independence, having concluded from Peking's
hard-line posture that they have little to lose. A conciliatory PRC
policy, on the other hand, would be more likely to encourage
retention of the one-China principle by Taiwan and allow communication between the two groups of Chinese people to develop.
The undefined state of peaceful coexistence that now exists
between the China mainland and Taiwan could continue indefinitely
if the leaders on both sides accepted the view that it was more in
their interest than facing the risks and uncertainties of trying to
change it. Under the umbrella of a one-China principle proclaimed by
both, Taiwan could go its own way, enjoying most, though not all, of
the advantages of a separate, fully-recognized sovereign state.
Scholars versed in international law might chafe at their inability to
fit Taiwan into a neat pigeonhold, but ambiguity may be preferable
to attempts to impose order on unruly circumstances when those
attempts intensify tension and conflict.
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ANNEX

Offices Maintained in Taiwan by Countries Which Do Not Have
Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China.
American Institute in Taiwan
Interchange Association (Japan)
Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee
Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (Philippines)
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce to Taipei
Belgian Trade Association
France-Asia Trade Promotion Association
Hellenic Organization for Exports in Taiwan (Greece)
Jordanian Commercial Office
Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion
Office of Singapore Trade Representative
Office of Austrian Trade Representative
Administrative Office, Thai Airways International
Cervantes Center (Spain)
German Cultural Center

Chapter 8
DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CASE OF TAIWAN
Aleth Manin
Introduction
The title of this symposium is somewhat daring: at first glance, it
seems rash to examine the relation between divided nations and
international law, because international law is supposed to consider
States to the exclusion of anything else. International law is in fact
based upon a theoretical point of view which considers the State as
the organized form of a nation.
The concept of "nation," consequently, is relegated to a secondary
level in classic international law. It is of interest only in regard to
relatively minor institutions such as national minority rights or the
recognition of the nation as opposed to the recognition of the State.
But at the present time, that is, since the Second World War,
international law cannot ignore a situation which is faced by several
peoples in their search for their national identity. It is therefore an
exercise in realism to examine how the general rules apply to divided
nations and how such nations themselves apply those rules.
In short, it is this double question which we will discuss today.
This discussion may prove to be somewhat fragmentary; first,
because the legal point of view is but one facet of reality, it cannot
elucidate the whole. More importantly, it is fragmentary because it
deals with present realities since we are examining the situation in
1981. The present status of these nations is still changing. In fact, the
very essence of divided states lies in the hope of reunification. We
must therefore endeavor to avoid betraying that hope, while examining the present situation.

Introductory Comments on the Chinese Case
Clearly, the Chinese nation is split by the same ideological
aflliction as other divided nations. There is a distinction, however. If
we take Korea and Germany, the two camps that claim to speak in
the name of the whole are relatively equal in magnitude. However,
the disproportion between the territory, population and strategic
importance of the two Chinese camps is startling. This disproportion
is naturally the starting point for the position taken by third States
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in their choice of one group or the other. Independently of any other
justification, it is strategic, economic, social and similar considerations which determine the actions of third States with respect to
divided nations as well as the significance they attach to their desire
for reunification.
The disparity between the two Chinese communities explains in
large part the current status of Taiwan and the peculiarities of its
external relations.

The Status of Taiwan
Because the international community is dominated by the
concept of statehood, divided nations concentrate their efforts toward
entering fully into the world of States.
It is well known that, strictly speaking, there is no objective legal
criterion for the existence of a "State" in international law. One
considers constituent elements only- territory, population, government - from which third parties draw, at their sole discretion, all
consequences with a view to establishing or not establishing State-toState relations with the chosen entity by virtue of the act of
recognition.
The institution of diplomatic recognition tends to favor - or
disfavor - divided nations as much as it does any non-divided nation.
However, it plays a further role in the dynamics peculiar to divided
nations, placing in the hands of the recognized entity the ability to
cite that recognition by third States as a legitimization of their claim
to overall authority. This explains the harshness of the means taken
to avoid giving support to the claims of "the other," whether those
means be the well-known Hallstein doctrine in the Federal Republic
of Germany or the same unqualified intransigence which one sees in
the two Chinese communities.
In this general scheme, the status of Taiwan presents two
notable peculiarities. The first arises from the mere act of counting:
the number of states which recognize the Republic of China, after
having diminished to an alarming degree, has stabilized despite the
fears aroused by the establishment of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the People's Republic of China. In 1981,
twenty-three States maintain official relations with the authorities in
Taipei.
The second peculiarity results from the historical circumstances
of the war. Two great powers, the United States and Great Britain,
had the right under international law to oppose the People's Republic
of China's claim to the territory of Taiwan.
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Since 1978, the doctrine of these two has been somewhat
"neutralized." After President Nixon's 1972 visit to mainland China,
Great Britain took a further step beyond its act of recognition in
1950: the British government acknowledged "the position of the
Chinese government according to which Taiwan is a province of the
People's Republic of China."
After long hesitation while it sought in vain for a formula that
would satisfy its new partner without threatening the security of
Taiwan, the United States on December 16, 1978, affirmed in tum
the principle that Taiwan by law formed a part of the People's
Republic of China. (Among the States historically interested in
resolving the issue of Taiwan, only Japan has sealed its relations
with the People's Republic without accepting the principle of the
unity of China. But Japan was hardly in a position to decide the
question of Taiwan.) As a result of American recognition, no State
presently has legal standing to contest the PRC's principle according
to which Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China. They
may, however, naturally observe that the People's Republic has not
taken effective de facto control over Taiwan but these recent events
are meant to bring change to the juridical status of Taiwan.
It is indeed rather unusual for a State to be called upon to
confirm the territorial claims of the State with which it is establishing diplomatic relations during the process of recognition. The
Peking authorities insisted on obtaining, particulary from Great
Britain and the United States, recognition of the principle of the
unity of China, in order to lend to the process of reunification the
appearance of internal order. Clearly, no measures of reunification
are actually being undertaken on this ground. Rather, in this case,
the law is being used, so to speak, to precede the fact.
Communist China does not conceal its ambition, in this context,
which is to grant Taiwan the status of an autonomous region. The
clear statements of the communist authorities indicate that, if
reunified with the People's Republic, Taiwan would retain its
autonomy - that is, in concrete terms, its monetary system, its
commercial relations, and its armed forces and governmental structures. All the same, it is noteworthy that on the international scene
the Peking authorities are acting as if the situation they describe
already existed. The American government has already discovered
this to their cost, when Peking protested on several occasions that the
United States had violated its commitments to consider Taiwan as
part of China. It is also well known that in the recent confrontation
between the People's Republic and the Netherlands, the latter was
accused of failing to respect the view of the People's Republic that
Taiwan is a province of China. (See, Le Monde, January 16, 1981.)
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In any case, the legal capacity of Taiwan is already somewhat
restricted.
The area in which the activity of the People's Republic has
already achieved immediate results is naturally security, which is
even more essential for divided States than for any other national
group.
The observations below are governed by the hypothesis that
reunification of China cannot be achieved by peaceful means.
The acts of recognition have a clear goal: to deprive Taiwan of
the right of recourse to the international system of collective security.
This deprivation operates on two levels. First there is the serious
question of whether the system of collective security, namely the
Charter of the United Nations and more specifically the Security
Council, would intervene and oppose forceful measures taken by the
People's Republic against Taiwan. Clearly, communist diplomacy has
sought to undermine in advance any attempt in this direction. Recall
that in 1971 the UN General Assembly "reestablished" China's rights
and passed a resolution confirming its claim to represent the Chinese
nation. Without being overly pessimistic, it is extremely unlikely
that the General Assembly - or a fortiori, the Security Council, in
which China has a permanent seat - would intervene in a show of
force. Moreover, the practice of the United Nations tends to
demonstrate that without being recognized as a national liberation
movement, separatist provinces may expect little aid from the world
organization.
Secondly, collective security exists also through the system of
military alliances. Such alliances are obviously precluded between
Taiwan and those States that have established diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic. The abrogation of the 1954 mutual
defense treaty with the United States is the clearest example of this.
This does not prohibit any State or group of States from manifesting
political interest in a peaceful resolution to the question, but at this
point one Is no longer dealing with legal aspects. Rather, one is
dealing with political aspects.
The vital issue regarding Taiwan is indisputably that of military
cooperation. And this is certainly the area where international rules
are established with the least degree of certainty. Broadly speaking,
it is prohibited to provide assistance to a separatist movement but it
is lawful to aid national liberation movements. In the first case, the
rules traditionally applied to the case of civil war are relied upon,
while in the second one relies upon the right of national self-
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determination which the instruments of the United Nations purport
to recognize.
Recent events tend to prove that neither of the cases applies to
Taiwan. The People's Republic intentionally maintained the fiction of
separatism when it acted with respect to the Netherlands, as if
Taiwan should already be regarded as a separatist province.
It is therefore logical that, for now, any assistance offered to
Taiwan must be a function of the balance of power rather than of
juridical considerations.

Taiwan's External Relations
The observations on the status of Taiwan do not give a realistic
appraisal of the situation.
In fact, the initiatives of the People's Republic have been largely
counteracted by the dynamism of Taiwan's diplomacy which, among
divided nations, shows an intense degree of activity and a great
ingenuity. The most visible sign of Taiwan's presence on the
international scene is its pursuit of substantive relations with most of
the world's population, including that of several communist countries.
Is it possible to measure the quality and extent of these
relations? The most significant communiques issued when recognition was extended to the People's Republic, namely, those of Japan
and the United States, clearly referred to "people-to-people" relations
with Taiwan. Do such relations have specific implications? That
would presuppose that the word "people" has a precise meaning or
that the Parties intended such a predetermined meaning inter se. At
first glance, the word "people" means more through the hopes it
conveys than because of the rights it restores. The declarations
recorded in the United Nations and in the conferences of non-aligned
nations used the word without having given a prior definition, and do
not provide a basis for determining the status that should, in general,
be attributed to a "people."
In truth, one is inclined to the opinion that the Parties directly
concerned did not consider that they were determining Taiwan's
external relations on any juridical basis.
The Sino-American communique is symptomatic of this dilemma.
If that communique expressly aims at the maintenance of commercial
and cultural relations, it is because such relations have caused fewer
problems. On the other hand, in referring to other "non-official
relations," the communique leaves foreseeable points of disagreement.
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Actual practice does not provide much clarification. If official
relations are state to state, there is no precedent which defines the
specific character of non-official relations.
This vague notion of unofficial relations is used by Taiwan to fill
the void caused by the lack of traditional diplomatic missions. The
creation of ad hoc organizations as opposed to the usual official
missions is the result of pragmatism. There is therefore no preexistent model; these organizations are entirely creations of circumstance.
To date, three types of organizations exist. The simplest consists
of setting up, based on parallel and independent acts, national
organizations which undertake the same activities. This is the
technique employed by the Europeans.
The second type arises from concerted action. Two organizations
created for this purpose conclude a nongovernmental agreement in
the terms of which they define their modes of activity within the
territory of the other. This is the aim of the Agreement of December
26, 1972 between the Interchange Association (ICA), the Japanese
Association, and its Taiwanese counterpart, the East Asian Relations
Association (EARA). This Agreement sets up the compositions of the
parties' respective delegations and the areas in which they may
exercise their authority. It specifies matters relating to the competence of the organizations and the means by which they are
empowered to act.
The third type is that used by the United States. A private
organization is charged, by the terms of a statute, to ensure relations
between the people of Taiwan and the people of the United States.
This is therefore a unilateral act which, at the same time, determines
the functional rules and the status within American territory of that
organization.
In each case, the organizations created fall within the same
juridical category; they are associations or corporations under private
law.
The peculiarities of their composition are well known. It is more
profitable to examine their functions. In this regard, one might say
that, in a very general sense, these organizations function on two
different levels: they are missions of general interest and they are the
sole channel for people-to-people relations.
Do these functions justify the granting of special privileges and
the use of facilities? Regular and active relations no doubt require a
minimum of privileged treatment, to ensure the protection of persons
and of the property of the organizations. The status of special
missions, as adopted in the United Nations, could provide a solid
reference for situations which are still unresolved.

Chapter 9
RECOGNITION POLICY WITH RESPECT
TO MULTI-SYSTEM STATES:
THE CASE OF CHINA
Morton A. Kaplan
The General Problem
The problem of recognition in the cases of the so-called multisystem states is a complex matter, both legally and politically. I shall
attempt to address this matter with respect to the Republic of China,
but it will be useful to consider the case of China from within the
context of the general problem.
Although I do not wish to spend much time on legal issues, a few
preliminary remarks are in order. Neither of the principal contending
theories of recognition, whether of states or of governments, is
without its problems. The position taken by Lauterpacht and Kelsen
that recognition is constitutive obviously overstates the case. Indeed,
Lauterpacht felt compelled to modify orthodox constitutive theory by
positing a legal duty to recognize a state or government that met
certain prescribed factual prerequisites. On the other hand, the
declaratory or evidentiary theory, according to which statehood or
governmental authority exists independently of recognition by other
states, implies a theory of law that in its own way rivals the
abstractness of Kelsen's pure theory. How can facts determine
anything in the absence of norms that make the facts relevant to the
issue? A system of law is neither a self-subsistent entity that is
divorced from the life and times of the political and social system
within which it is implemented nor a set of disembodied factual
conditions that exists abstractly in some timeless realm.
Legal theory, like philosophy in general, and despite Justice
Holmes' observation that general principles do not decide particular
cases, has long been governed by a search for identifiable criteria
that determine decisions, whether these are the social facts of
realistic theories or the norms of normative theories. If recognition
were merely a matter of state discretion, that would unequivocally
settle the issue. If, on the other hand, the existence of a state or
government were to be determined purely by a factual set of
circumstances, then we could tum the problem over to technicians.
Thus, the matter is somewhat analogous to the snake that is
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swallowing its own tail. A right cannot flow from facts except as
prescribed by some legal system. Conversely, all legal systems refer
to certain factual conditions, and these may differ with the legal
systems and the conditions of the societies in which those systems are
implemented.

Recognition in "Balance of Power Systems".
During the period of the "balance of power" international system,
the standards of recognition tended to conform with the general needs
of that system, because one of the primary requirements of that
system was maintaining flexibility of alignment. Inasmuch as the
independence of states was essential to that end, states attempted
to maintain standards that preserved this independence and that,
therefore, would not interfere with domestic arrangements.
States continued to deal with an existing government until that
government had lost effective control of the situation regardless of
political affinities or disaffections. A new state or government that
was in control of its territory and population might not be recognized
immediately. The primary purpose of withholding recognition from a
new state or government, however, was to bring pressure on the new
state or government to recognize its obligations under the system of
international law. Before recognition, a new state or government
gained some status and rights under international law, but not the
privileges that were accorded under the comity of nations. Even
belligerent parties that did not meet the standards for recognition
and that controlled both some territory and population acquired de
facto some rights and duties under international law because of the
general need for order in the system.
Any other position would have resembled intervention and would
have invoked the counter-interventionary activities of other states
regardless of their positions. Of course, at times these norms were
violated, as are the norms of any system of law, domestic or
international. Additionally, there were areas of so little importance
that for all practical purposes they fell outside the system. The
system of norms worked by and large because the social and political
international system provided the major states with incentives to
maintain it.

Recognition in a Loose Bipolar System
World War II constituted a watershed in the development of
international law. There was a system change and it affected the
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character of the international system and of the norms that were
enforceable. A loose bipolar system arose and the constraint that
supported the norms against intervention were greatly weakened.
Similar changes affected recognition policy. Recognition became less
a matter of enforcing conformity with the system of norms and with
specific obligations than of affecting the bipolar competition and the
contest over the rules of the game. Thus, the evidentiary criteria that
determined recognition began to lose their relatively neutral character and to gain partisan gloss.
One can note important differences from the "balance of power"
situation. Even if the United States opposes Soviet military intervention in Poland, the interventionary character of Soviet pressure is
resisted primarily by the strength of political opposition within
Poland itself rather than by the strength of opposition from either the
international political system or international law.
No firmly-established norm of international law that is generally
recognized prohibits Soviet intervention, numerous General Assembly dicta to the contrary notwithstanding. Some day, further
modifications in the world political framework may move the system
back to the general norm of non-intervention. But those conditions do
not yet exist.
There were also other types of system changes. The old colonial
system collapsed and very large numbers of new nations came on the
scene that dwarfed in numbers the states that had participated in the
previous "balance of power" system. The character of the political
contests for rule in these new nations, their fear of "neo-colonialism",
and their desire to expropriate the property of the old colonial nations
under justifying slogans, produced a contest over the principles
governing nationalization and quickly became confused with contests
involving intervention and recognition.
World War II had still another aftermath that affects the system
of law. A new state such as Israel and multi-system old states such as
Germany, China, Korea and (until 1975) Vietnam, became elements
of the post-war settlement. Although these divisions were created by
incipient bipolarity, and, except in the case of China, were sustained
by it, they are also reinforced by different ideologies and power
structures.
Despite the self-conscious effort of the framers of the Charter of
the United Nations to divorce itself, unlike the League of Nations,
from the post-war settlement and lack of success in implementing the
provisions of the Charter against the use of force, such a settlement is
part of the framework of post-World War II international law.
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Precarious though that framework may be in certain respects, the
territorial settlements and the new norms have strong material
interdependencies. Their material reinforcement also minimizes the
risk of a third world war. Thus, there are strong incentives in the
system for the major states to maintain the framework of law.
The question is not whether the durability of the post-war
settlement has been tested at times - for surely it has - but
whether the system has the strength, and the major nations within it
the incentive, to maintain the system and its norms against
challenges. And, within limits and with exceptions, including the
tragic case of Vietnam, it has and they do.
The loose bipolar system has changed from its equilibrium
position, but not so much that a consonant normative structure is
threatened. Although bipolarity continues to exist today primarily in
its military, and to some extent in economic, form, and although the
system continues to evolve in other respects, the loose bipolar
framework is sufficiently valid in important respects to reinforce
many of its normative features. Whereas, in its equilibrium state,
national recognition was designed to reinforce bloc cohesion and to
minimize the legitimacy of the disfavored government in multisystem states, this position is no longer tenable and should be
modified, as I shall argue below. But first, we must discuss briefly the
history of recognition with respect to China.
This normative system of which I am speaking was not
self-consciously put together by legal craftsmen who understood what
they were doing. Moreover, the boundaries and implications of the
system are murkier than they need have been because practitioners
- from intellectual confusion, political constraints, or the pursuit of
immediate objectives - failed to reach decisions that would have
been functional within the system.
For instance, the fact that the United States preferred for many
years to recognize the Republic of China as the official China entitled
to a Security Council seat in the United Nations confused two
different fora. Whereas, in a "balance of power" system, the
recognition decisions of individual states and of the League of
Nations ought in principle to have been the same, except perhaps in
some few exceptional situations, the same result need not follow in a
loose bipolar system. The purposes of recognition in the two different
fora and the legal criteria that determine them might very well and, in the instant case, should - differ. For many years it could
have been argued that United States recognition policy was appropriate from a bloc standpoint in a loose bipolar system. It did not follow
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from this that the decisions taken in the United Nations were
appropriate from the standpoint of a universal organization. The
U.N. is not a participant in the bipolar competition and one of its
main equilibrating functions in the system is to mediate bloc quarrels
from a neutral standpoint. Although one might have argued that
neither China was the appropriate successor to the seat held by
China in the Security Council, for many years the Republic of China
held that seat while its claim was factually indefensible. Although I
would argue that the Republic of China acquired by occupation the
province of Taiwan, it no longer had control of the people, or
substantial support in the territory, of that which constituted the
bulk of the state of China. However, the terms under which this
contest was fought so confused the issue that the subsequent
membership of the Republic of China in the General Assembly was
unfairly and improperly prejudiced.

How the Norms of Bipolarity Should have Developed
Let us return now to one of our starting points. The framework of
international law in the current era has among its major functions
that of maintaining the postwar settlement, the norms appropriate to
it and the avoidance of at least major war. Thus, the legal norms of
this system tend to be, and should be, consonant with these aims. An
integral part of this postwar settlement involves both the new states
such as Israel and multi-system states such as China, Germany,
Korea and, previously, Vietnam.
What norms are appropriate in such a situation? The General
Assembly of the United Nations immediately following the first free
election in Korea in 1948 took a major - but as it turned out,
abortive - step toward the recognition of this new international
order. It recognized the government headed by Syngman Rhee in
1948 as a freely-elected government and as the only such government
in Korea. This implicitly invoked a new and appropriate standard of
international law: the existence of a single state that could be
coterminous with more than a single legitimate government. This
was appropriate policy for the universal organization in a loose
bipolar system and is becoming appropriate also for national policy in
the system.
In fact, much of current practice recognizes what, from the
standpoint of classical international law, can only be considered an
anomaly. Although both Koreas recognize only one state and oppose
the permanent existence of separate governments, each government
functions independently and is recognized by a large number of
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countries. Although the German Democratic Republic recently has
came close to the position of insisting upon two states, the Federal
Republic blurs the issue by mandating the existence of only one
nation and by recognizing that it has at least residual responsibility
for all Germans in foreign lands. Both the Republic of China and the
People's Republic of China recognize the existence of only one
Chinese state, and each is recognized by a number of nations.
Both Germanies are represented in the United Nations. Neither
Korea is represented because North Korea refuses to acknowledge
the validity of separate representation and because the Soviet Union
would veto an independent South Korean entry. There is little doubt,
however, that a very large majority could be mustered for South
Korean entry. The Republic of China was expelled from the General
Assembly when the People's Republic was admitted. But I would
argue that this is the consequence of the absurdly clumsy, if not
deliberately counterproductive, way in which the United States
argued the issue.
The Case of the Republic of China

It would be unrealistic to deny that the specific history of events
has had some impact upon the legal structure of the system.
However, that impact may not be entirely preclusive. To date, in the
United States, the China issue has been made an appendage of
current, and often misguided, policy. The condemnation of the
People's Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea, when it had an
inherent right to protect its own security, undermined both relations
with the People's Republic and the stature of the United Nations by
forcing the United Nations into a compromise armistice with a nation
that it had labelled as an aggressor. Rather than allowing the
People's Republic into the United Nations while the United States
had a firm majority in that organization, thus permitting the People's
Republic to play its legitimate role in that organization, the United
States in effect supported the implicit Soviet objective of keeping
Communist China out of the United Nations. Later, when the depth
of the split between China and the Soviet Union was recognized and
when President Nixon was able to move toward initiating formal
relations with China, the United States overestimated China's
military and economic potential and acted in disregard of normative
considerations appropriate to the circumstances. As this policy was
conducted further by the Carter administration, in its effort inadvisably to play the China card against the Soviet Union, the United
States bargained away the position of its ally, the Republic of China,
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as it previously had that of Vietnam, without anything substantial to
show for the venture in terms of immediate gains, long term
interests, or normative values.
The very least the United States should have done was to resist
normalization until a decent modus vivendi had been arranged
between the People's Republic and the Republic of China. Had it not
been for Congressional passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, the right
of the United States to engage in commerce with the Republic of
China, to supply it with weapons, and so forth, except on terms
acceptable to the People's Republic, could have been challenged at
some future date on the basis of the agreement between the two
governments. Even though the United States did not formally
acknowledge the right of the People's Republic to control Taiwan, it
did "not challenge" that control; therefore, unnecessary damage was
done to the legal position of the Republic of China.

A General Recommendation for Normative Policy
Although each one of the multi-system states is significantly
different in one or more respects, the United States eventually should
move toward a relatively principled position with respect to multisystem states. The first aspect of this position should be to recognize
that each government in the divided state legitimately exercises the
sovereignty of the state within its area of competence. It, therefore, is
entitled to security with respect to its physical arrangements, its
commerce, its social life, its political arrangements and all the other
requisites of organized activity. The use of force to change this status
quo is forbidden by the U.N. Charter. But it should be understood
that these divisions are not permanent and that someday they will be
overcome voluntarily. In the meantime, the state entity includes the
territory and populations of the contending governments.
The second step should be to distinguish between that government within the state that comes closer to being the successor
government and that which does not. In the case of China, the vast
breadth of the People's Republic clearly establishes the fact that if
any government in China is entitled to the permanent seat in the
Security Council, it is.
Although the issues are not as overwhelmingly clear in the cases
of Germany and Korea, both the Republic of Korea and the Federal
Republic have larger populations, more territory, and more secure
and voluntary support from their respective populations. They also
have shown more willingness to accept their responsibilities under
international law than their rival governments. For instance, the
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Federal Republic has paid reparations for the criminal activities of
the Nazi regime while the German Democratic Republic, which
inherits many of the repressive features of the old Nazi regime, has
not shown the slightest sense of international obligation in this
respect.
To the extent then that there are differences in legitimacy and
inasmuch these differences should affect elections to the Security
Council, only the Republic of Korea and the Federal Republic of
Germany should be considered for those positions. In an organization
which includes among its members the Ukraine, the Byelorussian
Republic, and such states as Oman, it seems reprehensible that the
Republic of China is not a member of the General Assembly and of
other appropriate international organizations. I would argue strongly
that it is entitled to that status under international law. It is an
international entity that exercises sovereign powers, even though
both Chinas regard their anomalous condition as impermanent.
Surely, in the last analysis the People's Republic of China will not
wish to seem even less generous than the Soviet Union in this
respect.

A Specific Recommendation for Normative Policy
With respect to the issue of American recognition of the Republic
of China, the United States cannot entirely and quickly wipe clean
the slate. It has agreed to break diplomatic relations of a formal
nature with the Republic of China. There is no reason, however, why
its relations with the Republic of China should not be upgraded to at
least the status of its relations with the People's Republic before
normalization. Moreover, as more states recognize the Republic of
China and as the People's Republic finds it commercially and
politically impossible to break relations with these states, given the
conditions on its border with the Soviet Union and its other economic
and political needs, the American position eventually may be
upgraded even further.
My suggestion is that eventually the United States should have
embassies in the People's Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the Republic of Korea; but only legations in the Republic of
China, the German Democratic Republic, and, after a peace treaty is
signed on the Korean peninsula, in North Korea. This would
recognize the relative differences in status between governments
within the same state.
The strategic arguments against this position, in my opinion, are
weak. In the first place, the People's Republic has no offensive
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military capability to speak of and will not have for the next
generation at least. Its value in the American strategic option lies
primarily in its existence, not as a counterforce to the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the less the United States satisfies the People's Republic,
the more the latter's potentially closer relationship with the Soviet
Union would forfeit possible concessions from the United States.
In the final analysis, it is not in the American interest for
relations between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union to be as
hostile as they are now. However, they are unlikely, given the
potential conflicts between the two countries, to ever become parallel
unless the United States and its allies become so weak that China
aligns itself to a stronger Soviet Union out of fear.
The People's Republic is probably aware, in the unlikely event
that the Soviet Union attacks it, that the United States is likely to do
very little effectively to aid it. It likely would protect itself mainly by
guerrilla, rather than by conventional, warfare. However, if the
United States has been such an unfaithful ally in the case of the
Republic of China, why should the People's Republic expect effective
assistance from it if any risk is involved? Thus, even considerations of
political prudence support the more principled line of behavior.

Practical Contraindications
There are short-term political expectations that make rapid
movement to the position herein outlined unwise. I certainly would
not advocate that a high official of the American government state
such a position now in explicit form or that there be an explicit
strategy of moving toward it in a short period of time. Rather, the
ideas contained in this paper should be regarded as background
information that is relevant to more particular future decisions that
will be made partly on the basis of other considerations.
I have stated merely what I regard as a consistent and principled
position on the subject of multi-system states in general, and that of
China in particular. I have suggested some of the strategic as well as
some of the normative factors that would support an eventual
movement to a position of this kind. The history of events and the
promises that have been made, as well as immediate political
concerns, work against explicit adoption of this program now.
Nonetheless, if policy is conducted without reference to the considerations expressed in this paper, we may continue to make the same
kinds of tragic mistakes that we have made in the past.
The United States should promote responsible dialogue between
the two Chinese states that responds to the rights and equitites of
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each party in the current set of circumstances. True friendship for the
Chinese people supports such a policy; and in the long run it is the
policy most consonant with American interests and values.
With respect to the eventual unification of China the issue of
Puerto Rico and the United States has interesting similarities and
differences. If the United States were to demand that Puerto Rico
choose between independence and statehood now, I have little doubt
that it would opt for statehood even though I believe that most Puerto
Ricans in their hearts want eventual independence. I believe that
most Chinese both on Taiwan and on the mainland want eventual
unity. However, if the Chinese on Taiwan are forced in the near
future to choose between a two-China policy and autonomy under
mainland sovereignty, I believe they will opt for separate statehood.
In that circumstance, the United States will feel bound by reasons of
honor, friendship and reputation for reliability to support that choice.
No one's interests will be served by attempting to force a premature
choice.
Some day, changes in the characters of the multi-system national
systems and transformations of the international system may permit
the healing of the festering wounds in multi-system nations. Whether
this healing will take place within the confines of classical national
state systems or within a more complex set of national, regional and
international arrangements cannot now be forecast. But that some
day these wounds will be healed seems to me as close to a
foreordained conclusion as is possible in an uncertain world, provided
that we proceed now with intelligence and compassion.

Chapter 10
OVERALL EVALUATION

Robert Sutter, Yung Wei, Stephen Guest and Swan-sik Ko
Robert Sutter
I want to speak on the contradictions present in American
foreign policy, as seen notably in the trade-off between U.S. support
for moral and legal principles and the need to deal with realities in
foreign affairs. Historically, American foreign policy has dealt with
these contradictions between practical tough-mindedness and morality, idealism and legalism in international affairs. The Chinafl'aiwan
case is an interesting example of how these two types of factors have
confronted each other in U.S. foreign policy.
In recent years, U.S. concern for ideals and law in regard to
Taiwan has been overshadowed by the practical concerns of developing relations with a former enemy, namely, China. It seems clear
that we should try to restore more balance in our China policy and
move back toward principles and legality in our relations with
Taiwan and China, as Professor Kaplan spoke of today. However, this
will likely prove to be a difficult task because of the strong realpolitik
factors that continue to drive the United States and China closer
together, usually at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan ties.
Seeking to withdraw from Vietnam, to gain leverage against the
Soviet Union and to gain a more stable balance-of-power in East
Asia, the United States viewed its new relationship with China as a
practical tool, particularly useful in stabilizing the East Asian area
in the 1970s. The question was asked as to why U.S. officials did not
insist at that time that the PRC renounce the use of force vis-a-vis
Taiwan. Is it not fair to ask, could the United States have done this
and still developed the new Asian balance-of-power that it sought to
achieve? Could the United States have attempted to use the China
relationship to ease withdrawal from Vietnam or could it still have
achieved some sort of leverage over the Soviet Union? To have stood
by principles such as the renunciation of force vis-a-vis Taiwan at
that time would have been extremely difficult, if not foolish, and not
in the best interests of the United States.
I noted that the United States government has tried to cover over
the contradiction between principle and practicality in its China/
Taiwan policy with ambiguous public pronouncements. Thus, for
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example, while the U.S.-PRC normalization communique assumes
that Taiwan will be reunited some day with the mainland, the
Taiwan Relations Act assumes that Taiwan will remain separate
from the mainland for the foreseeable future and that the United
States will do what is needed to sustain that situation. The U.S.
government- ambiguously- says that it supports both documents.
I added, in regard to the demand that the United States require
China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, that such a stand
would not be popular in China nor in most of the rest of the Third
World. It would be seen as an effort by a satisfied, status quo power
(the United States) imposing its "imperialist logic" on the poorer
countries of the world.
I also referred to the issue of self determination which was raised
this morning in defense of the interests of the current Taipei
administration. I warned that using such a principle is probably not
wise in the United States because there is a large group of people
with the opinion that if there were true self determination in Taiwan,
the current Chinese Nationalist leaders would be turned out of office
and Taiwan would declare itself an independent state.
In conclusion, I applauded Dr. Kaplan's call for more ideals and
more consistency in principle in U.S. foreign policy toward Taiwan.
Although noting the difficulty of overcoming those U.S. leaders who
will argue in favor of "practicality" in U.S. foreign policy toward
China and Taiwan, I added that the Taiwan administration can assist
the process by continuing to show itself as a model of favorable
economic development, by further liberalizing political restrictions on
the island, and by showing itself as less intransigent vis-a-vis the
mainland, notably by no longer referring to the government there as
"illegitimate" and by renouncing any interest in the use of force to
overthrow the mainland government.

Yung Wei
Speaking on the need for conceptual framework, I wish to assert
that while concepts, such as the multi-system nation, may be vague
and not totally applicable, they provide some level of satisfaction and
in this way concepts serve a purpose. In the development of concepts
in human knowledge, concepts are often a result of trying to interpret
reality, or they are developed to create a reality. In the case of the
"multi-system nation," the term is a calling for concept to describe
and to prescribe a reality, and this is done to 'soothe the nerve of
those who have to live with the reality.'
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The task of the scholar, in turn, is to find out how concepts can be
developed to explain the reality; with the new concepts such as the
"multi-system nation." New rules can be advanced to regulate the
relationship between the different parts of the multi-system nation
on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other. Conventional
19th century laws of recognition provide for only three entities: the
state, belligerents, and insurgents. Movements between these three
entities were usually rapid. Since the multi-system nation is now
almost a permanent feature of the international system, this 19th
century law has become obsolete. Nevertheless, some governments
still apply it. The Non-communist side of the multi-system nations
had played the zero-sum game by applying the 19th century law and
eventually became the victims of a policy which they originally
advocated.
Despite the fact that most likely the multi-system nations will
continue to exist that neither side wishes the division to be
permanent, and that there are many legal complexities involved in
their interactions with other nations, governments and scholars have
failed to develop rules of international law to handle the multisystem nations on legal basis. In trying to accommodate on one-by-one
basis, many problems have arisen. There is a need, therefore, for
deep-thinking and communication on the part of political scientists,
and legal scholars, and policy-makers.
Without legal meaning, substantive relationships are useful,
practical, but unstable, thus the more powerful side of the multisystem nations access to pressurizing the other side and thus
achieving purposes which they could not achieve short of the use of
force. The communist side is playing this game in the case of China.
In short, these states are using the obsolete 19th century law of
recognition as an instrument to achieve aims which otherwise could
not be achieved without using arms. Similarly, to play down the
importance of legal recognition is to overlook the fact that nationals
of a system which is not recognized sometimes receive less protections
and privilege than stateless persons in the international societies.
The key point here is to separate the problem of recognition of
multi-system nations from that of unification. Other nations should
recognize all parts of a multi-system nations, neither recognizing nor
denying their respective sovereignty chains. The problem of unification should left to the various parts of multi-system nations
themselves.
The Republic of China will rely upon the teachings of Dr. Sun
Yat-Sen as a major means of reunifying China. The Republic of
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China is willing to improve its relations with the countries of the
world, so long as any of the following points are not required as
pre-conditions:
• renunciation of Republic of China's claim to mainland China;
• request of the Republic of China declare independence of
Taiwan; and
• forced negotiation with the mainland.

Stephen Guest
A number of diversifications of interests and interpretations
have arisen during the course of this Conference. It must, however,
be possible for there to be some sort of conceptual apparatus upon
which most of us can agree and for which we must seek in order to
solve the general problem.
Principles for such a framework can be extrapolated from the
situation that arose in Rhodesia when it attempted to depart from
certain principles of the United Kingdom constitutional law in 1965.
After the Ian Smith government deClared itself no longer constrained
by the principles of the United Kingdom 1961 Constitution originally
in force, the U.K. government held the actions of the Smith
government to be void. The case is similar to the situation of Taiwan
and mainland China in that a state declares that there is no existing
law in a territorial entity purportedly part of that state but claiming
its own constitutional sovereignty.
After a series of important test cases, it was finally decided by
Rhodesian judges appointed by the U.K. soverign that the Smith
government was the de jure government. The principles or doctrines
used in arriving at this decision were three in number.
•
The first principle was what could be called the historical
doctrine (or, the "nothing succeeds like success" doctrine). This
doctrine was based upon the fact that historically, de facto governments do "ripen" into de jure governments. An established government, effective in the executive and legislative spheres, is a
government which should justifiably be recognized.
The second principle was the necessity doctrine. This doctrine
states that even though a revolutionary government is revolutionary,
recognition should be granted because that government exercises
power over a territorially integral population, thereby preventing
chaos or civil war.
The third principle is the international doctrine. Simply stated,
this asserts that the government and the territorial entity over which
it exercises its control should be accorded recognition if there is a

OVERALL EvALUATION CHINA

181

government in effective control of a state as defined by the
international legal criteria of statehood.
The first doctrine can be countered by the argument that merely
because a government succeeds does not necessarily indicate the
justice of its success or the merit of its claims. To put it another way,
the might of the government does not make it right. Such a doctrine
could encourage revolutionaries to take power with the knowledge
that validity would be accorded to their acts.
The third doctrine was untenable for a number of reasons, not
the least being that no one would recognize Rhodesia as a state. It is
my view that the second is the important one and the one most
relevant to Taiwan.
The second argument enabled the judges to fill the "vacuum"
created by the position of the United Kingdom legislature. This
vacuum supposedly arose at least in spurious legal theory from the
simple denial that law existed over a sizeable and a territorially
integral population.
From these cases a general principle of jurisprudence may be
proposed. Except in war, a principle of civil necessity may justify a
means of acting towards effective but politically unrecognized
governments. One could in some respects politically ignore a country
(to use an ideologically neutral term), but allow certain if not most of
its government's acts to be accorded some measure of recognition.
Finally, the major problem of this proposal for a dual system of
recognition of countries such as Taiwan must !>e stated. How should
we distinguish between those acts which we may recognize in the
dual recognition context and those which we may not? For example,
should it be commercial, economic, civil and administrative acts that
are given pre-eminent recognition as opposed to governmental acts of
a purely political nature?

Ko Swan Sik
I will offer some remarks on how far the facts as they are known
fit into the framework of present international law, and to what
extent new legal constructions would be needed.
We must examine the framework of international law as it
applies to multi-system nations in terms of recognition and nonrecognition. Since World War II, the role of the institution of
recognition has decreased and eroded very much. Is it possible, then,
to continue relations between non-recognized entities and third states
on an ad hoc basis rather than in accordance with traditional rules?
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Any innovation in international law in this respect is found in
the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act serves to undo the consequences of
de-recognition while striving to bring about preferable consequences.
In addressing the application of the German model to the China
case, one should ask how far the German model can be applied. The
important thing is the desire for re-unification. If there is a will for
re-unification then traditional legal structures will not be very
important.
During the course of the Conference reference was made to
article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter. Could not the prohibition
of force referred to in article 2, paragraph 4 be combined with some
type of guarantee by an international organization? Such a guarantee
would eliminate the danger of the use of force between the ROC and
the PRC, thereby allowing the development of peaceful relations
between both parties - relations which could lead to future
re-unification.
The issue of self-determination can only be understood in terms
of international law within a specific stage of development. Selfdetermination was recognized after World War II in the framework of
decolonization. It has not been recognized until now for secessionist
movements or minority independence movements. Therefore, it is
doubtful that the principle of self-determination could be applied to
Taiwan. At any rate, we cannot speak of self-determination for
Taiwan as long as it does not want to be a separate state of
international law.
It has been stated at this Conference that reunification is not
necessarily a solution and that normalization need not be synonymous with unification. This is a reasonable position, for to maintain
the contrary would be to encourage us to strive for something which
may not be possible in the foreseeable future.
The application of traditional legal institutions has proven to be
only partially significant to cover reality. We have not come far
enough to say what new legal institutions have been developed and
should be applied.

APPENDICES
1. DIVIDED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:

Political Reality and Legal Practice

Yung Wei*
The purpose of this brief essay is to review the current status of
various divided states under international law in the light of a
world-wide appraisal of Institutions for the realization of human
dignity. It consists of three parts; the first part deals with the
existence of divided nations, or multi-state nations, as one of the
constant features of the international relations today. The second
part examines the problem concerning the recognition and representation of divided nations in their interactions with other states.
Finally, in the last part of the paper, an agenda for systematic
development of codes of behavior to be adopted by the states of the
world to deal with the complex problems of the legal states of the
divided nations is proposed.
The views expressed here in this paper represent those of the
author as an independent scholar, not the institutions he associates
with.
I.
One of the major legacies of the Second World War was the
creation of the divided nation: East and West Germany, North and
South Korea, North and South Vietnam, and mainland China and
the Republic of China on Taiwan. With the exception of the two
Vietnams, which were unified after the Indochina War, other divided
nations continue to be competing political systems within a territorial and cultural sphere which is considered by all parties involved as
being a single "nation".
There are, however, different patterns in the relations between
the different parts of divided nations and between members of a
particular set of divided nations and other states. The two Germanys
have somewhat "resolved" their problems, or to put it more accurately, reduced their mutual hostilities, which has led to: (1) the
exchanges of representatives between Berlin and Bonn; (2) dual
recognization of the two Germanys by other states; (3) dual repre-

* Delivered at the Panel on "The Legal Status of Divided States," Annual
Convention of International Studies Association, St. Louis, Missouri, USA. March
16-20, 1977. The contents of the paper represents the opinions of the author as a
scholar of international relations, not of the institutions that he is associated with.
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sentation of both Germanys in the diplomatic corp of other states;
and, (4) membership for both East and West Germany in the United
Nations.
The situation between mainland China and the Repubic of China
(ROC) represents the opposite end of the German arrangements. Here
we find that there is virtually no interaction between two systems.
Both political systems claim to be the sole legitimate government of
China, and insisted that they oppose the division of China into two
legal entities. In October, 1971 the Republic of China withdrew from
the United Nations after the "important issue" resolution was
defeated in the U.N. General Assembly. Since then mainland China
has been the sole delegation representing China in the United Nations
In addition to their victory in the U.N., the Chinese Communists also
made substantive advances in their efforts to replace the Chinese
Nationlists as the only recognized government of China in the
capitals of more than one hundred nations of the world, leaving the
ROC recognized by only 23 nations.
The case of the two Koreas falls in between the two Germanys
and two Chinas. Thus far, North and South Korea have not formally
recognized each other. But a North-South dialogue has been maintained since July 1972. The "detente" between the two Koreas has
not reduced significantly the hostility between the two Korean
political systems. It did, however, lead to dual recognition and dual
representation of the two Korean governments in a number of
countries. Today, the leaders of both North and South Korea are still
talking about national unification of the Korean nation, but short of
a war, the future trend clearly points to co-existence of two political
systems in the Korea peninsula.

II.
The continuing existence of divided nations creates unique
problem for international law. According to conventional international law, there are three types of international personalities: states,
belligerents and insurgents. Judging by the criteria specified in
international law, political systems in the divided nations fall
between a "state" and a "belligerent". In terms of the qualifications of
a state- such as a government, a territory under effective control by
that government, and the ability of that government to carry out
international obligations- almost all the systems within the divided
nations qualify for the status of that of a state. Yet confrontation
between various parts of divided nations in political, economic and
sometimes military arenas, plus the impact of East-West bloc politics,
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have prevented a full recognition of all parts of a divided nation by
other states.
Other than mutual hostility and cold war situation, another
element which has prevented multiple recognition and multiple
representation of the divided nations, or multi-state nations, has been
the problem of overlapping claims over sovereignty and territorial
control. By "overlapping claims", it is meant that various systems of
a divided nation make claims that they represent not only the people
and the territories which are under their effective control, but also
the part of a divided state which they do not control. Consequently,
diplomatic recognition and representation for the divided nation have
become a "zero-sum game" in which other states are compelled to
choose one of the political systems of a divided nation as the only
legitimate government of all the territory of that nation despite the
fact that it controls only a part of it.
The German solution actually amounts to the creation of two
separate states. The Korean situation seems to be moving toward the
German model. Before mainland China's entrance into the United
Nations in 1971, the ROC had been the beneficiary of the "zero-sum
game," with the majority of states recognizing only the government
in Taipei. Since 1971, however, Peking has fully utilized conventional
international law to gain diplomatic recognition at the expense of
Taipei.
The lack of diplomatic recognition has definitely generated
various kinds of difficulties and inconvenience for the government
and the people of the ROC. For instance, the absence of diplomatic
ties between the ROC and other nations often has prevented, or made
it quite inconvenient for, the nationals of the ROC to travel to other
nations. A notable example was the failure of the ROC athletes to
compete in the 1976 Olympic games in Canada.
Clearly, the Chinese Communist leaders in Peking are trying
their best to bring about total diplomatic isolation for Taipei. Lacking
the ability to take Taiwan militarily, the Chinese Communists
endeavor to subdue Taiwan through diplomatic maneuvers, hoping
that increasing isolation of the ROC in the world community will
produce enough discouragement and defeatism in Taiwan so that
they can take the Island without the use of force. Thus far, Peking's
strategy has not worked. The government and people of the ROC
demonstrated extraordinary tenacity and resilience in resisting the
Chinese Communist threat and in preventing complete isolation.
Many innovative arrangements have been made by the ROC with or
without the explicit endorsement of foreign governments, including
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para-diplomatic representation in foreign capitals to facilitate trade
and travel. Nevertheless, the lack of formal ties with other countries
bothers the people of the ROC. The possibility that the United States
may recognize mainland China at the expense of the ROC, without
question, is a primary concern for the people of the ROC. Both the
government and the people of the ROC are trying their best to
prevent a breaking of ties between the United States and the ROC.

III.
The foregoing analysis reveals the complexity of the problems of
the status of the divided nations under international law. Clearly, it
is a situation that calls for innovative ideas and practical remedies.
We should realize that the problem of recognition and representation
of the divided nations can be very dangerous and disruptive to the
maintenance of peace in the international system. First of all, there
is a disproportionately large number of armed forces in the divided
nations. Second, one part of a divided nation, mainland China,
already has nuclear weapons; and three other divided states, West
Germany, the ROC and South Korea, all have considerable nuclear
capability. A hot war resulting from fierce diplomatic competition
between the divided states could easily involve the big powers and
lead to a global conflict. In order to prevent this from happening, I
would like to suggest that we add a chapter or at least a paragraph in
international law which would include the following points:
1. International law should be a stabilizing, not a disstabilizing,
factor in international relations.
2. International law should not be used as an instrument to
achieve purposes which cannot be achieved short of the use of force.
3. Recognition and representation of the divided states should
not be a zero-sum game, i.e., other states should not be forced to
recognize only one of the systems in a divided nation and accept its
claim over all the territories of a nation, including those which it does
not control.
4. The third state should recognize all systems in a divided
nation without recognizing their claims beyond the territories under
effective control yet without denying those claims either.
5. All third states should not take a position on the question of
unification of the divided nations, neither forcing nor preventing the
unification of the different parts of a divided nation into one single
state.
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6. The principle of multiple recognition of the divided states
should also extend to multiple representation of the divided states in
the United Nations and in all international organizations.
One may challenge the above-mentioned proposals by arguing
that they are impractical because it does not correspond with the
"realpolitik" of international relations. The fact is that even for
highly mutually hostile systems, accommodations have been made to
ensure certain extent of representation of the divided states which
are not formally recognized by a third state. For instance, Taipei has
an Embassy in Washington, D.C., whereas Peking has a liaison office
there. In the case of Japan, the situation is reversed, with Peking
having an embassy and Taipei having an office similar to that of the
liaison office of Peking in Washington.
This is not to say that the divided states have accepted multiple
recognition. The key word here is tolerance, not acceptance! For
example, the Chinese Communists may not like the idea of a Chinese
Nationalist Embassy in the U.S.A. while it only has a liaison office in
Washington D.C. By the same token, Chinese Nationalists have not
accepted the Chinese Communist liaison office in Washington, D.C.
But for apparent practical reasons, they nevertheless tolerated the
diplomatic representation of the other side.
Consequently, what we have today in regard to the recognition of
the divided states is a series of creative accommodations to political
reality, though without legal meaning. This naturally cannot be a
satisfactory arrangement. For it leads to constant juggling of
positions between the divided states in regard to recognition by the
third states - a situation which is not stable and therefore can be the
source of future conflicts. In sum, the current practice and norms
concerning the status of the divided states is clearly inadequate. This
is a problem which awaits a solution so that international law will be
able to cope with existing reality and will function as an instrument
for peaceful transition, and not a factor which may contribute to
violent change.
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2.

BASIC FACTS CONCERNING TWO CHINAS,
TWO KOREAS AND TWO GERMANYS

Population
Density
Area
Education

Literacy
Life Expectancy

People's Republic
of China
(PRC-Mainland)
1 billion
270 per sq. mile
3,691,502 sq. miles (not
including Taiwan)
5 years compulsory
education 0.1% of
population are college
students
over 50%
61

Work Force

560 million
Agriculture 85%
Industrial & Service
15%

GNP
PerCapitaGNP

581 billion (1980)
$234.50 (1980)

Growth rate

(1957-78) 6.5% (1980)
4.5%
(1980) 19.3 billion export
20.1 billion import
72.8 billion (based on
Beijing Review, September 29, 1980, pp. 11-12.
In 1979 PRC's Revenue
was 110.33 billion yuan
(68.96 billion U.S.) and
Expenditure was 127.39
billion yuan (79.62 billion U.S.) with about
17.03 billion yuan deficit (10.66 billion U.S.)

Trade

Budget

Republic of China
(ROC-Taiwan)
18 million
1212 per sq. mile
14,000 sq. miles
9 years

compulsory
education 1.8% of
population are college
students
89%
72 (World Bank, World
Development Report,
1979, p. 167)
7.6 million
Agriculture 34%
Industry & Service 37%
Transportation & Commerce 29%
40.3 billion (1980)
$2200 (adjusted for
1980)
(1970-78) 9.1% (1980)
6.7%
(1979) 19.80 billion export
19.78 billion import
5.94 billion
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Defense
Living Standard
Calories per
day
Protein per
day
Living Space
Electricity
Television

People's Republic
of China
(PRC-Mainland)

Republic of China
(ROC-Taiwan)

8.5% GNP (1978 estimate)

9.2 of GNP (1978 estimate)

1800

2845

35 gram

79 gram

39.24 square foot per
person
292.3 unit
31 per 10000

184.68 square foot per
person
2192.8 unit
1858 per 10000

Sources: Based primarily upon
1. June 1981 State Department Background Notes on China.
2. July 1980 State Department Background Notes on Taiwan.
3. Living standard based on various official sources released by the PRC and the
ROC.
4. International Monetary Fund Report and U.S. Government Data.

North Korea
Population
19,627,000 (1980)
Density
142 per sq. k. (1978)
Area
47,000 sq. m.
Education
11 years compulsory
Literacy
90%
Life
M: 58.80, F: 62.50
Expectancy
6.1 million (1980)
Work force
GNP
$14.1 billion (1979)
Per Capita GNP $750 (1979)
Growth rate
7.2% (1978 est.)
estimate of defense
Defense
budget ending 12/79 is
$2.9 billion or 15.2% of
total budget.
total budget.

South Korea
38,197,000 (1980)
376 per sq. k. (1978)
38,400 sq. m.
6 years compulsory
90%
M: 63, F: 67
14.5 million (1980)
$60.1 Billion (1979)
$1600 (1979)
10% (1979 est.)
defense budget ending
12/81 is $4.4 billion or
37% of total budget
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Trade

Budget

North Korea
1979
E: $1,320 million
I: $1,300 million
$8.10 billion (1979)

East Germany: GDR
Population
(1981) 16,759,000
Density
(1978) 155 per square
kilometer
Area
41,601 s.m.
Education
10 grades compulsory
Literacy
99%
Life Expectancy M: 68.5 F: 74.19
Work force
(1981) 8.9 million
Agriculture
11.9%

Per Capita
Income
Growth rate
Trade
Budget

Defense
Living Standard
Calories per
day:
Electricity
produced:
Protein per
day:
Living space
Televisions
GNP

Industry & Commerce
42.5%
16.8%
Service
$5,310

South Korea
1979:
15.1 billion :E
20.3 billion :I
$10.524 billion (1980)
West Germany: FRG
(1981) 61,388,000
(1978) 24 7 per square
kilometer
95,975 s.m.
9-10 grades compulsory
99%
M: 67.2 F: 73.4
27 million
Industry &
Commerce 48%
6%
Agriculture
25%
Service
10%
Government
$12,500

(1979) 2.3%
E: $17.3 billion
I: $19.2 billion
(1979) in million DDR M
R: 140,633
E: 148,223
8.9% of total GMP (1978)
or $3.8 billion

(1978) 3.4%
E: $172 billion
I: $160 billion
(1980) in M OM
R: 189,773
E: 214,480
3% of GNP (1979 est.)

3,000 per capita

2.980 per capita

5,780 per capita kWh

6,100 per capita kWh

(1979) 5,634,000
$89.1 billion (1979) ($)

(1979) 19,421,539
$766.1 billion (1979) ($)
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